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Forfatter(e) | Author(s):

Gellina, Arnliot.; by Arnliot Gellina [i.e. Oscar Patrick Sturzen-Becker] ; translated from the Swedish original by an English Scandinavian [i.e. George Stephens].

Titel | Title:

The Scandinavian question : practical reflections

Udgivet år og sted | Publication time and place:

London : John Russell Smith, 1857

Fysiske størrelse | Physical extent:

49 s.


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THE
SCANDINAVIAN QUESTION.

PRACTICAL REFLECTIONS

BY

ARNLIOT GELLINA.

~~~~~  
Att se tillbaka, är nyttigt.  
Att se framåt, är nödvändigt.  
[*To look back, is useful.*  
*To look ahead, is necessary.*]

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TRANSLATED FROM THE SWEDISH ORIGINAL

BY

AN ENGLISH SCANDINAVIAN.

LONDON:
JOHN RUSSELL SMITH, 36, SOHO SQUARE.

M.DCCC.LVII.

Price One Shilling.

31, - 230, - 8°



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TO THE READER.

THIS most interesting and well-timed pamphlet (rumoured to be "half-official") has just appeared in Stockholm, from the pen of an anonymous writer.

It concerns ourselves, as much as our Scandinavian brethren.

They demand permission to *live*, and to live *free*, and to live *united* that they may be able to defend their lives and freedom. They object to being swallowed up by Muscovy or Germany, the Cossack or the Bund. *We* must earnestly pray for, and assist the formation of, a Northern State able to protect our own shores, strong enough to become a barrier and bulwark for our own liberties. We cannot always have fleets and armies in the Baltic, to resist and watch the pressure of Russia upon these noble Scandinavian lands: Our cousins offer to become our coastguard *at their own expense*.

Shall the wiles of a tortuous, heartless, bat-blind diplomacy once more entangle and confound this great consummation?

We trow not.

Our countrymen are daily becoming more alive to the

truth, that "foreign policy" has been too long neglected by them, and must be most narrowly watched, as being intimately interwoven with our "home affairs." Sham or wicked wars, and sham or wicked peaces, are "domestic policy" with a vengeance, and are daily felt by all of us in our honour, our safety, and our purses.

A word or two of explanation here and there, deemed necessary for an English reader and included within brackets [], has been added by

THE TRANSLATOR.

THE SCANDINAVIAN QUESTION.

CHAPTER I.

NOT very many years ago, it was remarked concerning *Scandinavianism*, that although, perhaps, "the Utopia of the moment," it was "the axiom of the future." This "future" would appear to be drawing nigh much more rapidly than could have been expected, when this observation was made. It may be confidently asserted, that no political question in modern times has developed itself with such mathematical progression as the Scandinavian. It may so far be likened to certain plants, which require a comparatively long period to shoot into bud, but only a few hours for the bud to unfold itself into a rich and perfect flower.

In this respect, it is interesting to sketch a short comparison of the Former, the Late, and Now. Only about fifteen years have elapsed since the students of the Northern Universities revived the Scandinavian idea as their own, and gave it a general impulse such as it had not enjoyed at earlier periods. Within these scarcely fifteen years, what surprising changes, what enormous advances!

We all of us remember somewhat of the unfavourable circumstances against which the Scandinavian movement had to contend at the beginning of this its latest appearance. It was declared heretical; in Denmark it was met, at every step, by the preventive attentions of the police, or the categorical veto of the "higher policy"; among ourselves [in Sweden] it was regarded, by persons in authority, with a nervous suspicion and secret disquiet. The Danish Scandinavian Society—first smothered in its cradle when, in 1843, some of the young Upsala-pilgrims attempted to found some such institution, although afterwards most graciously allowed to exist on several of the older and most distinguished of the University pro-

fessors adopting it as their own, and giving their honour and guarantee as a pledge—was from the very commencement under the especial surveillance of the police, somewhat like a man beforehand registered *to be* criminal. Nay, when ORLA LEHMANN a [distinguished Danish jurist and publicist, in 1848 nominated Minister, now Lord Lieutenant of Vejle] and a couple of other speakers, at the festival in the Riding-house [in Copenhagen] to the Swedish students, with somewhat greater boldness touched the Scandinavian string, the [Danish] Attorney-General thought it his bounden duty to prosecute, even unto the stake and wheel, to drawing and quartering, as for high treason. [He was condemned to three months' imprisonment.] As long as "these Scandinavians" confined themselves to pious wishes in a merely *social* spirit, to cautious expressions about spiritual kinsmanship, and described as their object an esthetical and agreeable intercourse between the Northern nations, the authorities condescended to be "rather gracious than severe." And yet, in the eyes of the panic-stricken, even the laurel-wreath which TEGNER placed on the brows of OEHLENSCHLAGER was not without great danger. But when any one was so imprudent as to whisper a word of politics—about interests in common other than literary, about oneness and a stricter confederation—the long-trying patience of the Government came to an end, and the sword was bared to meet and avenge so wicked an attack against the right divine of things as they are. "Caveant consules," cried they; "ne quid detrimenti capiat respublica!"

But this deep suspicion of the loyalty of the Scandinavian idea, this dread of any political breaker rushing up from this quarter, was not confined to the other side of the Sound. The Danish students, after their first Upsala-expedition in 1843, had scarcely returned home, when fright for "the young Scandinavia" here also broke out in the Conservative press of that day, a beginning being made by certain "prompted" articles, protesting against any political interpretation of these student-visits, in the columns of the *Svenska Minerva*. We have not forgotten the logical severity in the pages of this organ, "clearly to prove" that nothing could be more "absurd" than the accomplishment of a general Scandinavian Union, or, in fact, "more unfortunate" and "entirely destructive," *if* (which Heaven forefend!) any such event could take place. But the *Svenska Minerva* comforted itself, meanwhile, with the per-

suasion that any such confederation was for all time altogether *impossible*, for the very simple reason, that “the several European dynasties would never permit an act which would give the world a *Ruling House less*”!

We have amused ourselves by quoting these expressions from a journal of 1843, in its day favoured with many intimate relationships, for the sake of comparing it with what in 1857 is, so to speak, the standing theme of the whole Scandinavian press, in so far as it claims to represent any serious policy, or to serve general patriotic interests. From being regarded even as a theoretic impossibility, as only an aërial fantasy, the Scandinavian Union-idea has suddenly advanced to become the theme of all Northern discussion, and, in the most different quarters, is acknowledged to contain not only much of the most practical significance, but to be so important as to be, in parliamentary language, “urgent.” What was proclaimed unfeasible *à priori* fifteen years ago, is now—an eventuality.

In Denmark, the ever since 1848 unfettered word [the Liberty of the Press]—a freedom far older among ourselves and our brethren across the western hills [the Norwegians]—has given a surprising bound to this development. Scandinavianism has no longer thought it needful to disguise itself in the trailing domino of esthetical pretexts, and the pious mask of “poetical anthologies”; it has marched boldly forth as the political shield-may of the future. In Norway and our own country, the distant effects of the last war have undoubtedly exercised a mediate but not unimportant influence in the same direction, so as to push on and simplify the Scandinavian question. Through the high play carried on at our very doors, through the sudden daybreak which for a moment, like a broad flash, showed us the whole threatening possibility of fated entanglements for our own lands within a not distant period, the public mind has necessarily been impressed with a solemn seriousness, and a wish, before it is too late, to look around and to eye the future. We believe, even, that not improbably our Royal House has felt the same influences, and has been induced to make a change in its foreign policy, *pari passu*, with the same inward reasons which have alarmed our populations to a greater consciousness and preparation for what may come.

We have thus seen *political* Scandinavianism, by degrees

more and more openly and *sans phrase*, pronounced in the press of the three Scandinavian states—we would particularly point out the article, which, at the moment, excited such considerable and just attention among a very large circle, printed two years ago in the *Christiania-Posten*, and which shortly after (June 13, 1855) was echoed in a not less emphatic declaration (“Den Nordiske Union” [the Northern Union]) in the Danish paper, *Fædrelandet*—while, at the same time, the two Kings of the North have, in the most frank and fearless language, given a kind of formal sanction to these pointed expressions of public opinion. What, only a few years back, was esteemed an impropriety, or even a crime, has thus been acknowledged as a right, a fully loyal labour. As we see, the “paradox” is becoming the “axiom,” which is the sentiment wherewith we ushered in these pages.

But not Northern journals alone are occupied with the Scandinavian question, from a purely political point of view. The Foreign Press, also, has become almost equally imbued with its importance. Scarcely a week goes by that we do not see, in some French or English paper, an article on Scandinavianism and subjects belonging thereto. Even in Germany, it can no longer be denied that there is something more in this movement than a “student-demonstration”; and, however frequently the Russian *Le Nord* may assure us that Scandinavianism only “exists in the excited brains of some *dreamers*,” perhaps the Russian statesmen themselves, when all comes to all, are those who *least* believe their own asseverations.

In this way, “the Scandinavian Question” may be pronounced already European. It will become so more and more every day, and must attract the attention and interest of Europe instead of “the Oriental.”

Under these circumstances, we esteem it above all of weight, to make clear to ourselves and solidly construct the contents of this question. Events are thickening around us, and we cannot read to-morrow’s historical scroll. In all political changes, it is of the last importance not to be surprised, to be beforehand tolerably familiar with not only the situation as it evidently *will* be, but also as it evidently *may* be. It is true that, with reference hereto, there is very much about which the Scandinavian lands are already agreed by instinct, sympathy, direct feeling, if not by strictly conscious and concrete consideration. But there is also much about which our views

are unfixed, our ideas only tentative, our plans rather well-meaning than well-grounded. We wish, in the following remarks, to give some hints and guidance towards forming a firm and detailed independent and clear public opinion. We have no claims beyond an attempt; but we would willingly have our solemn assurance believed, that we here speak words sprung from a patriotic heart, and with no other motives than those suggested by our own immediate political future; although, it is true, the interests of *Sweden* are here identical with those of the whole *North*.

CHAPTER II.

SCANDINAVIANISM is root and branch *a national idea, a national movement, a national necessity*. This is our threshold, this our text. Only as such hath it its great historical significance, right, and future.

