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fra
Oversættelsen.*

THE CONDITIONS
OF
A POWERFUL WILL

SIX LECTURES

BY

R. NIELSEN

PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF COPENHAGEN

TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL DANISH

BY

REV. HERMAN JENSEN
DANISH MISSIONARY

MADRAS CALCUTTA BOMBAY

TRACT & BOOK SOCIETY'S DEPÔTS

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THE CONDITIONS
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H. NIELSEN

TRANSLATED FROM THE DANISH



P R E F A C E

While reading the following pages great care should be taken in order always to be clear as to whether the author is giving his own opinion or that of others. I have been requested to draw out a table of contents as a help to follow the author's arguments. This I have tried to do, but only so far as to point out the more important subjects.

I translated the book with the assistance of Mr. J. Lazarus, B. A.; and then got the whole translation thoroughly revised by Miss C. Spence, the translator of Martensen's Christian Ethics, for which my best thanks are due. I am also indebted to the Rev. W. Stevenson, M. A., who was kind enough to revise the proof-sheets. Thus all care has been taken to make the translation intelligible. Yet it is a translation and as such it will have its defects.

Finally my best thanks are due to the Gentlemen who with their pecuniary aid have encouraged me to print the book.

Madras, 22nd Sept. 1882.

Herman Jensen.

Egmore.

PREFACE

The history of the United States is a story of the growth of a nation from a small colony to a great power. It is a story of the struggles of the people for freedom and justice, and of the triumphs of the spirit over the forces of oppression. The story is told in many ways, by the pen of the historian, by the brush of the painter, by the voice of the poet, and by the action of the people themselves. The story is a story of the past, but it is also a story of the present, for the principles of the American Revolution are still the principles of the American people. The story is a story of the future, for the American people are still the people of the future. The story is a story of the world, for the American people are the people of the world.

THOMAS J. BROWN

NEW YORK, 1892

CONTENTS.

Lecture I.

What liberty is, p. 1. The basis of liberty, p. 1. **Is the will innate or acquired?** pp. 2-12. The will compared with the other faculties, pp. 3-4. The will in reference to the movements of our body, p. 6. A distinction drawn between the innate and the self-acquired will, p. 8. The innate and the acquired will viewed in relation to the will of Spirit, pp. 9-12.

Lecture II.

Man's body, soul, and spirit as a unity, pp. 13-15. A distinction between **to have** and **to be**, p. 15. The three wills in man corresponding to body, soul, and spirit, p. 6. The sensuous man, p. 16. The reasonable man, p. 16. The spiritual man, p. 17. The man of the nineteenth century in relation to the sensuous will, the reasonable will and the spiritual will, p. 17. **The sensuous will**, pp. 17-24. Impulse as the germ of will, p. 18. The impulse-will in relation to the reasonable and the spiritual will, p. 18. The impulse-will in reference to "**people**" and "**multitude**", p. 19. The genius-will, a will of impulse, p. 20. Exploits in history under the will of impulse, p. 20. The erotic sentiments in relation to the will of impulse, pp. 21-22. Heroes under the will of impulse, pp. 22-23. General view of the will of impulse, p. 24.

Lecture III.

The will of reason, pp. 25-36. The will of impulse raised to become the will of reason, p. 25. The way in which the will of impulse has to submit to the will of reason, p. 25. A short definition of the will of reason, p. 26. Motives for the will of impulse and the will of reason, pp. 26-27. Difference between the Greek will of impulse and the Roman, pp. 27-28. Is it possible to reconcile pure reason and humanity? p. 29. Reason reasoning about itself, pp. 29-30. The satisfaction of the individual under the will of impulse, p. 30. The satisfaction of the individual under the will of reason, pp. 30-31. The inconsistencies of reason's reasoning, pp. 31-33. Men of reason in ancient times, p. 33. Liberty derived from reason, pp. 33-34. The logical result of the pure will of reason, p. 34. Men of reason in modern times, pp. 34-35. Reason in reference to immortality, pp. 35-36.

Lecture IV.


Discoveries and would-be discoveries of reason, pp. 37-38. What is man? p. 38. The answer of science to this question, p. 39. Difference between animals and men, pp. 39-40. Man's discovery of his own self, p. 40. What man is obliged to, p. 41. The harmony between man's claim and God's claim, p. 42. The discovery of faith, pp. 42-45. Difference between discoveries made by science and those made by faith as regards their appropriation, p. 43. A superficial definition of "faith", p. 44. What faith is, pp. 44-45. Is an inquirer after faith able to stand in the same relation to religious facts as one after nature stands to nature? pp. 45-46. Historical evidences insufficient as evidences for faith, p. 46. Difference between the will of spirit and the will of reason, pp. 46-49. The work of the spirit, p. 47. The help the spirit gives to the wills of impulse and reason, pp. 47-48. Is science able to conceive the religious? pp. 48-49.

Lecture V.

Whence comes the Spirit? p. 51. Revelation and miracles, pp. 52-58. Objections to miracles, p. 52. What is the moving power in universal existence? p. 53. Difference between the probable and the possible as to faith in the religious, p. 54. The Revealer, p. 54. The possibility of miracles, pp. 55-56. How far science is able to give proofs of God's existence? p. 57. Why does the Spirit not show His almighty power in the world? pp. 58-60. Self-delusion in thought, in will and in feeling, p. 60. Development leading to a denial of the Eternal, pp. 60-62. Love and hatred, p. 62. Self-delusion as to the religious among religious men, pp. 63-65. Attempts of new rationalists, pp. 65-67. Revelation in relation to the individual, pp. 66-67. How to measure one's faith? pp. 68-69.

Lecture VI.

The choice of God and the choice of men, p. 70. What faith is, p. 70 (pp. 44-45). What the three wills respectively aim at, p. 71. The temporal, what it is, p. 72. The eternal, what it is, p. 72. Difference between the living and the lifeless, p. 73. The will of impulse and the will of reason in relation to the eternal, p. 74. The relation between the temporal and the eternal during temporal existence, pp. 74-75. The blessed state and the condemned state, pp. 75-76. The religious and the human, p. 76. Sin in reference to the religious and the human, p. 77. Life in this world as a condition for life in God, p. 79. Godly and ungodly actions, pp. 79-80. The human in relation to the three different wills, p. 81. The matrimonial state in relation to the religious, pp. 81-83. Civic society, p. 83. "Sell all that thou hast and give to the poor" from the standpoint of wills of impulse and of Spirit, pp. 83-86. The difference between idea and Spirit, pp. 86-89.