If we glance backward at past and fargone ages, we shall find Scandinavianism breaking out again and again, like a kind of political law of nature, in the one or other of the three Northern lands—opposed often by contrary forces, but never annihilated—mostly as yet dim and unformed, but always to be recognised. Like the Northern summer struggling in successive and long spring-throes with winter's grasp, the Scandinavian idea has battled—for centuries, it is true, not weeks or months—with malignant elements, but it has never failed, never been broken. Out of the fight shall one day come victorious the Historical Genius of the Northern Folk-lands, crowned with the phoenix-plume of one great collected national triumph. As every other honest energy, this labour also, this toilsome effort in the heat and burden of the day, shall have its reward—its blooming Midsummer!

The oldest chronicles of the Scandinavian North show us, during a long period, properly only *one* nationality ruling over this our "ultima Thule," from the heights of the midnight sun to the Eider, but whose expansive force stretched "three pair of arms" over the most diverse parts of the rest of Europe. After this passed a period, also very long, when we see the painful spectacle of this union gradually sundered, this whole broken up. It was the dynasties which became consolidated, the feudal interests which became organised and swung themselves over the people, they finding needful the policy, "divide to conquer." But so tough was each link in this Scandinavian chain, that the process of disruption was most difficult, the resistance often desperate. Almost each moment, the quicksilver drops were ready to run together again. This actually did take place in 1397 [the Kalmar Union].

Queen MARGARET'S work, the Kalmar Union, has not yet,

in our opinion, found an historian impartial and free from previous tradition. GEIJER [the great Swedish historian], who, as we all know, was not without paradoxes, though even these were full of genius, let fall a word which has become a hobby for all those who see in that great confederation only the misfortunes which it doubtless produced, especially for Sweden. He called it "an event which looked like a thought," and this has been repeated oracularly and *ad nauseam*. But it may be doubted whether his expression might not be reversed—as in fact, if we remember rightly, was actually done by the Danish publicist PLOUG, during the last Upsala-expedition, in his speech [to the assembled thousands of Scandinavian students], when he stood on ODIN'S How [Odin's or Woden's Cairn, near Upsala]. Indeed, this *mot* of our great historian is rather effect-seeking than truthful, and we would much rather say, it was "a thought which appeared an event." The union of the three Northern crowns on one head seemed perhaps chance-work, or dynastic accident, but it was the great Scandinavian Union-idea at the bottom of the whole which gave motive to the act and a soul to the shape. It was something more than dynastic personal ambition which dictated these words in the Act of Union:—

"Oc skulæ alle thry koningxriken i en samdirect och kerlich blifue oc wæræ, suo at engte et scal sich fran thet annet draghe met noken twæ-drecht eller syndran. Utan huat thet enæ upa gar, entich met orlogh eller met andre utlensche manna anfæktan, thet scal thom upa ga alle thry, oc huort thera annet behelpelicht wæræ met al troscap oc al macht." *

[*And shall all three kingdoms continue to be in one union and love, so that the one shall not draw from the other with any disunion or separation. But what happeneth to the one, either by war or by any other assault of outlandish men, THE SAME SHALL HAPPEN TO THEM ALL THREE, and each of them shall help the other with all truefastness and all might.*]

This clearly expresses the thought, not only to melt three crowns into one, but once more closely to unite three races separated "*injuria temporum*," and to declare the solidarity of common interests and of an original brotherhood between the three nations.

The reason why the Union fell to pieces must not be sought

* [This whole document, Queen Margaret's Act of Union, Kalmar, July 20, 1397, is for the first time printed *from the original MS.* in BRANDT'S *Gammel-dansk Læsebog* (Old Danish Reading-book), Kiöbenhavn, 1857, pp. 81-85.]

in the *principle*, which was good and right, nor in its *object*, which was the offspring of a natural tendency and was guaranteed by the attraction of kinsmanship; it lay in the *form* adopted, which was radically mistaken and unfortunate. The seed of the evil was "the elective kingdom," and it shot rapidly up, because, if there were any freedom of choice, it was only within a circle of candidates from "the great fatherland" [Germany], which, even at this early period, was to be the cradle of so much misfortune to the North. The consequences exhibited themselves in the frequent schisms which occurred in the very first years; and the situation soon became, as it is expressed by LALLERSTEDT (in his *Scandinavia, its Hopes and Fears*)—"the Union was no longer a free compact of three kindred nations, but a common dependence under a common yoke." Specially as regards our own country, these foreign German youngers succeeded in gradually associating with themselves the Danish youngers, for the common purpose of treating Sweden as a conquered province, instead of a united brother-land. Successive crises brought things to such a head, that nothing was left but the most pressing necessity for Sweden to free itself from an unbearable tyranny—for such had that form of government become, which had been intended to serve as a "stadhelich och ubrydelich sæmye, fridh och forbinding" [fast and unbroken agreement, peace, and union] between the three peoples. GUSTAF VASA became this *deliverer*; but with him was this Scandinavian oneness again definitely suspended for many generations.

The whole following history of the North is only one repeated and re-echoed—"the sins of kings are the scourge of their peoples." The policy with respect to the relative situation of the three kingdoms which resulted from the 8th of November, 1520 [the massacre in Stockholm, by CHRISTIAN II.], and the 7th of June, 1523 [GUSTAF VASA's election as King of Sweden], was one of bitterness, ill-will, and revenge. One can easily understand that this should so be, but we may also be allowed to lament it. Above all, we are justified in regretting that, for so long a period, no Northern statesman had an eye to see how poor the contest is where we can only wound and exhaust each other for the benefit of a third party, or calmness enough to perceive that *that* statecraft is wiser—we will not speak of its being far nobler also—which builds on what is common

and essential in nationalities, instead of on what is unnatural and inharmonious. The Vasa-house has the lasting and great glory of having rescued the independence of the country, and waked the nation to new life, in a moment of deep degradation; but, as well as the Oldenburg family, it has also on its conscience the stretching of its inimical policy far beyond the limit justified by the occasion, and the using as a tool, and for interests seldom or never really popular, that angriness of feeling which unhappy events had produced and left behind them, but which, in leech-phrase, would soon have died away "if Nature had been left to herself."

During this whole period, when the Scandinavian nations were continually pitted against each other in mortal strife by their several monarchs, often for the most beggarly and ridiculous dynastic objects, we have abundant instances of the secret protest of nationality against such perpetual fratricide. Among the numerous stone-heaps and crosses which yet mark, in the old border provinces, the spots where Danes and Swedes mingled blood in mutual battle, tradition clings to accounts of the "bonde-frid" [yeoman-peace] which was so often made, on their own account, between the Danish and Swedish march parishes. So, it is said, before the peace of 1645, several Smoland districts on the one side made a separate settlement and agreement with some Bleking parishes on the other, to live in harmony and friendship together, like good neighbours, let the kings fight as they would. And again, in 1657, the vicars of Fridlestad in Bleking and of Wissefjerda in Smoland drew up, in behalf of their respective yeomen and parishes, an agreement to live as friends and brothers during the disputes carried on by the dynasties. But the grand question of quartering three crowns in their arms, or of owning a petty strip of land more or less, was of far more weight in the eyes of the Vasa kings than any "bonde-frid"; and that theirs was a brother-war they forgot, so strong grew the habit, till at last they did not know that it was so. GUSTAF II. ADOLF seems for a moment to have had a shadowy sense of it—but that was all.

As to the possibilities which time after time offered, in spite of both natural and artificial hindrances, for restoring the broken bonds of fellowship, perhaps some will dwell on the year 1660 [Carl X.'s attempt to conquer Denmark]. For our

part, we lay no great stress on this whole episode; not because it was an "event" which never took place, but—to judge from the Swedishizing of Skone—because it might well have happened, if CARL GUSTAF had succeeded in his attack on Copenhagen, and really taken all Denmark "in a lump," that the same radical system would have been followed there, and Denmark thus have been *incorporated* instead of *united*. Of quite a different character was the remarkable movement in Sweden, in 1742 and 1743. However viewed, and whatever the part played by the Danish Minister GRÜNER in this transaction, certain it is that it would have been impossible to bring whole provinces—and not a few of them—to rise almost as one man in favour of a Danish prince (afterwards FREDERICK V.), as designated successor to the Vasa crown, unless there had been beforehand in the nation a strong tendency to what we now call Scandinavian principles. And one thing in this whole chapter is peculiar and surprising, that it was just those same Dalecarlians who of yore had holpen GUSTAF VASA to drive out the Danes and break up the Union, who now with clamorous "zeal and tumult" (as it is expressed in the official account of the "Dale-dance") demanded the Danish crown-prince as their future king, and allowed themselves for this their "Scandinavianism" to be shot down in Norrmalm Square [in Stockholm].

We do not believe that GUSTAVUS III.'s inclination, for a time (in 1788), to a more intimate union between Denmark and Sweden, is worthy any particular mention. This monarch was full of fantasies, but they were mostly only for the day, and were rather the fruit of caprice than conviction. But it must be confessed, that after this period the idea not only of a Scandinavian Alliance, but of a Scandinavian Union, became more and more prominent among the statesmen and thinkers of both Sweden and its sister-lands. Lately published works and details, especially on Swedish history at the close of the last and the beginning of this century, have clearly shown that the plan of a Union between Sweden and Norway on a popular basis, had been entertained long before 1814. But it is equally certain that, in the last ten years of the eighteenth century, a similar scheme for consolidating *all the three* Northern lands had been supported, at least in Denmark, in the *very highest* circles. As early as 1797 a

“Scandinavian Literary Society”* existed in Copenhagen, to whose President the then Duke of Augustenburg, on behalf of the Government, sent the remarkable letter in which he expressed the most ample acknowledgments of its activity.

The celebrated MALTE-BRUN published, about the same time, his “tendency-piece,” *Tria juncta in Uno*, and shortly after, in 1804, founded “The Colonial Association of New Scandinavia.” The distinguished Danish historian SNEEDORF, even before this, in 1792, had distinctly, in a small accidental Scandinavian Society in London, declared himself for a United Northland, so as to form a strong defensive power—“which our hills, our islands, our united fleets, our severe climate, our old love of liberty, country, and king, would make strong enough to defy the greed or jealousy of any other state.”

The Scandinavian agitation of 1808, revived in 1810, is sufficiently familiar. It was undoubtedly to a great degree dynastic, but it cannot be denied that it reposed on a national foundation; at least, it was found necessary to support these dynastic efforts by open appeals to the Public Opinion of the North. If, on the one hand, the famous Balloon-proclamations (in the winter of 1808-9) may be traced to some member of the Danish Government, it was, on the other, a purely popular feeling which dictated the warm poetic lines by HÖST and GRUNDTVIG, composed about the same time, in support of the reunion of the North by the election of FREDERICK VI. as King of Sweden. As little can it be denied that ADLERSPARRE and PLATEN in Sweden, like WEDEL-JARLSBERG in Norway and SCHIMMELMANN in Denmark, early viewed the question with the eyes of statesmen,

* It was in the Journal of this Society (*Skandinavisk Museum*, vol. i.) that [Bishop] F. M. FRANZEN inserted his beautiful poem, “SVEA to DANA,” which commences as follows:—

“Omsider, DANA, äro vi då vänner!
I nattlig strid vi ej förvillas mer;
En vaknad vishet hjelmen of oss spanner,
Och jag en syster i min ovän ser.”

[At last, then, DANA her sweet heart-friend findeth;
By night's dim strife misled no more we go;
Upwaking Wisdom War's grim helm unbindeth,
And now a sister see I in my foe.]

while they by no means neglected the popular sympathies and the weight of purely national interests. In our opinion, King FREDERICK VI. himself went far beyond pure dynasticism, when, in 1810, in his "conditions of capitulation" forwarded to ROSENSCHÖLD, he agreed, among other things in favour of the Union, to grant Denmark-Norway a constitution—a point which he had opposed with his whole absolutistic obstinacy the year before, when it was proposed to him by Prince CHRISTIAN AUGUST as "the only means of uniting the North and developing therefrom beneficial results."

This time also, as we all know, these plans for a Union fell through. But one great thing was obtained. People began *to think the matter over* much more generally and seriously than before. We now enter a new era, which we may well name that of *National Reconciliation*. Poets, scholars, and men of letters, stepped forth to familiarize the three nations with each other. The meetings of scientific bodies, the student-expeditions, the book-press, and journalism, have succeeded in restoring mutual acquaintance and esteem between three brothers who had well-nigh forgotten each other's family features. Hence has sprung a longing for *political unity*, a feeling which now advances with all the decision and distinctness of a *national demand*.

CHAPTER III.

WE have just quoted a sentence of the well-known Dansker, FREDERICK SNEEDORF, from the close of the last century. However simple and natural it now appears, the thought there expressed had required the light thrown by the teachings of several ages to stand clear at last before the gaze of an historian. Since then, it has taken half a century for it to be properly understood and acknowledged by the masses, the folks. The three Northern kingdoms, said SNEEDORF—and this is now merely the common A, B, C of all Scandinavia [eagerly supported, where it is properly understood, by the *fourth* Northern land, *England*, which will one day be formally allied or united with her three illustrious sisters]—are made to form a single *strong defensive power*, a firmly joined federative complex, ready to meet any danger which may threaten any one of its members from without, and ruled by a common policy, that of its national independence and general collective interests.

All this may be now regarded as a postulate admitted by wide circles in all the Northern kingdoms. But objections are sometimes raised, even in quarters not directly, for special private reasons, opposed to the idea. Two such we will at once discuss.

First, then :—

It cannot be denied that Sweden, during a certain period, after being gradually clipped and shorn of its over-sea possessions, became a weak power, easily liable to attack. But the union with Norway has once for all amended this fault. The Northern peninsula, rounded and limited as it now is, already forms a *strong power*, as great as it can well be, and the addition of Denmark would by no means increase its strength and security. It is not *we* who need Denmark ; it is Denmark which needs *us*. A Scandinavian Union stretched over the Sound, would therefore be a *concession* on our side, for which, properly speaking, there is no grounded political reason, at least no absolute necessity.

This is the argument of egotistical shrewdness ; but, in our opinion, it contains a coarse mistake.

One point alone in this statement is relatively true, namely, that Sweden-Norway constitutes a better-rounded whole than most of the kingdoms on the European continent. All the rest will bear no serious criticism ; and even the admitted axiom will be found, if narrowly examined, by no means to include the signification which has been given to it. With all its naturally excellent configuration, for instance, the Swedish-Norse double kingdom has more or less open coasts for thousands of miles ; an absolutely strong power, strategically considered, it therefore is not. True, within our coasts are our hills. But, though these are usually a good help and comparatively secure fortress, we must not with too much confidence and pride lie down behind them—to slumber the morning over ! Armies have crossed the Alps. The pass of Ratan [a Swedish harbour, five Swedish miles from Umeå] has not been an impenetrable door for an on-rushing enemy. With all the advantages nature has given us—and we by no means wish to undervalue them—we must have fleets and armies ; and it must be granted that so far, in the hour of need, a Danish *plus* of a fleet whose cannons alone number two-thirds of those our own liners can show, and an army equally great in proportion, is far from being a trifle easy to dispense with or obtain in other quarters. The objection, that if Denmark were taken into the Union, Scandinavia would have so much the more coast and so much the greater land to defend, and that “therefore” Denmark’s military resources would be required for itself as before, can only apply in the worst possible case—an attack against two such far-off points as, for instance, the Eider and Grisslehaum. But should this happen, and it would evidently be a great exception, Sweden would not be a whit worse off than she is at this moment.

But, it is added, we do not need Denmark for any additional safety. So far as we can see, no serious danger threatens *ourselves*. It is Denmark which is in peril. Strong or weak, whichever you please, *our* situation is so fortunate that we have no fears for our own independence. The dilemma is Denmark’s, and it would become our own by forming a union for better and worse with that kingdom. This “pitiable country” has our warmest sympathies, but—“Charity begins at home.”

It is not our object here to appeal to the *feelings* of the Northern nations, although we really believe that they have long since made up their minds boldly to protest against the logic of mere mean selfishness in this matter, but to their *conviction*; and we endeavour to give not hypotheses, but arguments. We ask, then, from what moment do we date this happy invulnerability and future paradisiacal security of the Scandinavian peninsula?—From the day when Bomarsund blew up, or from the 21st of November, 1855? Is it possible that any living soul, endowed with half an eye for historical facts and political systems, can lull himself to quiet slumber with the conception that Muscovy, after having pursued for 150 years a fixed policy with wondrous skill and iron-fast perseverance, should now all of a sudden, simply because it has met its first serious check, throw all its plans overboard, sweep away the webs spun by six generations, sacrifice the weary night-watches of so many distinguished statesmen, the desperate days'-works of so many butchered armies? Is the great conflict which so lately shook Europe, really set at rest *for ever*? Seriously and between ourselves, have the Paris Conferences rendered any new outbreak *impossible*?

Ha! ha! ha!

Does any goose in Europe believe in the Sham Peace?

But, *in case* the war break out afresh, shall we then also be idle spectators, our hands in our pockets, our chin out of the window, gaping at such "interesting events"?

For ourselves, we must confess that the reflections made, the consolations uttered by certain "calm spirits," not only can persuade no one, but are even beneath contempt. It is clear, to our eyes, that an era of immense danger has arrived for the Scandinavian peninsula, and that we were never more justified than at this moment in suspecting the future. No one here talks of provoking a powerful neighbour; we would only be on our guard against an empire whose "inmost thought" no one knows, or, rather, which has long been known as anything but good faith and good fellowship. *The joke* is really a little coarse, that friendly demonstration of his in Finland, where he is building SEVERAL Bomarsunds, and immense ones, instead of the *one* he had on Aland,—and that he should still permit himself small privateering and buccaneering and spy-expeditions in Northern Norway. Sebastopol

was a "joke" of a similar kind; so was the last "peaceful" "occupation" of the Danubian provinces—merely an innocent caprice. To-morrow, mayhap, General BERG [Governor of Finland] will paint on the Finnish guide-posts on the roads leading to Torneå, "This is the way to—Stockholm," as, in the good time lately, was inscribed on the finger-posts in the just conquered Black-Sea provinces, "This is the way to Constantinople"—all only raillery. "*Vieux farceurs, ces Messieurs Cosaques!*"

It is not Swedish to despair, or to let a panic dread carry away both sense and reason. But neither is it wise to let events wag as they may in a critical moment. It is certainly not patriotic, for the sake of momentary and petty interests, to neglect those great ones on which, after all, our very existence often may depend. We lately touched on the antithesis, "the Eider and Grisslehaum," and we would wish here to accent these words. It is, doubtless, all very true, this continual hubbub about the dangers which beset Denmark from the south, and the impudent claims made daily and hourly by the German Powers to interfere with the private concerns of the Danish people; but, in the long run, this danger is, perhaps—we will not say less, but less distant, less overhead, than the peril which hangs like a thunder-cloud at our own eastern horizon. We have, perhaps, quite as little right as Denmark to lounge in idle expectation, to fling ourselves, with affected nonchalance, "under the thick shade of the verdant beech," self-contentedly tuning shepherd-pipes, and making wood-nymphs dance to the sound of Arcadian songs and childish music.

We trow that as Denmark, to defend its own national existence, has no better, scarcely any other resource, than to cling fast to the Scandinavian peninsula, so we shall sooner or later feel quite as bitterly the want of Denmark as our firm ally. Our long history has sufficiently taught us what it is for Sweden, in any conflict with its Eastern neighbour, to have Denmark as our foe, gnawing at our heel and splitting our power. True, any renewal hereof, thanks to the friendly relations of late between the two peoples, is quite out of the question. As King Oscar last summer declared, with open confidence in this their mutual disposition, a *war* between Sweden and Denmark is hereafter an impossibility. But there is a risk not less hazardous, so long as the whole Scandinavian

North is not a collected whole with a single collective policy—the *intrigues* of our enemies, the accursed machinations always going on in Copenhagen. Properly to appreciate the eventual jeopardy of continuing the parallelism of the Scandinavian as *separate* kingdoms, we need by no means fancy Copenhagen a Russian camp, or a fortress of the German Bund. Nothing of the sort. We need only contemplate there an *unnational Cabinet* binding the hands and neutralising the sympathy of the Danish people, isolating us by this very inactivity, or, what is still worse, active indeed, but *secretly* and in the service of *foreign* states, so as to bring upon us at critical moments all those mishaps and *tracasseries* of a game *behind the scenes* which are so much the harder to meet and overcome as we have to deal with invisible agencies, and must front expedients not to be crossed like sword-blades in open fight. We have given hints of the *advantage* resulting from the armed assistance of Denmark in the day of extremity; the *danger* is not less of *not* being able to count upon this open help when the tocsin really sounds. Nay, we are almost inclined to assert that we *gain less* by its actively taking our part than we *lose* by its passive and suspicious policy in moments of peril.