ON THE WILL.

Lecture I.

There is in the human mind an unconquerable restlessness, an obscure ungovernable craving for liberty. But what is liberty? A personal good, therefore something more than an outward circumstance. If liberty were only an outward circumstance, which could be attained by withdrawing oneself from outward restraint and compulsion, the gipsy would be more free than the citizen, the beasts of the forest and the fowls of the air more free than men. But liberty is essentially an inward good, liberty is the independence of our individuality, the essential stamp of our personality, liberty is our patent of nobility, our inward, real, original self.

Independence is based upon self-reliance, self-reliance upon self-determination, and self-determination is liberty. The more self there is within a man, the more liberty there will be. The less self and the weaker the principle, the smaller is the liberty. The foundation of liberty is will, as the will is the kernel of self. The self is the self-determining power, but the ability of self-determination is the will itself; the will is free: the more powerful the will is, the more liberty; the more weak the will is, the less liberty.

Now, if all men are originally formed for liberty, then it follows that all without exception must have free will. But when we assume that all men have free will, we must certainly acknowledge, that we do not all possess it in the same measure; some have a strong, others a weak will. How is this to be accounted for? Is the will something innate, or is it something self-acquired, or is it perhaps a gift from heaven, a gift from the Spirit, the eternal free Spirit? It may be answered that it is partly innate, partly self-acquired, and still altogether a gift of heaven; but in this case we have to see how this is to be exactly understood.

Our first pre-supposition was that the will has its source in *something innate*. The will rests upon natural constitution. It is a well known fact that individuals are born with such marked self-reliance, that they appear as mere wills. They are born rulers. The impress of ruling power together with its superiority is on them, whether they belong to a higher or lower class. Those who saw Napoleon in his first youth met the very same glance of the eye, the fine features seeming to promise a remarkable destiny, the same iron will in the young pupil of Brienna, that was afterwards observed in the great emperor. Others again are born into this world with such weak self-reliance, and show such a remarkable want of will that they give one the impression that they are destined to go in leading strings all their life long. Even if they are born in the purple, and with a sceptre in their hand, so to speak, this weakness of will is still so great, that they are themselves neither able to form any determinate resolution nor stick to one. They live under a constant pupilage: favourites, servants, counsellors have to determine everything for them, which these generally undertake very willingly.

Instead of holding the principle that all men have the same right to the privilege of liberty, one is tempted from this stand-

point to believe that Nature has raised an insurmountable barrier between the free-born and the slave, that is to say, has predestined some to self-reliance and others to dependence, some to be masters and others to be slaves. However, as regards the innate will we dare not overlook the fact, that the faculty of volition is by no means under the same conditions as the other faculties of the soul, as for instance, the memory. When one says: "Once I had an excellent memory, but alas, I lost it almost entirely during a severe illness," we pity him and we do so without any reservation. On the other hand, if any person comes forward with the assertion: "Once I had a very powerful will, but unfortunately I lost it during a severe attack of fever," we should then too feel pity, but with a certain reservation. One may lose his sight without losing his hearing, one may to a certain extent lose his memory without losing his intellect; but we know no sickness, in which a man can lose his will and otherwise recover health.

The man who assures us that he has retained all the faculties of his mind unimpaired, except the will, which was unfortunately lost during an ague, is not of sane mind. What a singular man! He has knowledge, education, a brilliant memory, and as far as one can see, good sense too; he is able to take part in conversation upon many subjects, such as science, politics, art, mercantile business, no one being able to detect any deficiency in him. Only on one point, viz: that about the will, and the ague, he becomes strange. Such things may happen, when the mind becomes diseased. An old woman, who in her own family, had always been looked upon as healthy and robust, suddenly took a fancy that she could not eat. Had she then no appetite? She had. Was she afraid of being poisoned? No. What was the matter with her then? Alas! It was her sad fate. She had for a long time a foreboding, and now at once the mat-

ter became clear to her. She was not like other people furnished with internal organs, and of what use then would it be to eat? She was, she declared, hollow inside, quite hollow, hollow as a drum, and then she wept. In like manner a man may get into his head the crotchet that he has lost his will, or that he never has been gifted with such a faculty, that in his inner being there is something hollow, in the inmost recesses an empty space, a little dark hole, exactly where the will ought to have been placed.

This is a crotchet; but feeling convinced that it must be such, we take a step forward in comprehension. In other words, we comprehend that the will in spite of its innate origin is far more dependent on ourselves than any other faculty whatever. By merely willing I could not attain a strong memory, by merely willing I could not procure a brilliant intellect, nor by merely willing could I acquire deep feeling or a fertile imagination; such advantages depend on the gift of Nature; concerning all these we can say: "No man by taking thought can add one cubit unto his stature." Regarding the will, however, it is quite another thing. The will I get solely and alone, because I will, wholly because I will. A man may have many great gifts and rich talents; but if he will not, he will not get any will. He who wills half, gets a half will; but he who wills with power, gets a powerful will. From this standpoint it will be seen that the will is its own cause; by willing we produce will. The will therefore is our own product, a product by which the self or the power of volition within us produces itself. It may be given us to will; but will cannot be given to us, we must acquire it for ourselves. The will is something *self-acquired*.

Why then have not all men in the same degree a strong and powerful will? According to the above mentioned view, it must be their own fault. But this view too has its variations. One stands forth with an objection, let us hear what he has to say. He says:

If will depended entirely upon the act of willing, then my will, I unhesitatingly affirm, would be one of the greatest and strongest of the present age. For the self-attainment of will, a will evolved by will and in itself a constantly increasing and strengthened self-determination, a mighty, great and energetic will is exactly the ideal, which I have enthusiastically pursued since the days of my youth. But just on account of my enthusiasm I have come short of my ideal. I did not give myself up to the extravagant fancy that a man can in the external world effect what he will, that the will can remove mountains. I stuck to gifts granted to me; but indeed within the internal world, I have seen the yawning gulf between *willing* and *being able* to effect. To be able to fix my will as my own, I had to begin a careful and precise separation of that which belonged to me from that which did not belong to me. When I had eliminated everything not belonging to me, what had I then left? Only this power to will, this inward determination, the idea of will, the pure will, a shadow without power. Only in so far as I am clearly conscious of my will, dare I call it mine, and only so far as I am able to call it mine, can I determine it? What I am not conscious of does not belong to me; no one can determine what he does not know. The only thing in the will of which I am conscious is that I know I will. With this consciousness I may remain day after day, and go on willing and willing without achieving any thing at all. At the very moment that I essay to undertake something, there spring up before me at once a multitude of heterogeneous subordinate circumstances, which I did not anticipate and which I am unable to control. For instance, I may sit down at a richly spread table, hungry and thirsty, but if I do nothing else there than will, I shall simply starve, and this is just what I do not will. Now people say with justice that this is sophistry. "Stretch out your hand and help yourself; in short, make use of your power and