CHAPTER IV.

BUT the *second* objection.

Well, well. We will not dispute all this. We will admit, for argument's sake, that Sweden-Norway may really *need* Denmark, as Denmark has been supposed to need us. But how far must we go? A *Union* is in any case the uttermost, and has its practical difficulties. Let us be content with something simpler and nearer hand. As regards the eventualities in question, an *Alliance* may be quite as useful—and can be accomplished by a stroke of the pen!

We reply: Agreed! An alliance between the three nations with all our heart! Such a step would be no small gain. If, in time, it could be made both *offensive* and *defensive*, much might follow.

But we must here make a most decisive distinction.

Some may think a Scandinavian Alliance *the end*; we can only regard it as *a means to the end*.

We must lay down the axiom, at the very outset, that a Scandinavian *Union*, such as we fancy it, is a national work, the keystone of a building by the peoples themselves—an action carried through by the unanimous vote of three kindred tribes, its future strength guaranteed by the mature persuasion abiding in the very depths of three nations' hearts. An *Alliance*, although grounded on the same popular tendencies and assured of the full adhesion of the peoples, is in reality a mere diplomatic act, drawn up by two reigning houses, and with its guarantee in certain *personages*. A Union is a thing which we have seen require centuries to reach practical perfection, but, once solidly based, fast enough to defy the flight of ages. An Alliance, it is true, can be effected at any moment, but it can be dissolved as easily! What nationalities build, is not so lightly pulled down again. We ought to remember this oftener than we do, and act accordingly. But what diplomacy effects, it undoes again the moment after.

Our opinion of the two monarchs who now fill the thrones of Scandinavia is, that they have sufficiently understood their

position and their time to sympathise—for instance, in this question of a Scandinavian Alliance—with each other, as warmly as the nations they govern. We may even be permitted to opine that they long since *are, de facto*, allied, and that what may yet be wanting in such a Prince-Alliance—some words on a piece of paper—can soon be forthcoming. But it is an illusion which we must carefully guard against, to suppose that the future destiny of the Scandinavian North were entirely assured by any such written act. Without giving way to undue suspicions, and without too severely judging persons whom we may be said to know but little about, we are surely entitled to believe that the continuance of any such alliance would unfortunately be found very precarious, so soon as the present King of Denmark is gathered to his fathers.

Certain it is, that patent facts, with respect to the hitherto openly expressed sympathies and tendencies in the high family which has the *survivance* to the crown of Denmark by the new Succession-law of 1853, render it almost certain that it would not be difficult, if found desirable, for certain foreign influences and intimate relations to induce this high family again to break up the new alliance, and to adopt a new policy—and one far from Scandinavian. As a *means*, for the moment, of reaching the goal more rapidly, we accept the Alliance if it should be proposed; but, further than this, we do not lay great stress on any such more or less artificial measure.

But there are two important considerations connected herewith.

There is a great difference, especially when viewed *morally*, between a union and a mere alliance. The latter, however intimate, is only accidental and temporary, more or less a diplomatic *rapprochement*. With every step towards carrying it into effect, the existence of the two factors, the two governments and their several wills, is abundantly visible. In any case, the machinery works with a certain friction and heaviness; the combination is endangered by perpetual and unseen difficulties. An alliance, even where the right of the several parts to self-government is as pronounced as it is for instance in the several states of the American Union, is, in idea, and becomes more and more in its development, an *organism*, where the general polity becomes as it were the natural law of the minor divisions, and the Executive *can* only work in

one manner, according to premises laid down in the whole collective national consciousness and national tendencies. In one word, as to the intensity and contents, we had almost said the volume, of a political system and the chances for its success—there is a material difference between that form where two cabinets represent a common public opinion only by accidental agreement (examples enough of the uncertainty attending such a policy may be seen in the Anglo-French Alliance)—and one where a previous organic combination between the peoples themselves determines the cabinets and gives the system a greater and more continuous stamp. Specially as to the North, *we* require this *moral*-power so much the more, as our *material* force would only be that of a secondary state. We therefore *cannot afford* to lose any opportunity of strengthening our moral position, and elevating it as high as possible.

The next observation is: that the acknowledgment of Scandinavia as one, and therefore as a strong power, is no longer a Northern question; it has become, so to speak, European. Not only the Governments of France and England, particularly since the Oriental war and with a forecast of probably new and not very distant collisions, have seriously begun to entertain the thought, in the interest of peace itself and for the consolidation of our whole European civilization and development, that the necessity has arisen for a firm and respectable breakwater in the Scandinavian North, against any Asiatic attempt to play on this side the game which failed in the Black Sea. The Public Opinion also of these countries, more and more decidedly and with increasing knowledge of our circumstances, has pronounced in the same direction. But it is plain, that if the Western Powers do or will understand that, for the sake of Europe itself, the Scandinavian race must be allowed as a Northern fore-post to stand guard for the benefit of our hemisphere, they will never suppose this object gained by a simple *alliance* between the Scandinavian Governments. Accordingly, the opinions hitherto expressed by the English and French Press hereon, have mostly been directed to the idea of a Northern *Union*. Occidental cabinet-policy and enlightened public opinion in these countries are already at one in the axiom, that if anything worth speaking of for the benefit of Europe is to be accomplished by the help of the handful of Scandinavians and their weight in the

political balance, it cannot be by the pledge contained in an accidental agreement between two dynasties, but will demand that strict solidarity, that trustworthy future, those essential contents, in a word, that moral significance and energy which is to be especially looked for in a close union. What appears to be the wish abroad, is just what we ought to seek at home—*the full force of a collected nationality*. The more we consider these circumstances, the less can we understand any reason for waiting till this European *wish* perchance becomes a European *necessity*, and one day unexpectedly snatches from our grasp the grand historical significance of our own initiative.

CHAPTER V.

WE have spoken of the Scandinavian Union as a great national *problem*. We believe that the moment for solving it was never nearer than now, and that many accordant circumstances at length have made this step more than ever a practical one. The possibility hereof lies particularly in the clearness of apprehension respecting it among the peoples themselves; the zeal and warmth with which it is eagerly followed up in the three kingdoms, by men of political views and historical and practical ability; in the fortunate fact that the idea appears to have gained the common sympathy of the present Northern monarchs, the wishes of the people being thus echoed by the thrones; and in the whole European situation for the moment.

But a problem so important, of course, cannot be solved without specific conditions. Certain arrangements must be made beforehand. Certain stumbling-blocks must in good time be removed. To these we pass over.

And we must at once give it as our conviction, that, for this Unity to be true, real, fruitful, a Scandinavian Federation must be grounded on the principle of a fully disinterested and close agreement between the separate kingdoms, not only socially, but in many other respects—military among the rest—carried consistently through. We so far quite agree with the very honourable author of a remarkable Danish pamphlet just printed (*Scandinavianism Practicable*, by BLIXEN FINECKE), as to the necessity, for instance, with regard to the duty of mutual defence, of not neglecting the wise arrangements laid down by the Kalmar Union. We thus imagine, also, the inevitable prudence of a kind of Federative Representation, sitting either in a specific federative capital, for instance Gothenburg, or by turns in one of the three Northern metropolitan cities. Its task would be, to prepare such common unional business as would especially crave the free and collective opinion of the whole Northern people, to smooth the way for further agreements and approachments in any particular direction (in this manner, considerable progress has been made by means of the

several Norse-Swedish Committees), and to vote such common unional grants as circumstances might require. But with all this, we as openly hold fast the principle, that, as far as is compatible with the higher objects and interests of the whole Union, each of the three countries should be allowed freely to develop itself, *with each one its own individual independence*. We are convinced that just this unfettered development, this government left to itself as regards the internal concerns of each land, will lead to a voluntary tendency to harmonise, and will bring greater likeness in institutions than all manipulations, all artificial attempts to regulate matters beforehand. Example and contact will here work better and surer than commands; experience will induce the gradual adoption of much which, at first sight, might appear objectionable; and esteem for the equal rights and liberties of the separate states, as previously sanctioned by common enactment and studiously observed, will induce free mutual modifications, where one would never have given way to the humiliation of submitting to insolent claims.

This equality of each state and same right to self-government is, however, so necessary a result from the idea of a reasonable union in the nineteenth century, that we need not dwell upon it. There are other points, especially as regards ourselves and Denmark, which must be clearly understood at the very beginning, and as to which the conditions must not only be openly and honestly expressed, but distinctly reasoned. We so come upon the Danish "whole-state," and upon what has been called "the *integrity* of the Danish monarchy."

This is not the place to enter upon a complete *historique* of this so-called "whole-state," and what more or less belongs thereto. But we cannot avoid mentioning the chief facts. Our sketch will be as short and clear as the wondrously and nauseously confused question, and its endless branches and details, will allow.

As is well known, the Peace of July 2, 1850, between Denmark and Prussia (the German Bund), really left all the points which had been fought about in the previous campaigns miserably undecided, and, so to speak, handed them over in a lump to the final arrangements of diplomacy. Denmark had to no purpose exhausted its resources during three years' heroic efforts and the highest patriotic enthusiasm. But Germany had also met serious obstacles in its plans for the subjugation

of Denmark in open war. Prussia and the German Bund had come to the conclusion, that they had a much better chance for gaining their end by means of diplomacy—that is, through intrigue and fraud. Accordingly, they laid down their arms, and began to intrigue. The peace itself was essentially a German fraud, neither more nor less. There was thus a given and most advantageous basis on which to build.