you will not die from starvation.” But I have a suspicion that people in cases like this are not always aware of the force of what they themselves say. “Make use of your power.” This is exactly my dilemma. Is it the use of the limbs that depends on the will, or is it not rather the use of the will, that depends on the limbs? When we voluntarily move hand and arm, it seems to us that it is our conscious will, which does it, but that it is not really so, we may perceive on from the smaller reflection. The will moves the nerves, the nerves move the muscles, and the muscles move the arm without our being in any way conscious of how the process is effected. Only so much we know, that it is not that in our will, which we dare call ours, that is able to effect this. If the arm gets lame, if the nerves of movement are cut, the person concerned may will as much as he likes, yet the arm will not move.

If the use of the power rested absolutely upon our will, then our will itself would have the power within its authority. To acquire will by willing vigorously would then be literally the same as to acquire those bodily powers which are needful for the will. One would then by self-acquired will be able to overcome sickness, and recover health; but that this is impossible, will be acknowledged by every one. It is a known fact, that certain muscles and movements of muscles are subjected to the will; but it is evident that this will is by no means our conscious self-acquired will, which from the beginning has made itself master over the muscles. To explain the use of the organs by saying it is all due to habit is simply want of thought. Habit comes from repetition; the will, it is said, repeats the use of the organs for so long a time that at last it obtains a mastery over their movements. Thus the use of the bodily powers is explained by saying: that use is repeated; an indifferent explanation indeed, when the question is exactly concerning the possibility of use. This is

really just as if one should explain a miracle by saying, that the miracle repeats itself.

The disease called *St. Vitus's dance* affords striking instances of the disproportion between the will and the movements of the body. The limbs move without consulting the will. In the course of conversation it seems to one that the words we use, are simply governed by our conscious will, and still it is not always easy to find the very word we want. In cases of weakness of the brain the discrepancy between what the patient really wants to say, and what he really says, may be even so great, that for instance he would say "kitchen" when he meant "bread", and "drawer" when he meant "money". The will aims at the right thing, but the motive powers refuse to afford the right use.

The will is like a master, who carries out all his purposes through his servants, and for that reason has to bear the responsibility of all that the servants do. If some good work has been done, then we praise not the servants but the master, because it was he who willed or determined it to do so. This goes on all right so long as the servants have no will of their own, but like slaves render perfect and implicit obedience. But if they begin to act according to their own will and become disobedient or perhaps half obedient, then the master can no longer bear the responsibility. And yet, as a rule, a master has more control over his servants, than the will has over the bodily powers. Besides, the master may dismiss a disobedient servant and employ another. But the will has not the power of getting rid of old disobedient nerves and employing new ones instead.

Make use of your powers! It is as if an Aladdin should say: "Rub the lamp!" The employment of the powers by the will is not at all arbitrary, for it is governed by laws; but in its fundamental principles it is yet as inexplicable as the coming of the spirit on the lamp being rubbed. The will wills, and the powers

move; the lamp is rubbed, and the spirit comes. The first phenomenon is as enigmatical as the last.

We have now considered two mutually contrary theories of the will of which the first makes the will exclusively something *innate*, while the last makes it no less exclusively *self-acquired*. That both these theories end in absurdity is owing to the fact that each of them in its own way mistakes the will itself for its condition. The innate will is not the will; it is only a disposition or inclination towards will and so far a *condition*. The self-acquired will is not the basis of the will. Self-acquirement pre-supposes precisely that which should be acquired. To produce will, one must will, but *to be able* to will, one must beforehand have the will, and to will powerfully one must have a powerful will. He who has no will at all to begin with, cannot will; and he who has not beforehand a powerful will, is not able to will powerfully. From this then it will be clear that the process of self-acquirement during which the will appears and develops, cannot be the fundamental basis and first cause, but only *a condition*.

Now one might be tempted to join the two conditions together and say: The will is something partly innate and partly self-acquired; and so by combining the innate and the acquired in one, we get both the origin and self-determination of the will, in other words, the whole will. This is an impossibility; the two conditions are too heterogeneous to coalesce so very easily. There is in the nature of will something which rests on nature and something which depends on us. But that which rests on nature cannot possibly depend on us; for, if so, we ought to say, that the whole depends on us. On the contrary, that which depends upon us cannot be said to depend on nature; for, if so, all would depend on nature. Nay, that which shall join the two heterogeneous conditions together must positively be a third

higher, a power of will, which is at the same time in nature and still above nature, within us and still above us. This power of will is *the Spirit*.

On apprehending our free will as a gift of the Spirit, it becomes in the highest sense a problem of my life, the solving of which is a religious exercise. But on becoming religious, the difficulties recur with even greater strength, because here begins the misconstruction in all its seriousness.

Religiousness has many enemies. Pious men lament bitterly over the wickedness of our days and the increasing infidelity; certainly they have reason for doing so, when they look abroad and see the number of outward enemies constantly growing. But the real enemy is within: Yes, they say, our arch-foe is within, that is the devil, antichrist, the beast with many horns, whose mark we soon perceive—in the outward world? But the enemy is within, in the religious individual himself, a host of lurking misconceptions. The first dangerous enemies a believing mind has to defend itself against, are monsters of its own imagination. Such monsters appear under many disguises; they do not always announce themselves by agony of soul, doubt and despondency shunning the light; they announce themselves often by exaggerated faith, false self-confidence, and with a certain full-blooded self-satisfaction, which obstruct the development of the Spirit. Those who wish to build on the holy foundation of religion must bear themselves like the Israelites when they built the second temple, that sanctuary which in the fullness of time should receive the Saviour of the world; they built it with weapons in their hands. The only difference is this, that the enemies of that material temple were outward, while those of the Spirit's sanctuary are essentially internal.

Reflections too are dangerous, when the intellect begins to reason, while it is still uncertain concerning the origin of the

sphere of the will. There is one who complains, that in spite of all his meditations, he has not been able to come to a clear understanding of the relation in faith, between the Spirit and the will. I receive indeed, he says, a good deal of pious assurance, that it is God the Holy Spirit, who regenerates us and creates within us a new man, a new mind, a new will etc. When this is spoken of in a general way, especially when spoken of with pathos, I get a feeling as if I too understood it, that is to say, in a general way. But when I afterwards think of it myself and try to account for the real nature of the connection between the Spirit and the will, my brain is in a whirl of perplexity. The awakened tell me: "You should not ponder but believe; if you would merely believe, the rest would come of its own accord!" I would gladly believe, but where shall I practically begin? whence shall the beginning issue, from the Spirit or from myself? If it is I who must take the first step, I am then obliged to begin with that will which I have already with me; but that will, which I have, is only the old will, a will of no value, a will outside the Spirit, therefore an unspiritual will. How can a man come to the Spirit by an unspiritual will? To this they reply: "You must pray for the Spirit!" But as long as I have not received the Spirit, my prayer is unspiritual! Therefore it cannot be I who have to begin; it must be Spirit then. If it is taken for granted that the beginning comes from the Spirit and not from me, then, I have to do nothing but sit down quietly waiting for the Spirit. Shall I then become a Quaker? "You have the Spirit already as surely as you have been baptised. It depends on yourself alone, if you will remember your covenant of baptism and give room for the Spirit to work." Give room for the Spirit to work! But then after all here is something which rests entirely with me and not with the Spirit. What is meant then by bearing in mind the covenant of one's baptism? It cannot be a mere bearing in mind or act of memory;


here must be something, which expressly rests on the mind and the will, my own mind, my own will. In order therefore that the Spirit should be able to work within me, I must, as stated above, by my unspiritual will help Him to work within me. Recourse is next had to their last explanation: "Tempt not the Spirit, nor presume to wish to understand how He works. He works in secret as a new nature; nevertheless you experience His influence as a fact. You can understand the fact that a plant grows, but you cannot penetrate the mystery of nature and conceive how it grows. The new life is a new plant, it develops silently; we wax, we grow, that is a fact."

Thus very much edifying discourse passes concerning the spiritual growth of life, its growth even when we sleep. I am, however, sorry to say that this fact does not strike me. Barley grows, oats grow, the foetus grows in the pregnant woman, the child is born and grows up to be a man, and within the man a craving awakens, which he did not know as a child. These are facts. But as regards the growth of the spiritual life in believers we have a peculiar case before us. For many years past, I have heard them say, that it is growing within them, that they constantly grow; I have taken them at their word, carefully observed them, that I might at last be edified by the fact. But what did I find? I have been able to see that outwardly believers too undergo changes in the course of time, that some of them become, if not always taller, not seldom a good deal stouter; but as to the development of character I was not able to discover any progress. It seems to me that the average is exactly at the same degree this year that it was ten, nay twenty years ago; decent people, who, with the exception of a few canting phrases, bear a striking likeness to other decent people. There must then be a great mystery in this growth. My share in the secret, however, is that there is no growth within me. At a certain time I too

went through an awakening and hoped that the new life would grow ; but I am sorry to say, it has not ; I am like the pine-tree, that was once a Christmas-tree—stunted in growth.

Such a specimen of reasoned out misconceptions contains a strong warning that the enemy is within.

What is the significance of all this? To come of course to a clear and proper understanding of what the will is. We began to regard the will as something innate, but the supposition led to absurdity. We then went on treating the will as something self-acquired, but found that this supposition also led to the same conclusion. We concluded by referring the will to the Spirit ; but when the problem assumed a religious aspect, we got amongst misconceptions. It is therefore necessary that an endeavour should be made to discover the true origin of the will and *clear up the conditions for a powerful will.*





Lecture II.

According to an old division, man is said to consist of three principal parts: *body*, *soul*, and *spirit*. These three divisions must not be understood as though man were composed of three separate parts, so that his entire being results from the soul being put into the body, and the spirit into the soul, the external covering the internal, as one box can cover another. If the internal were merely put into the external, the unity would fail, that organic unity which makes us real living beings.

One of the strongest evidences that the human body in spite of the varieties and diversities of its parts, is not a machine, a total pieced together, but is an animated self-unity—is the feeling of pain. There may be pain in the different parts of the body; but the pain as such does not concern each part separately, not even the nerves, it is the soul that feels. To take a case from every day experience. If one has an attack of toothache, he would not say: "It does not concern me, it is a pain in the nerves, for which I do not care"; no, he will acknowledge, that it does concern him, that it is himself who feels the pain that is in the teeth.

If man were such a total pieced together, so that every part had its own life and its own feelings, it would be a very easy thing for the perfect conscious self to submit its body to operations. But in order to submit to painful operations and still to a great extent remain unconscious of the pain, one is now-a-days chloroformed. By this self-narcotic it happens that each separ-

ate member of the body and each separate organ, become like parts that suffer separately.

The feeling, especially self-perception, grows, develops, and is refined by civilisation; but, strange to say, it seems as if the will had degenerated. When Mucius Scævola put his hand into the fire and allowed it to be burned while he spoke to Porsenna, he was certainly not at all under the influence of chloroform. It seems as if his hand had been a mere separate piece of the body, that did not concern him, but had to look out for itself whether it could bear the fire or not; and still there was no parcelling out of the body. He felt what was going on, he felt the pain; but there was within his self something that was stronger than the feeling, above the pain, and that was his resolute will. Mucius Scævola was a man of a powerful will. Is it then only man who in connection with pain is found to possess such a powerful heroic will? No, woman too. History tells us that among the Romans there were such women. When Marcus Brutus, Cassius, and Casca had entered into a conspiracy to murder Cæsar and save the Republic, the secret bore hard upon Brutus, who was afraid of revealing it to his wife: she was but a woman. Portia anticipated what was going to be done, but to make herself worthy of confidence and to show that she, a woman, could stand by the side of men even at the crisis of danger, she gave herself a deep and painful wound in her foot, immediately stepped forth with nimble and firm steps in spite of the agony she was suffering, and then Brutus trusted her with the secret. Portia was a woman with a will, a great, firm, and powerful will.

Now the will as well as the feeling shows us evidently that our human being is not a total pieced together, but a unity of life, a self-determining personal unity, a unity of feeling and a unity of will, an ego (I).

Common sense has in its own way raised itself above the piecing together theory by ascribing to man a nature above that of a mere machine, consisting of three parts. Every man calls himself "I" and says, "I have a body", "I have a soul", "I have a spirit."