The efforts of the German Powers were now directed, above all, to induce Denmark altogether to abandon its intention to draw Slesvig [the old Danish province of South Jutland] nearer to the kingdom, and organise Holstein as a crown-land for itself, the plan which formerly (in 1848) had been so decidedly resolved upon in the programme of what is known as the March-ministry. Instead of this, they wished an arrangement by which the abnormal connection of Danish Slesvig with the German Bund-land Holstein should again, as far as possible, be effected, and thus the whole kingdom of Denmark itself continue to be dependent on the German Confederation. As pretext for all this, from first to last, was laid down the principle of the monarchical *integrity*, and at the bottom of the whole lurked the reintroduction of *the whole-state system*.

We recapitulate. The March-ministry had proclaimed that the “*kingdom*” of Denmark in the narrow meaning, to which *would be added* Slesvig, closely united to the kingdom by a common free constitution, though at the same time preserving its own provincial independence, should be constituted as a separate state from the Sound to the Eider—Holstein-Lauenborg, on the contrary, already a German Bund-land, being preserved to the monarchy as a loose appendix, at the most only in the same way as the German Confederation-land Luxemburg belongs to the same crown as the not-German-Confederation Holland. Germany, on its side, laboured incessantly not only to prevent any such close and special union of Slesvig with Denmark, and, on the contrary, at least to preserve the *continued possibility* of that “Slesvig-Holstein” which had just in vain appealed to military violence, but also, in addition thereto, so to unite all Denmark, instead of only its most southern province, with the German Bund-lands (by means of a “*whole-state*” arrangement), that Germany, on behalf of Holstein and through Holstein as its legal owner, could continue *its* influence on the whole monarchy.

In this their object from the beginning, the German Powers

succeeded only too well. Denmark, as was foreseen, stumbled into the net of this "integrity," and the Minister BLUHME announced his accession to office by that "open Royal Letter of January 28, 1852," which has since been so often referred to as the plot has thickened.

In this state-document there was no longer any mention of an intimate union between Slesvig and the kingdom, and of a separate position to be given to Holstein as a loose annex. On the contrary, it was determined that both Holstein and Slesvig should receive, each for itself, enlarged provincial chamber institutions, and that certain kinds of business "common to both duchies" should be transacted in "united collegial deliberation" by the ministers of the two duchies; it was also fixed that for the future the monarchy "should be preserved undiminished in territory," that the connection between its separate parts should therefore "be strengthened so as to produce a well-ordered whole," and that this complex should be placed under the government of "common" ministerial authorities, and formally be subject to a "common constitution."

Herewith, then, the *whole-state* was "de facto" reconstituted; but it was not so "de jure." To obtain this end, more was required—a whole new series of German intrigues and Russian menaces. Between the 28th of January, 1852, and October the 2nd, 1855 (the date of the whole-state form now in use) lies, for the Danish people, a period of the bitterest experiences, of fruitless efforts, of mocked expectations. We must always remember that the "Ay" which the Danish Parliament at length, after long and just delays, gave to the preliminary changes in the ground-law of the Danish kingdom, and without which the whole-state administration would have been constitutionally impossible, was really such as is forced from the breast of a martyred victim in a moment of both moral and physical weakness, and that in the "acceptance" by the Danish people of this change lay a hidden "To this I am driven by force" [exactly as was the case with the "acceptance" by the Danish nation, after the most obstinate resistance at all risks, of the infamous annihilation *in favour of Russia* of the old Danish Succession-law, forced upon the gallantly struggling Danish Parliament by *English* "statesmen" and the other accomplices of Muscovy].

In the mean time, as a consequence of this eventual compliance and of the altogether illusory consent previously given

by the entirely illegal Rigs-Raad [whole-state Junta] which had been octroyed by the ORSTED Cabinet, July 26th, 1854, was solemnly proclaimed—October the 2nd, 1855, by the “December-ministry” (SCHEEL, BANG, ANDRÆ, and HALL)—the “Forfatnings-lov for det danske Monarchies Fælledsaneliggender” [State-law for the common concerns of the Danish Monarchy], commonly known by the shorter phrase, “the whole-state institution.”

We shall not allow ourselves to be detained by all the separate curiosities in detail exhibited by this “constitution.” We will only observe, that the legislative power in all whole-state matters has been intrusted to the King and a Rigs-Raad “in common” (this Rigs-Raad being only a new and modified edition of that spawned by ORSTED in 1854), in which, however, the Ministry has *the lion’s share* of authority and influence; that this same Rigs-Raad, as a whole-state representation, and as the only form in which the voice of the people can be heard in all that concerns the extensive and weighty class of the so-called “common” business, consists of eighty members (twenty chosen by the King, thirty by the Danish Parliament and the Slesvig and Holstein Chambers, and the same number directly elected in districts) in such a proportion that forty-seven members are from the kingdom, thirteen from Slesvig, eighteen from Holstein, one chosen by the Lauenborg Equestrian Knights, and one for Lauenborg selected by the King; that the right of voting to the direct elections is only given to those who have an excessively high annual income [the number of voters consequently being ridiculously and invisibly small]; that the method of voting is so unfortunately original and artificial, that it, in fact, is the work of a mere fraction and minorities; and that, all taken together, though a Danish majority *would seem* to be assured in this Rigs-Raad, yet we must not expect it ever to represent the Danish *people* or the Danish *will*. But, what is of most consequence by this arrangement of Oct. 2, 1855, the Danish Constitution has been definitely limited to the kingdom, the Danish Parliament has sunk to a provincial representation, and thus Denmark Proper, as a strict whole for itself, is constitutionally cut off from Slesvig by the Jutland border—while Slesvig and Holstein, in consequence of the delightful harmony between their miserable “constitutions” (the consultative chambers and peculiar combinations of each duchy, as granted them by ORSTED while he

was in his glory*), continue to stand as it were arm in arm, in contradistinction to the kingdom, an "in petto" reserved Slesvig-Holstein. To this must be added the weighty result, not only that the principle of the Patent dated Jan. 28, 1852, acknowledging a separate ministerial government for all "common business," was fully carried out and the whole-state fiction thus finally sanctioned,—but also that a whole-state representation was definitely established as the highest parliamentary organ in the monarchy, in which, for the future, a pure *German-Bund* fraction—let the number of its members be great or small—is entitled to discuss and vote on the affairs of *Denmark*, mayhap on altogether specifically *Danish* interests, whenever they can be dragged into the category of "whole-state business."

We have used the words, "a pure German-Bund fraction, let the number of its members be great or small"; and it was clear at the first session of the Rigs-Raad last autumn, that the *number* was of no consequence. The opposition of "the eleven" on this occasion was undoubtedly, if we please, the effort of a despicable and futile minority. But nothing can more evidently and undeniably prove the madness and mockery of the whole institution than the fact, that such a minority could accomplish what it has—no less, in fact, than that the independence and freedom of Denmark is again risked, and is at this moment exposed to the renewed efforts of the German Powers. The "eleven" might have been "five" or only "three." The result would have been the same: frantic outcries against "Danish oppression," an appeal to Berlin and Vienna, and thence to Frankfort, and so German "notes," and so the "sommations" of the German Confederation, and so perhaps a new German army of execution in Holstein!

Such is the result of leaving German claims and German influence so much as a little finger in a Parliament which yet actually and ostensibly was to be *Danish*. Such is the consequence of jumbling together in a "whole-state" what is one's own with what belongs to another state-union. This comes of acknowledging in *one* monarchy *two* separate sovereignties, in this case that of the Frankfort Bund side by side with the Danish King, and of not seeing to it that one is master in

* The Slesvig Constitution is dated February 15, 1854, and was countersigned by the "famous" CARL MOLTKE; that for Holstein, dated June 11, 1854, was countersigned by REVENTLOW CRIMINIL.

one's own house. It is this which is *called* "integrity," and which *is* dissolution; this is *yclept strength*, but is *ruin*. The monarchical state-building is perhaps gayer to the eye, the Holstein wing decorates the palace; but it was forgotten that the dry-rot, which will destroy the whole, secretly spreads on from this very addition, till the whole house is infected.

But, for Sweden-Norway to admit into its union a Denmark thus "whole-stately" constructed, would be to throw one's self headlong into difficulties from which we must pray God to deliver us. In this case, those persons are quite right, who make all the objections they can to any Scandinavian Union. But such was never our idea, no not for an instant. We regard "the integrity of the Danish monarchy" as something infinitely beneath the Scandinavian Union. If an opposite opinion has sometimes been insisted on in Denmark, occasionally even by men of whose patriotism we would not willingly doubt, we yet opine that the sound sense and dearly bought experience of the Danish people will, when the moment for decision arrives, emphatically pronounce in favour of our views, which we here make a sort of "thesis sine qua non." It is evident that no Scandinavian Union can be thought of with the *whole-state* Denmark. We have too long been spectators of the misfortunes Denmark has reaped from its obligatory connection—through Holstein—with "the great German Fatherland," and its consequent dependence on the German Confederation, for a single moment to contemplate a close political movement whereby all Scandinavia would occupy the same crooked and dangerous position as that which now threatens Denmark itself. But we do not therefore abandon the Scandinavian idea. There is a very natural method of escaping the dilemma. Where two things cannot agree, one *must give way*. Here it is the Danish whole-state which must make room for the Scandinavian Union!

On the side of Sweden-Norway, this must once for all be a condition so fixed and determined, that not a hairsbreadth must be sacrificed. Nay, the conclusion must even be stretched a good ell farther!

CHAPTER VI.

IN other words—What we have now pointed out as the especially Norse-Swedish condition for a future union with Denmark, is, in fact, the kernel of what is named *the Eider-programme*.

The unhappy experiment of a Danish, or rather Dano-German, whole-state, must at once, and without further talk or reservation be abandoned; and Denmark Proper (the islands and Jutland), *together with Slesvig*, must be created a whole for itself, as was intended in 1848, and as was the object for which the Danish nation then, though in vain, fought and bled. How far the union of Slesvig with the kingdom may be looser or tighter, is of course a pure Danish affair, and must be left to Denmark itself to determine. We do not doubt that the Eider party continue to insist that this approximation must be more than nominal, and that the Danish Fundamental Law will accordingly be extended to Slesvig, while the special provincial peculiarities of the duchy will be left in peace—an arrangement which the Scandinavian peninsula could not object to. But it must be distinctly understood, that Sweden-Norway wish no other modifications in the Danish ground-law than are perhaps necessary from its being extended also to Slesvig.