Now here occurs a peculiar relation between *to have* and *to be*. Concerning our possessions of outward things, it is quite out of the question to make that, which we have, to be one with that which we are. Because if one has an estate, he will not say: "I am what I have, an estate," nor will he who has a stick say: "I am a stick". To be sure, in certain circles in America it is customary for a host introducing two gentlemen at a party, to each other to say in a short and categorical form: "Two million dollars! four millions!" but although this mention of each sum has the advantage of pointing out the exact angle of inclination for the different nods with which the two greet each other, it cannot be denied that such a simple amalgamation of "*to have*" and "*to be*" does appear to us too materialistic.

It is otherwise when we speak of the parts of our nature and of our essential qualities. In this connection "*to have*" in certain aspects is identical with "*to be*". We have a body, we are bodies, our nature is bodily; we have a soul, we are souls, our nature is psychical; we have a spirit, we are spirits, our nature is spiritual. In this connection of what we have with what we are, we assert the unity of our nature. Our self, our ego, that which we have, and that which we are, is from its very origin bodily-psychical-spiritual. There is in man only one nature; but this nature can be viewed from three standpoints. There are in our original nature three natures: *a sensuous* corresponding to the bodily and that part of the soul which answers to perceptibility and sensuous incitement; *a reasonable*, corresponding to the unbodily, to that part of the soul, that deals with

views of abstract ideas and thoughts of a general character; *a spiritual*, corresponding to the original self in eternal liberty, that is, to the Spirit.

This threefold division is essential to the will and its conditions, because it follows from this that the will itself is divided into three. The many troubles of ours concerning liberty, all our exertions to get ourselves into our own power, to bring ourselves up to self-dependence arise from the fact that we originally have three wills: A *sensuous will* corresponding to our sensuous nature and to that which is innate in the will, a *reasonable will* corresponding to our comprehension of the generally acknowledged laws of the world and to that in the will which is self-acquired, and finally a *spiritual will*, a will which, if it understands itself and comprehends its origin, has its self in unconditional dependence on the Spirit itself, and knows itself to be moved by the will of God.

There are thus three steps on which man may stand with his threefold will; but it is evident that we must be either on the first, or on the second, or on the third of these, if we would have an undivided firm and powerful will.

The sensuous man, by which phrase we understand not merely a man in a rude, natural state, but also one whose talents are still in a natural undeveloped state, stands on the first step. He is with his individual gift, his reason and genius as cast in one mould. The natural man has, no matter how far he has advanced in civilisation, only one ruling will, one original will, and that is the instinctive or sensuous will. The heroic life of old times, and the flourishing life of civilisation among the ancient Greeks show us what this means.

The reasonable man, by whom we exclusively think of those persons whose will is moved by that which seems necessary to the thoughts, and in its essential necessity universal, stands

on the second step. The man of thoughts, the sage, who only wills that he ought to will, has in agreement with himself one will, one original will, and that is the reasonable will. The great men of old times, as Socrates, the Stoics and others, furnish us with examples.

The spiritual man, in the prototype itself the only true man, the revealer of liberty—Jesus—who will emancipate all, stands exclusively on the third step. There are in unity of will two wills, a Divine and a perfect human will. But the two wills are not divided, not discordant; the Divine will is human, and the human is Divine; the oneness of both is an absolute personal oneness of will, that is *the spiritual will*.

We who are the children of the nineteenth century, the men of nature, civilisation, and spirit, the men of many races combined, where are we really standing? Not on any single step of the three; we are standing on all steps, on all possible intermediate steps. The cause of this is that we are not at all one-sided. To stand on one step, to remain and stand firm is to be one-sided, and one-sidedness, we are apt to say, is the fault to be dreaded above all. After all we are not one-sided, which means: we have something of a sensuous will, something of a rational will, and a little of a spiritual will in various proportions. This many-sidedness affects the world of will, which, in spite of its active nature, moves with some difficulty. We have to serve not only two, but three masters. For each of the three wills within us is a "great power," and great powers are always ambitious. If none of the three can acquire supremacy, certainly they will be at variance with another; they will weaken us, parcel out our being, and divide us, as the great powers once divided Poland.

We shall now view each of the three steps of will in their respective order. And first, we will take the *sensuous will*.

Man, like the beast, possesses certain natural impulses; but

on this account man is no beast, nor are human impulses bestial. One, however, ought not to disregard these impulses, they belong necessarily to the nature of man; only when human impulses turn out to be bestial, man has reason to be afraid of himself. The characteristic of the human impulse is, that the sensuous may accept the intellectual, that it may submit itself to judgment and draw power from the spiritual. Impulse may embrace the lowest and the highest; there is an impulse towards sensuous enjoyment, but there is also an impulse towards the kingdom of God.

Impulse is the fruitful bosom of the will, the bolster and swaddling clothes from which it evolves itself. On account of this the will of impulse acts with a peculiar primitive power of nature. The will cannot grasp, without being grasped by something; it cannot move powerfully, without being truly and strongly moved by something. That, which from the beginning urges and moves, because its object fills the will, the inward moving of the natural will, is impulse.

The will of impulse may appropriate the intellectual and be filled with ideas, but by so doing, it cannot become an intellectual will, it remains simply a *reasonable* will of impulse. It may possess a longing for eternal happiness and appropriate the promises of liberty, nay, even the spiritual nature of deep love, and yet it can never become spiritual; it is and remains a *spiritual* will of impulse. If we think of the relation between husband and wife, between mother and child, we will acknowledge that on the foundation of the will of impulse, the sensuous may be transformed into the intellectual and spiritual. The passions may at the same time be both sensual and intellectual. The poet praises love, and we thank him for doing so. But love is a will, and yet, we call it a passion too. Right! In Cupid the will is the passion, and the passion the will; so it must be: that is the will of impulse. Those who insist that this will of impulse

in its mysterious foundation is bestial, calumniate Cupid and scoff at humanity. Juliet loves Romeo, her will is passion; but this passion is like a spiritual breath of life, the higher element in which she grows; its flash and flame is the light in which she stands transformed.

How great the extent of the impulse-will is, may be easily seen when it is applied to the terms "*people*" and "*multitude*." Where are the people? In the multitude. Where then is the multitude? Amongst the people. And yet the multitude is not the people, and the people more than the multitude, although both the terms fall within the drift-will. We have a sublime example of this in the Old Testament. When Moses was with Jehovah on the mountain, the people grew disorderly, became a multitude, a crowd. This passion-moved multitude demanded from Aaron, that he should make them gods, that might guide them and "walk before them". That was an impulse-will. Gods of gold, gold-gods, that were something more real and tangible than that Invisible up in the clouds. Multitude claimed it, and claimed it with a loud voice, for it possessed a will. Aaron found their will to be a powerful one; so he mistook the multitude for the people and made the golden calf. When Moses came down and Aaron saw his countenance he was afraid and besought him: "My master! do not be angry with me, thou knowest the people that they are set on mischief." Then it was evident what the spiritual will is. Moses placed himself at the gate of the camp and ordered: "Who is on the Lord's side, let him come forth unto me!" Moses perilled his life, for the multitude was infuriated. But on hearing the voice of command, that powerful authoritative voice, the multitude changed its mind and got another will: the multitude again became the people. But did the people then all at once get a spiritual will? No! Only Moses had a spiritual will, but through him the people got a will, which

by an involuntary impulse had to yield to the Spirit. This then was a spiritual will of impulse, and a higher will than this the people as such can never get.

As regards the particular forms of the impulse-will, every spiritual exertion which depends originally upon any particular gift, talent, or genius, is to be referred to impulse-will. Genius-will is impulse-will.

It is a deep and true and touching trait in Oehlenschläger's Correggio, that poor Antonio, whose courage had been crushed by Michael Angelo's unjust judgment, upbraiding himself and yet comforting himself on the ground of the innocence of art saying: "God knows, I did not sketch that picture in order to make a show of it. I painted it, as the bee forms its honeycomb and as the bird builds its nest in the tree;" so he did it from an innate impulse, from artistic impulse, that is, the will of impulse.

If this can be maintained concerning practical outward activity, how much more important will it be as regards historical exploits, as incitement of impulses and passions! This is seen in the case of heroes, a circle of great figures, who are all under the will of impulse. How much intellect, how many ideas and thoughts has the will here been able to appropriate, and yet it is not, if viewed more closely, the will of reason, and still less will of spirit, but simply a will of impulse animated by ideas, and inflamed by passions, which we here have to deal with. It is a spiritual power of nature, an unconquerable craving, that urges the hero forward; he wills because it is his nature to will. Scule Jarl in "*Kongsæmnerne*" will not give up his war against Hakan, or renounce the throne and make peace; and why not? It is against the craving of his nature; the great ambition of becoming king says: No.

It is a peculiar exalting sight to contemplate the many very

different phenomena, which the will of impulse has exhibited at all ages, in each sex and in every possible way; they are like meteors, they shine; but the more they shine, the more easily do they break up. Individuals actuated by the will of impulse are not, in spite of their powerful will, free, but enslaved by nature: they are under the force of obscure powers. Surely they do not rush forth blindfolded, for if they blindly followed the inspiration of passions, became eccentric, comet-like in their course, we would lose our interest in them. But even though they desire to keep within the track of the idea to a certain degree at least, their way would still be the most dangerous of all. They have elevation, power of motion and swiftness; but the foundation is rocking, and their movement is like a dance over an abyss. They might get power over others, but no one among them all can, in the true sense of the word, get himself under his own power.

It is peculiar to the will of impulse to be moved by something over which it has no control in itself.

Take, for instance, the erotic passion. To fall in love, it is said, is something which happens to people without their being able to tell from whence and why they do so. It is not merely youths, who are exposed to this; no age can be quite secure: elderly people, especially, if attacked by the passion, are generally severely smitten by it. But anything coming of its own accord, might leave again of its own accord; if it depend upon the humour of the will of impulse, no one can account for it. The unsafe condition is particularly seen, when two feelings are at variance with each other, or two passions rise up against each other, like two waves, and a surf ensues. The party concerned is as it were in the peril of the deep; of course it does not depend on him which of the waves will be the highest, or in plain words, which of the two wills within him is to have the mastery. When the erotic will, for example, is placed against the art-will, we have a

beautiful story about a young chivalrous lover, who burned his harp to rescue his beloved from death from cold. But this can be easily reversed; for many poetical lovers have left their dear ones to die from cold, and saved their harps. No person is to be held responsible, neither the faithless nor the faithful. No one can be called to account, as everything depends on the largest wave. There is a Romance by Schak Staffeld called the *Return*; it treats of a Moorish warrior, who returns home from the shore of Tagus with "the dust of fight in his curled hair, and its blood in his track path"; he calls his dear one "Selindaja!" But she only gives an evasive answer; he may speak of anything he likes, the grotto, the almond tree, the railing; there is something wrong in everything, all has been changed. At last he says in noble vexation: "Ha! faithless woman, while I have been about these fifteen years gathering of glory, without shame, you have given away to another your faith"; she replies in a cold and unexcited manner, as one who had a good conscience: "Why! my love I did not give away, Allah, hear my words! Almoralif has taken it and how could I help it?"


That the heroes in spite of all their powerful will, are after all as uncertain regarding themselves as the lover, presupposing that their will is merely an impulse-will, can be easily accounted for. If one examines what it really is, in the character of a hero with so many plans and under so many diverse influences, and thwartings of outward circumstances, that keeps the whole together and builds the foundation of harmony, by looking at it on close inspection, it will be found that it is by no means a self-powerful will, but simply one or another absolute ruling passion. Such a passion does not always appear on the foaming surface, it prefers to keep itself underneath the waves and works quietly in the deep. But that it is not the hero himself, but the passion, which is the real master, becomes evident, when circumstances


so happen, as to awaken in the mind a new and powerful passion that stirs up the deep, and the two opponents are brought into contest with each other. In a case like this the more powerful passion may suddenly turn weak, become for a time insane, and the character breaks to pieces, so to speak. Just one example from ancient history: Marcus Antonius. During the triumvirate of Octavius, Antonius and Lepidus, so far as his gifts and talents as a general were concerned, Antonius could certainly compete with Octavius in taking revenge on Cæsar's murderers. Nevertheless he succumbed when it afterwards came to enmity between themselves. Why? The common explanation is that Antonius abandoned himself to debauched passions, while Octavius during the confusion of fighting understood the art to rule himself, to consider every step, to remain in a decent way, and to keep the folds of the toga closed. However, one would be very wrong in concluding, that Octavius was a man, who only followed the commands of reason, while Antonius was urged on by blind impulses. The truth is, that both of them were under the will of impulse. The difference between the two characters has to be decided by the relation between their passions. Octavius, afterwards the very fortunate Emperor Augustus, had the good luck to be ruled by only one passion, a passion that had power enough to compel and subdue all other passions within him. The state of health of Octavius was such that he had only one sickness, the sickness of ruling. On the contrary Antonius had the bad luck to be possessed by two passions, infected with a double sickness, the sickness of ruling and the sickness of love. He arrived in Egypt, saw Cleopatra, and how could he help it? She conquered and captivated him. Upon this the battle at Actium was fought. Antonius ran away, because Cleopatra ran away, to Egypt, and as she, the truthless, kept herself hidden, and caused a rumour to be spread that she was dead, Antonius

put himself to death. The hero fell, an unfortunate victim to a passion, that was as faithful as it was unaccountable.