But there is another point, as regards Slesvig, which affects us more nearly—the question of *the partition* of that duchy. We have all along supposed, that this is not for one moment to be contemplated. But the subject is important enough for a few remarks, that no misunderstandings may arise in the future, and a public opinion thereon arrived at in the three Northern countries.

The idea of “Slesvig’s partition” was started in Denmark in 1849, at a period of despair and irresolution, by a few perhaps well-meaning, but certainly rather inventive than energetic, persons, who regarded it as the chief thing to discover some *resource* from the difficulties they had to combat, almost “first come first serve,” rather than a dubious appeal

to arms. Some of them frankly admitted that this resource, this partition of Slesvig, would be a hard sacrifice; but, said they, "need has no law," and if we can buy ourselves free from any further German torments by a "stump" of this duchy, it would not be paying too dearly for so great a blessing. A few, to bribe as it were their own better feelings, and to comfort themselves by giving the loss a show of honesty, suddenly made the great discovery, that, in fact, Denmark *owed* Germany a slice of Southern Slesvig, as belonging to "the great fatherland" "by the right of nationality."

True, this whole scheme fell through: partly because the Danish people declined to acknowledge either the necessity or the logic, and partly because of course Germany would scarce have been content with less than *all* Slesvig, if any such plan had really been proposed. In Denmark itself, we also believe that every body has long since turned his back to all such partition-crotchets, and that nothing would be so unpopular as their revival, even in connection with the most distant eventualities. But as, of late, expressions have appeared in the French and English Press which would seem to show that this partition-idea still has some adherents, by whom perhaps it may one day be again discussed, a short recapitulation anent the whole may not be out of the way.

We remark at once, that even when some persons in Denmark advocated this partition, no admission was ever made of the supposed strictly *political* right of Germany to any part of Slesvig. This concession would have been too monstrous. On the contrary, we have never seen more than *one* Danish opinion on this head (excepting perhaps that of some open Danish traitor), namely, that by public and political law, the duchy of Slesvig entirely and completely belongs to Denmark. Historical facts, which cannot be gainsayed, and which no subterfuge can explain away, are:—that the present Slesvig was originally called by another name, and was possessed by Angles and Frisians [two Dano-Northern tribes] (not *Saxons*), who however appear at the same early period to have thrown their outposts up as far as Holstein; that these Angles [being weakened by their emigration to England] afterwards gave way before the [also Dano-Northern] Jutish stem, which now in their place occupied the whole of Slesvig, an amalgamation probably taking place to some degree be-

tween the Angles and the Jutes ; that the whole peninsula down to the *Sle* was accordingly called Jylland [originally, as yet in English, Jutland], and its Southern half, the present duchy, during many centuries [and even at this moment] being as commonly known by the name Sönder-Jylland [South Jutland]; that the old Haddeby [*read* Hætheby, Hedeby, as on the famous Slesvig Rune-stones, the same harbour as King Alfred's "æt Hæðum" "and hyrð in on Dene" ("belonging to Denmark")]; Haddeby was a village a little way off]—where ANSGARIUS first preached Christianity to "the Danes" (and which has since changed its old name for that of Slesvig) [properly SLE'S VIG, originally SLIAS WIK, the *wik* or bay of the *Sle*, similarly formed to our Ber-wick, Green-wich, Woolwich, &c. This term *Slesvig* has since been gradually creeping up, as *also* the name of *the whole duchy*]—was first for many generations a Jutish border-fortress against Holstein; that, in addition hereto, a separate wall* was early erected by the Danes from Haddeby [*read* Hedeby] or Slesvig-town, in a south-western direction, still further to defend this limit; but that so early as 811, at a meeting of the Jutish King HEMMING and the Emperor CHARLEMAGNE, it was formally decided that the Eider (more to the south than Haddeby [Hedeby] and Dannevirke) should constitute the border-line between the Danskers and the Germans; that the "Jydske Lov" [Jutish Law] of King WALDEMAR II., given anno 1240, was for centuries that universally in force also in South Jutland [or Slesvig] (it is still the land-law for the greater part of the duchy at this very moment!), and that divers town-laws (for Flensborg, Haderslev, and Aabenraa) [and others now lost, or only extant in Latin], as also several Slesvig guild-laws, were issued *in Danish* even down to the fourteenth century; that it was first the intrigues and perfidy of the Holstein Counts which in this fourteenth century succeeded in getting a hand in the affairs of Slesvig, and gradually usurping power over a part of this duchy, principally by transplanting thither the Holstein feudal estate-institution; that thus, in 1460, a *coup de main* of the Holstein and Slesvig feudal knights wheedled King CHRISTIAN I. into the declaration that Slesvig and Holstein should "bliuen ewich tosamende vngedelt" [be ever together

* But the wall or fortified dike, *properly* called *Dannevirke* [the *Dane-work*], was not constructed till the tenth century. The Chronicle relates that also men from Sconé [Scania, in the present South Sweden] assisted in its erection.

undivided],—but that this act undoubtedly lost all possible value when FREDERICK IV., compelled by circumstances, at the head of his army conquered the ducal part of Slesvig, and in 1720 formally united the whole duchy with the Danish crown. This special union of Slesvig and Denmark was then guaranteed [*not for nothing*, but for a heavy “consideration”] by England and France (and afterwards also by Russia), and representatives for the duchy gave a new oath of homage, in which they promised to be true and faithful to their only liege lord, the King of Denmark, according to the words and spirit of the “Kongeloven” [the King-law, the Royal Law, “Lex Regia,” the Constitutive Act of the Danish State].

All this is a series of simple historical facts [to which hundreds of others might be added of a similar decisive character] whose weight no one can deny; and before such a cloud of witnesses something more is required than the whole artifice of German hair-splitting, to manufacture even the shadow of anything like a German right to touch so much as the hem of Slesvig’s garment. But at this point appears, like a “*deus ex machina*,” the question of nationality. As we have observed, it was taken up by the Danish party, which reasoned thus:—We deny any and every juridical or historical claim of Germany on Slesvig, which is Danish by constant possession and constant treaty; but we admit that this duchy contains a German as well as a Danish nationality; but, as “the nationality” has its own right, let us divide the land at the point where it meets the Danish element, and so get rid of the difficulty.

No one can lay greater stress on a *real* and *actual* nationality than ourselves. But we start as from an axiom with the principle, that the system—or rather the mistake—of *à priori* and without further to do, giving each fraction of a foreign nationality in a state the same political right and authority as the mass of that nationality which constitutes the land itself, is merely throwing over the fate of the whole to every separatory minority which has impudence enough to demand the dissolution of the kingdom. That the Flemish nationality in Belgium (which is the original one, and therefore actual and true) should try to assert *its* right against that of the French, which has been imposed upon it, we perfectly understand and sympathise with. But that the *opposite* should take place—that a *bastard and compulsory* nationality, like that in

Slesvig, should have the same power over the *original*, as is the Danish in that duchy,—nay, over the real and peculiar nationality of the whole Danish kingdom—we *cannot* understand, and must continue to protest against. In other words, we altogether reject that assertion of nationality which would entitle a petty quota of a state-family to become the “cock of the walk,” and steer as it will. We deny it doubly; for this quota is not home-born, but was only lately a stranger and guest on the garden-plot which he will now usurp as his own property, and, duly considered, is scarcely to be held a nationality at all!

For, while it must be admitted on the one hand that, in consequence of the monstrous system which has been followed by the Copenhagen Ministries since 1720, German officials and “knights” have been allowed for more than a century to do every thing they could to Germanize Slesvig, and that this permission, eagerly and actively used, has not been without sorrowful fruits,—still it must be granted on the other side, that it would be quite a rash conclusion to regard Southern Slesvig (the field for these division-experiments) as quite a German land. As we have said, it would concern us but little even if it were so. But it was not so then [in 1849], and it is not so now. Out of the 350,000 souls Slesvig was calculated to possess ten years back (the number is now upwards of 390,000), about 130,000 spoke only *Danish*, about 70,000 spoke a *mixed Danish* dialect, about 25,000 were *Frisians* [also an Old-Northern race]—the rest, about 125,000, remaining as the “pure German” nationality, about which we are now talking as having a claim to a part of the duchy. But this is the weakest side of the whole question. For, when all comes to all, what is the *real* character of this “Germanism,” this so-called “German” folk-speech, represented by the 125,000 people in South Slesvig?—Hear, O Heavens!—It is [not “German” at all, but] a Platt-tysk [a Dano-Saxon] dialect [far nearer to the Danish than to the “German,” which is as Chinese to the common people, although they are *compelled* to learn it in all the schools and churches in the “German districts”]; it is so excessively barbarous that it differs immensely from the real Saxon language of Holstein, &c. [which fine old tongue—an element in our own, and so much more beautiful and musical than that hungry yoke of lean kine the “High-German” dialects, which greedily and

tyrannically devour every other, *and become none the fatter*— is now unhappily giving way before the scandalous and intolerant propaganda of this same “German”];* it is mixed up with all kinds of accidental words and forms [most of them showing that its real basis is the *old Danish folk-dialect* of Slesvig itself!]; and has not the shadow of a literature [or even of a grammar, it being merely a modern loose unformed peasant-patois]. Thus, in fact, the *actual* German language reduces itself to a few hundred, or, if you will, a few thousand, persons scattered about mostly in the South-Slesvig towns, and belonging to the “educated” classes, that is, to a “clique” rather than to any sound and honest folkship, in the real meaning of the term!

Still more curious does the whole question become, when we take a map, and see for ourselves the *line* of this assumed “German nationality.” It then comes out, according to the clear evidence of the most exact language-maps, that Danish is the decided and unmixed folk-speech in far more than *half* of the duchy (about 93 out of 163 [Danish] square miles); that in a still further *very considerable* part of South Slesvig the Danish is the prevailing element, or at least not so Germanized but that the people can quite well speak and understand their mother-tongue, when they are *allowed* so to do by the [mostly High-German] priests and officials; and that it is properly only the three most southerly bailiwicks in which the “German language”—that is, not a “German” language at all, but a Slesvig-Dano-Saxon patois—has taken the place of the old native Danish, and become the popular dialect.† How slowly this “German” speech-usurpation has progressed may be seen from the fact, that even now, in the district round Slesvig itself (a town famous for its German pretensions) the population does not speak better *Platt-tyska*, than that we hear such half-Danish expressions as, for instance, “Wi heve sonst dänsk wesen, *men nu* [pure Danish] sin wi

* [The same oppressive and intolerant propaganda is carried on in *all the other lands* in any way connected with Germany. In *Prussian Poland* the dragooning has been shameless, and scarcely a single Polish journal is now allowed to appear. Of course in this way “German” is extending.]

† [See, among other excellent treatises on this subject, especially Professor ALLEN’s valuable work, “Om Sprog og Folke-Eiendommelighed i Hertugdømmet Slesvig eller Sønderjylland” (On the Speech and Folk-characteristics of the Duchy of Slesvig or South Jutland”), 8vo., *Copenhagen*, 1848, with a coloured language-map.]

düdsk bläwen" [we have formerly Danes been, but now are we Germans become]. Another equally eloquent fact is, that of the numerous Danish parish-libraries which some Danish patriots in Copenhagen have established of late years in all parts of Slesvig, there are many which flourish in spite of all the efforts of "Germanism," and which, to use a newspaper-phrase—"supply a long-neglected demand," in districts *far more to the South* than that line which has hitherto been usually assumed as the demarcation-border for the Danish language in the duchy.

And for such a dubious nationality was it, to suit the illusory claims of so evident a minority, that some well-meaning persons were for a moment, when out of heart, inclined to offer a state-border in zig-zag and gracefully bending in a thousand "lines of beauty"—to suit the "great fact" of a German-speaking schoolmaster living in one or other corner of Slesvig, or a late Holstein nabob having settled in this or that ingle with a student from Göttingen as his house-tutor. Our expressions may perhaps be slightly exaggerated for the sake of the fun, but in fact they are "sober seriousness."

Certain it is, that we cannot but think enough has been said to prove, that this whole *division-scheme* was based on a lamentable forgetfulness of Denmark's own history and political right, as well as on very nebulous ideas as to what a nationality really is, and how far it may justly extend its claims. The only plausible ground for any such sharing of the country, namely, its pressing *necessity* (supposing that this bugbear ever had any existence) has long since passed away, and we may securely add, that there is less chance than ever of its reappearing, from the moment that Norway and Sweden should be inclined to cast in their lot with Denmark. In a word, in our eyes Slesvig is historically and politically a Danish land; its mixed nationality in its most southerly extremity is no more than always takes place in every border-district; it would to some extent have existed even if the amalgamation had not, "per fas et nefas," been forced on at all risks by an invading foreign nationality; and Sweden-Norway can so much the less ever consent to give up any part of the EIDER-BOUNDARY, *Denmark's positive right*, as it besides offers itself as the most natural and "*nettement*" rounded strategic limit of Scandinavia to the south, the plain

line up to which the German Bund may go—but not an inch further.

Lastly. This question will also decide that of the future position of Holstein, with respect to an eventual Scandinavian Union.

But we almost expect some reader here to exclaim:—Well, but if we grant all this—if we suppose the Danish whole-state to be finally abandoned, the Eider-system carried through in its stead, and lastly, a Union realized between the three Scandinavian kingdoms—surely there would then be no longer any danger if Holstein, though belonging to the German Confederation, were to remain loosely attached to Denmark, in reality only as a kind of monarchical attribute. Circumstances would then have changed so much, that we need scarcely fear any future attempts at interference from Germany. The German nationality would then stand face to face against that of all Scandinavia, not the small Denmark alone, and would look thrice before it bearded it once. After all, Holstein is a possession not to be despised, and why should we, *without any call*, throw this tit-bit into the open jaws of, for instance, the long hungry Prussia?

There may be something in this; but we must confess that, from our point of view, we think Sweden-Norway ought to reflect well before it altogether accept it. We are very sensitive as to our nationality being entirely secure; we will allow no one to mix in our concerns; our motto is, “My house is my castle,” and we will give up to no one the keys of our homestead, no, not of its least postern. We cheerfully admit that a united Scandinavia may be supposed to exhibit so much strength and influence, that Germany will in vain endeavour to treat it in the same cavalier and insulting manner as she has done Denmark. But, in spite of all this,—“He must have a long spoon that eats porridge with the Devil:” we would have Frankfort as far from us as possible. The German Bund is one of those worthy individuals with whom we can keep on the most friendly footing possible—provided only we have nothing whatever to do with them. However it may be labelled and limited as a mere provincial make-weight, we cannot but regard Holstein as always offering Frankfort a door whereby, at least sometimes, it will be enabled with a certain appearance of right to have its say

in Northern matters. One thing is self-evident. The very first conflict with Germany, or with some good friend and bottle-holder of Germany, would at once compel that part of Scandinavia called Sweden-Norway instantly to protest against the continuance of anything so absurd as that Kiel, the naval station of "the crown of Denmark," should or could be suddenly converted into a Russian marine depôt—by order from Frankfort—as a threat or "material pledge" against the whole North; or that the "Scandinavian [Holstein-] contingent" of his Scandinavian Majesty should receive the same high commands to execute a foray against, for instance, this same Scandinavian potentate's Swedish coasts! It is true, we may one day see a similar catastrophe, whether Holstein belongs to Denmark or no, perhaps even the sooner if this union be dissolved; but this latter is a thousand times preferable. Fair play, if you please! Let friends be friends, enemies enemies! No illusions made by smoke and a magic lantern! No light-guide which turns out to be a will-o'-the-wisp!

We are, therefore, personally of opinion, that the entire exclusion of Holstein from the Danish monarchy could only be in favour of Scandinavian interests, well understood, and we cannot conceive of this being considered any great sacrifice on the part of Denmark. But hereby we do not exactly mean that Holstein is therefore, *ipso facto*, at once to be thrown "into the open jaws of, for instance, the long hungry Prussia." Hints have been given in the foreign papers of Holstein's being perhaps constituted as a German duchy *for itself*; we regard this as by no means a bad arrangement. In connection herewith, we might also fall back upon the hints given by the author of a pamphlet we have already once referred to (*Scandinavianism Practical*, by Baron BLIXEN FINECKE), as to the possibility of certain hereditary claims being resigned by certain persons, and the seasonableness in that case of eventual *compensations*.

But, after all, this whole dispute about taking or leaving Holstein depends in fact upon a yet more interesting question—whether Denmark would be allowed any choice at all in the matter, in case she united herself to Sweden-Norway. It is true, every body glibly assumes this power of refusal to be inherent in Denmark. But we doubt that our friends have reckoned without their host. As an hereditary state, this Holstein has the peculiar situation, as we all know, of being

claimed as an eventual heirloom (whether this claim is false and impudent or no, we shall not now discuss) by *the Russian Dynasty*—the moment the Danish OLDENBORG House becomes extinct on the male side; and it now hangs on two childless old men, King FREDERICK VII., and the heir-apparent Prince FERDINAND. We know also that Russia, when she ceded these so-called “hereditary claims” in furtherance of the new Danish Succession, in 1853, did so expressly and only in favour of the then nominated throne-heir [Prince CHRISTIAN of Glücksborg], but more especially to assist her own well-perceived interests, veiled under that unhappy and “untoward” phrase, *the integrity of the Danish Monarchy*, of which we shall have a word to say anon. The question of preserving Holstein (whereagainst we have advanced weighty reasons) would therefore, in any case, when the Danish succession there is possibly changed, be dependent on new formal details, new “renunciations,” with of course new “reservations,” &c. &c. —*but under quite different conditions than in 1853*, and before all *not* in the interest of any such Danish “integrity” (which Heaven preserve us from), whereby *all Denmark* is in fact handed over to Muscovy as a family expectancy. In a word, the Holstein question will always be an open one, and when it is decided, every body’s interest will be regarded *rather than Denmark’s*. The most fortunate result would undoubtedly be, Holstein’s establishment as a state for itself, instead of as a Russian fief or a Prussian farm.

CHAPTER VII.

It will have been remarked that this subject of Scandinavianism has hitherto been treated from its National point of view, which *we* regard as the chief, and as far outweighing every other consideration. But however important it may be, in good time to find and explain and establish the gist and bearing of this question, we must not therefore neglect its *formal* side. We are thus at once led to those *dynastic* considerations which for the moment hedge it round.

Otherwise expressed, we come to "*Practical Scandinavianism*," as it is named *par excellence* by all who only see a mere dynastic arrangement in this union of the three Northern countries. Whether then, like the latter, we regard the dynastic as the great point, or, like ourselves, only as a necessary complement and corollary of the question itself—for the idea can only be realised one way or the other—we must all run our heads against this dynastic wall. But it has such "practical difficulties," it is said. Let us then approach this awful *cheval-de-frise*.

Mayhap we should be liable to grievous misinterpretations if we dwelt on our own conviction, that where Public Opinion is strongly pronounced on any one point, and a people has strength enough to *will* anything absolutely and without mistake, there we seldom find any impassable hindrance, whatever accidental stumbling-blocks may be found or made. But on the other side, if we lay no *stress* on this our own private persuasion—and these "practical" scarecrows cannot require *more*—and acknowledge every and any weight in these said objections, still we find ourselves *in limine* not a little fettered in the discussion by one trivial circumstance—that all this dynastic trouble is in reality *not our affair*. Sweden-Norway has, in a way, nothing to do with it. Its removal is altogether in the hands of *Denmark herself*.

Of course we cannot stoop to such petty objections, as that a dynastic union would lead to "the proud Mälare-city's" [Stockholm's] ruin; as though a Union-king could not rule as

well from Stockholm as from Copenhagen, especially now that the electric wire has rendered it almost immaterial what central point in Scandinavia be the royal residence; and as if so promising a capital as Stockholm depended on the Court passing a few months per year under the shelter of Seland's beech-woods, instead of at some watering-place or king's palace. But as to the question itself, the union of the three crowns on one head, it is for Denmark to find the ways and means. *We* may wish this *dynastic* union as a condition for the *national*; still it is our business not to produce but to approve it. It is for Denmark to *execute* it, and to discover *how and when*.