As regards its nature the impulse-will is the same, whether it appears in little incidents of every day life or shows itself in great historical events; but if we wish to penetrate its nature, it will be best, for the sake of clearness, to look at it in great events. We will then see, that the secret of its power is weakness, that self-independence is dependence, that the strong liberty succumbs to necessity. The hero and heroine of the will of impulse are dauntless to stem the tide of events; their outset is imposing: each vessel goes under press of sail, for passions fill the sails. But there are dangerous shallows, the compass has incalculable variations, the impulse-will is like a drunken steersman at the helm, and the sheet-anchor is wanting. And thus they become a wreck, they run aground on the rock of fate. Opposed to the one restless element of impulses, of proclivity and of passions, stands the barrier of existence, the inexorable laws of nature, the firm walls of reality; that is the power of fate, and no wonder the end is tragic. That a single person, like Octavius, is fortunate enough to escape shipwreck, is a mere accident, a phenomenon, that only concerns the outward; in the event itself they are all under fate.

It is in the collision between the restless and the firm, between the impulse and the reason, that self is dissolved and ruined. When the outward resistance incites the passion, when the internal seething and boiling increase, and the surf rises, the deep has its own thoughts, it thinks upon destruction; the large vessels, the grand sails are dashed into fragments, the powers of the will of impulse are dispersed. After all the will of impulse is not free will; if the will is to be free, it must be transformed, raised to a new step and be subjected to laws. In the following lecture we will make an attempt to inquire into the subject.





Lecture III.

It is a transformation that the will must undergo to raise itself from the first natural step to its next and higher one from being a will of impulse to become one of *reason*. That this transition is more than a change, that viewed in its essence, it rests on transformation, must be emphatically asserted.

The impulse-will may, as shown above, be enlightened, be altered, be spiritualised, may be changed from a sensual blind will into an intelligent will, a will with thoughts, ideas, plans; it is a progress for the better, a refinement, a great change, but it is not yet a transformation. The inmost moving power is impulse and remains impulse, all of which falls within the province of an enslaved obscure impulse of nature. As long as impulse rules, passion is the real dynamometer; and there are not only raging violent passions, but also still, quiet passions, brooding, dreaming, smouldering passions. But it must be maintained within the whole circle of natural excitements: the more passion the more will, the force of the passion is the condition for the power of will.

As soon as the impulse-will progresses from a reasonable will of impulse, it becomes what we may in the right sense of the term call a will of reason, and the transformation takes place. Everything is changed from the very foundation. The impulses are not rooted out, but their power is subdued. They are reclaimed; the natural excitements enter into the service of reason, and must engage themselves to unconditional obedience. New motives, a perfect stock of new motives takes the helm; it is

literally a new dynasty that ascends the throne. Instead of impulse we have insight; not blind obscure feelings, but clear thoughts, not enticing views of a juggling hope, but notions of general utility, a firm conviction of that which is in itself true and right. This will be the moving power of the will after this has become a will of reason. At this stage neither likes nor dislikes nor inclinations are in question, but only duty and right; for duty and right are personal expressions for incontrovertible laws. There is astonishing sublimity; a frigid sanctuary, a cupola with everlasting stars is arching over temporal existence. Man comprehends his original destiny and begins to respect himself. But in the attractive there is something repulsive too, something that causes one to shudder. To make the will free, reason has to begin to cut asunder those ties by which it is bound to the maternal root of impulses; every nerve, every fibre and thread from the maternal trunk must be torn asunder. If reason is to rule, it must rule altogether. Such an autocrat pays no regard to the motions of the heart, it will not parley with whimsical inclinations, it will not acknowledge any veto from the feelings: reason is a sovereign with absolute power.

It will be understood from this, that the sovereignty of reason does not depend upon the external appearance of an act, but intrinsically upon its inmost motive. An act, arising from a reasonable will of impulse, might in its external appearance have a striking resemblance to an act arising from pure will of reason: the difference lies in the inmost motive. When we speak of historical persons it is often difficult to pass a faultless sentence. An Agamemnon sacrifices his daughter; a Junius Brutus "offers up his sons on the altar of civic liberty": what kind of actions are these in reality? Those, who immediately cry out: "blind fanatics, monsters, unnatural fathers!" do not exhibit a very deep insight either into the nature of the will of impulse or into the nature of

the will of reason; for, to be sure, there arise scenes, collisions, frightful coincidences from claims at variance with one another under which the cool reason may tyrannize over the natural feelings of the heart with even greater force than any passion inflamed by the will of impulse.

These acts might, when viewed at a distance, look like acts of reason; because it is the command of reason, that everything individual must be sacrificed for the universal. Yes, this might be so. But looked at more closely, neither Agamemnon nor Brutus holds the stand-point of pure reason; both engrossed with limited objects, although aiming at the universal good of society: their will is a potential will of impulse. On the ground of limited objects the reason must regulate the impulse, as to other matters it must treat them with leniency, that it may within certain limits get liberty to preserve itself in all its naturalness. From this point of view a dark shadow falls on the two persons, Agamemnon and Brutus; because the heart of the father has as fully its indisputable right, as universal society has its claims on the king and on the statesman. In the name of impulse-will we claim, and with reason, that the reason must be human, and that its authoritative commands must be reconcilable with humanity. The Greeks, the Spartans excepted, claimed it too; but not the Romans.