Our part in all this is accordingly but small. But, although we will not give positive counsel, we may at least, as reporters and spectators, and particularly in order to throw some light on the subject for the benefit of our own countrymen, make some memoranda on the obstacles Denmark will have to overcome in order to arrive at this dynastic union. We shall then see what chance there may be of its success.

Doubtless an opportunity existed eight or nine years ago, which has now escaped for ever. If other circumstances had then been as forward as now, the dynastic union might have been brought about ere this. But what is, is. Russia, who leaps where others crawl, and eagerly snatches while others deliberate, played her cards skilfully; and accordingly she had the satisfaction, in the Danish Succession-law of July 31, 1853, of seeing a massive bar drawn before a door which had "too long" stood wide open.

It is in this Succession-law we find centred the difficulties in the way of a Northern dynastic union, or rather, this Succession-law *is* the Scandinavian difficulty *in propria persona*.

First, as a general observation. When people speak of this Danish Succession-law, we commonly hear the London Protocol of May 8, 1852, referred to as the conclusive document. This has become such a jargon, that the Treaty of London is often confounded with the Succession-law itself of 1853. But the mistake is enormous. As it has caused many others, it deserves a moment's consideration.

What does this Treaty of London say? That—"considering that the maintenance of the integrity of the Danish Monarchy, as connected with the general interests of the European equilibrium, is of high importance for the preservation of

peace, and that a combination which should call male heirs, excluding females, to the succession to the totality of the lands at present united under the sceptre of the King of Denmark, would be the best means of assuring the integrity of this monarchy," the several Powers (who in addition "acknowledge as *permanent* the principle of the Danish integrity") have agreed to acknowledge the "combination" by which, according to agreement between the King of Denmark, the Danish Hereditary Prince, the Danish renouncing Cognates, and the Emperor of Russia, it has been proposed that the Danish Crown, in case no direct descendants exist in a straight line from FREDERICK III., "shall pass to Prince CHRISTIAN of Glücksborg, and to the family he may have by his marriage with the Princess LOUISE, according to primogeniture, man after man."

It is true that in this act the High Contracting Powers expressly acknowledged the "Danish integrity" as a great European principle—and many have seen herein an artful Russian snare. But it must be particularly observed, that Russia's assumed hereditary rights to Holstein, as asserted by the Emperor and carefully reserved *vis-à-vis* Denmark, *are not even mentioned* in this treaty; that the agreement between the King of Denmark on his own private account with the Russian Emperor as the chief of the Holstein-Gottorp elder line, as he still calls himself ("le Roi du Danemark de concert avec l'Empereur," &c.), is only passingly mentioned; that there is only mention in the treaty of a "combination" in favour of Prince CHRISTIAN and his male stem; and that the offer of the Powers, in paragraph 2 of the Protocol, "to take into consideration" any proposition of the King of Denmark in case Prince CHRISTIAN's male line should die out, cannot at all injure or prejudice any one of the branches of the Danish house, far or near, named or unnamed. Calmly considered, the Treaty of London therefore merely contains, that the Powers allow Prince CHRISTIAN and his male heirs to be placed in succession to the whole Danish Monarchy (one and "integer"), by means of a departure *for the moment and occasion*, from the old Danish order of succession by the Kongeloven [Lex Regia, the old Danish Succession-law, in force till its surreptitious abolition in 1853]. By this Lex Regia, as we all know, Danish *Cognates* as well as *Agnates*, descendants male or *female* by the *female* as well as the male line, had full

inheritance at least to the kingdom of Denmark *and Slesvig* (to this latter since the incorporation of 1720). All this was therefore, by a "happy combination," to settle the dispute about Holstein, where only males can rule, and where the cognatic lines were therefore excluded in case the reigning Danish male line became extinct, to the imminent peril of the Danish "integrity." What was to be done to preserve this "integrity," in case also Prince CHRISTIAN's male line should die off, was, as we have seen, left undecided. But, as regards the succession-right after Prince CHRISTIAN's family to *Denmark-Proper and Slesvig*, we must, as we have said, hold fast to the opinion that it could never have been their meaning in any way to weaken or abolish the then reviving and restored rights of the cognatic lines. In fact they said nothing at all about it, and never dreamed of any such criminal absurdity. Whether then we regard either the words or the spirit of the Treaty of London, we cannot find therein any longer suspension of the succession by the Lex Regia than was required by this famous "combination."

But the Succession-law of 1853; what is there in this?

It begins with an introduction, in which we are told how the Emperor of Russia with "friendly benevolence" resigned his claims on Holstein in favour of Prince CHRISTIAN, and how the nearest kin of the royal house "with a noble willingness" made similar renunciations (in so far as regarded the *rest* of the whole-state) in behalf of the same person. [All these renunciations were made in favour of the *Danish* Princess LOUISE, whose right was founded on the Danish Lex Regia, and *only through her* in favour of her husband, the *German* Prince CHRISTIAN, to whom she transferred her own rights, she distinctly asserting and reserving the rights of the offspring of her body, male and female, rights sprung from herself as a Danish princess. These renunciations expressly assert the continuance of the old Danish House-law (the Lex Regia); and in the document in which Prince CHRISTIAN agrees to accept these renunciations and this power, he does so on the express condition and solemn assurance that he shall *preserve secure and defend this Danish Succession-law*—by virtue of which he himself (through his wife), without the shadow or imputation of any other merit than his having married the Danish princess, was now suddenly presented with so noble

a sceptre—*unbroken, on pain of forfeiting all right to the crown!*]

But hereupon, straightway,—to the excessive surprise of every one who can spell or think—this Law of 1853 continues, that “His Majesty has resolved, in case the now ruling male line should fail, TO ABOLISH ALL RIGHT OF SUCCESSION ACCORDING TO LEX REGIA, and call Prince CHRISTIAN to the throne,” &c. This is repeated in the first article of the Law itself.

We will not now inquire *how* this remarkable and radical destruction of the ancient Succession-law of the Danish kingdom was brought about, with what illegalities, domestic and foreign, it was attended, or the endless intrigues behind the scenes by which it was secretly concocted. What we *will* inquire into, what the blindest must see, is—that all this was something *quite different* from what had been determined or caused by the Treaty of London, which does not contain *one single word* about any such abrogation.

By this categorical abolition of the Royal Law, one of the strongest ties which had hitherto bound Slesvig to the kingdom—the common agnatic-cognatic succession, according to a specific order—was at once wantonly severed by a mere stroke of the pen. Hereby also the succession-order to Denmark Proper (and Slesvig) *after* the extinction of Prince CHRISTIAN’S family was either rendered a mere hazard (by no means avoided by the smooth-phrased addition to Art. III. of the Succession-order, to the effect that the last regent of CHRISTIAN’S house shall “make arrangements for the further ordering of the succession”), or simply abandoned as a prize to the claims so decisively reserved beforehand by the Russian dynasty in the Warsaw Protocol. By there insisting on its assumed hereditary right to Holstein “after Prince CHRISTIAN and his family,” and at the same time by means of the so dexterously manœuvred and solemnly sanctioned principle in these formal treaties of the *integrity* of Denmark, Russia would have an indefeasible claim to—all Denmark, which it would take care to make good, while all the cognatic branches of the old Danish royal house would have—NO CLAIM AT ALL! When this period of “extinction” arrives, and it may come at any moment, *just by means of* this abrogation of all future rights on the side of the cognatic lines of the royal Danish

house, the kingdom of Denmark will have *no single legitimate pretender to the Danish crown.*

This is the gist of the whole matter; this the triumph of modern Western "diplomacy." All will then depend on how far the last sovereign of Prince CHRISTIAN'S house may or may not have been able to "make arrangements for the further ordering of the succession," and whom he may happen to select as his candidate for the succession. But this very selection, as we have seen, will be confined within the narrowest possible limits; for, if this principle of "integrity" is to be at all respected, no one *can* be chosen but the person who, after his death, will have the best claim on Holstein; and, as we have seen, Russia has taken good care from the first formally to reserve this right—to herself and no other soul!

But by that time, it is objected, many things may happen; and, besides, the other Powers will come with their "bona officia," and the whole will become another of those wonderful "diplomatic" "European" questions which we know so well [and whereby a few intriguers decide everything, the people nothing]. True. But as matters really stand, reasoning merely from open facts, the *Danish nation* can have no very great confidence in this whole 1853-abortion. We cannot wonder that, with an eye to the dangers impending therefrom, it wishes the whole

"Buried certain fathoms in the earth,
Deeper than did ever plummet sound."

We must expect it to take the first favourable opportunity of throwing this Russian Succession-law overboard, as belonging to the same useless lumber as the "whole-state" itself.

And on the other side, as regards Foreign Powers, and particularly with respect to the London Treaty of which we are so perpetually reminded, it is evident that the Danish Succession-law of 1853 so far exceeds and contradicts this treaty, that it is, in fact, a *direct infraction* of its stipulations. No reasonable being can doubt that France, England, and Sweden-Norway, when they signed this treaty of the 8th of May, 1852, honestly intended such an arrangement of Denmark's future position as should prevent the chances to which it was exposed with reference to its throne-succession. It must also at once be admitted that these same Powers are now entirely persuaded, that by the illegal and one-sided *changes* which have

been made, the strange conclusions which have been drawn from the premises laid down, the dangers which they apprehended have only been replaced by others *far more grave*. Nothing therefore would seem more natural than that at least the Western Powers will find that the time has arrived—in order to carry this same Treaty of London into honest instead of dishonest execution—for submitting this whole Danish Succession-law to a new revision, in the interest of the whole “European equilibrium.” In this case, even now, nothing will be easier than to escape from the principle of such an “integrity” as that Denmark and Slesvig should eventually be flung over *into the bargain* to the owner or claimer of Holstein, instead of Holstein, in a more or less unnatural connection with Denmark, going with the latter power.

This, then, is the actual character of “the great Scandinavian difficulty.” If the Danish People is agreed, and if England and France are so too, will the sword of an ALEXANDER long be wanting to cut the knot, or will so heroic a resource be required at all?



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