The remarkable difference we find upon the whole between the Greek and the Roman mind, between the impulse-will of the Greeks vitally warm, and the cold, but strictly consistent will of the Romans will be known even from examples cited at random. The harsh and revolting element in the sacrifice of Agamemnon, the Greek mythology has known in a peculiar way to soften and reconcile with refined humanity. Artemis, the offended goddess, comes to the help of human sentiment, she claims her sacrifice, but she saves it too; she saves Iphigenia, carries her away to

Tauris and chooses her for her priestess. The impression of the divine gentleness destroys the severe cruelty of the act of sacrifice, and affects us as a fountain of spirituality in which the natural feeling becomes purified. This, however, is quite otherwise in the Roman tragedy. Certainly the sons of Brutus had sinned against the Republic, in as far as they had joined the young conspirators, whose intention it was to reintroduce monarchy, and Brutus, "the deliverer of his native country" could not without being inconsistent have voted for their pardon. But the manner, in which the execution has been depicted, the petrifying coldness with which the father without even turning his face away, looks at the fall of the heads of his sons, that is entirely opposed to all humanity, a symbol of the will of the Romans disregarding all natural, human feelings.

This heartless hardness, this unyielding sternness of will quelling all natural feelings, may easily awe the looker-on, confuse his judgment and mislead him to consider the will of the Romans not only as more reasonable than the will of the Greeks, but even as a pure, great and lofty will of reason, an exemplary, systematically carried-out will of a statesman. This is a mere fancy. Surely the will of the Romans is much more systematically consistent than the will of the Greeks, and therefore stronger too. The Greek will in its springlike fresh youthfulness has power, great, ingenious power of nature; but the will of the Romans is more than a mere radiation of power, it is a peculiar oneness of power, a power, a world-conquering, nation-destroying will of power. That this power, far from being what properly speaking we would call a will of reason, is but an unspiritual power of nature, a wolf-greedy insatiable will of impulse, which, after having consumed all, must at last consume itself, is a fact that in this connection needs no evidence: History bears testimony to it.

The modern notion of reason and will of reason is in our days

not more clear or in a practical sense hardly as clear as it was with the sage of olden time. We claim reason and we claim humanity; but the question is, whether these two claims can be actually united, if reason is to be our first and last, the sole, highest governing power in the mental world.

We claim that reason should rule us and yet treat the feelings of our heart with leniency; we think that this might be done as our noble inclinations give strong evidence of intellectual peculiarities, and if so, they must be quite willing to submit to unconditional dominion of the will of reason: this must, however, be a mistake. We claim from the reason, that it should not merely be strict, but at the same time temperate, that it should respect our weakness, in short, educate us as a strict, but kind father educates his children. But the analogy fails. Reason is no kind father, but an inexorable ruler, cold, unchanging as the eternal law. When the father punishes his little boy, the little one repents of his fault and promises amendment and good behaviour: "will be a good boy!" Upon this the storm subsides and a reconciliation ensues, although the father knows, that the repenting sinner will as soon forget his promise as he forgets the rod. But reason cannot treat us who are adults in this way, it cannot at the same time both flog and forgive. We claim, that reason should respect our individuality, should be friendly, be a gentle, human and pleasing reason: Under these constitutional conditions it may be allowed to rule supreme. But with such conditions the reason will have nothing to do. And why not? Because it cannot without contradicting itself and becoming unreasonable.

Is reason then despotic, inhuman and cruel? By no means. Far be it from us to depreciate reason, to speak ill of it, and to try to put blame on its pure and exalted character. On the contrary, we will let reason speak for itself. It says to man:

“You have to choose. Will you remain on the stand-point of the will of impulse? Well! as far as I can, I will assist you in giving you advice and admonition, instruction and enlightenment in every way. But then you must know, that I am merely your servant, not your master. If you choose, you may follow my advice, and if you choose, you may reject them: I am not responsible for the result. If your feelings are set at variance, if your passions make insurrection, if your mind is in a ferment, and a whirlpool arises, which draws you away and whirls you down into an abyss, the matter is your own concern: I have no responsibility at all. If on the contrary you desire to be set free from a state of natural bondage, and be raised up to the stage of self-independence, the process will be just the reverse. Then it will be I who have to command and you who have to obey. I am then not your servant, but unconditionally your master: Now choose!” This language cannot be called inhuman; it is, I think, quite reasonable, spoken by the reason.

The only thing to be feared is that reason on becoming so absolute, will forget to use the noble royal prerogative, called the right of pardoning. And so it is. Reason is the universal devoid of self, the nature and substance of which is the inseparable association of laws. The will of reason is the will of self, as far as the reflecting self only wills that the laws of necessity be fulfilled. The emancipation lies in this, that the self wills what by conviction it ought to will: it dissolves itself into the universal and selfless.

At the stage of the impulse-will the individual is happy, if its individual claims, be they material or spiritual, are satisfied; therefore health is a good thing, sickness a bad thing, wealth a good thing, poverty a bad thing, etc. The reason will never accede to such a satisfaction. Everything external and internal, both perceptible and imperceptible good things, as far as they

serve to satisfy merely the natural individuality, are of a subordinate significance. One need not indeed despise them; but they are subjected to casualty and depend upon luck, and therefore must be reckoned among things in themselves indifferent. The sage is above the changeableness of fortune; he hopes for nothing, because he fears nothing: this is the old Stoic ideal, and this ideal of reason is as yet the only consistent one. The sage is sufficient to himself; he wills what the fates will; his life is a revelation of fate, and thus he is strong as fate, firm as rock, unshaken as fate.

If we now look at this ideal of reason a little more closely—and there is none else besides this—we shall see, that the much praised harmony of character in itself, about which both in old times and now-a-days there has been made so much fuss, dissolves in contradiction upon contradiction, and that these contradictions by no means have their origin in eternal reason, but have it in men's misunderstanding of what reason is, and for what it should be employed.

And first it is an easy thing to comprehend that the ideal set forth cannot be realized. The high-flown phrases, that the sage is sufficient to himself, is happy even in a fiery furnace, is king, priest, soothsayer, poet—must be taken for what they are worth—mere phrases. If one say: such an ideal is set forth as the end, to reach which we strive endlessly; but we attain it only in an infinite approximation: then it is not difficult to convince oneself, that this approximation includes a contradiction. As long as all that which the natural individuality must look upon as essential good things: health, natural gifts, riches, respectability, power, influence etc. have not yet been reduced to be looked upon as something quite indifferent, that is to say, so long as the inmost inducing power is natural impulse, so long man remains under the will of impulse. Standing upon this step, it is as

impossible to catch the pure ideal of reason, as to approach the moon by travelling round the earth. If it is seriously urged, that the conscious reason must in all our actions be the inmost inducement, so that no one dare desire anything unless reason commands it; no one can feel hunger or thirst, love or hate, unless expressly ordered to do so by the reason; then begins inhumanity. But an end that according to its inmost nature is inhuman, cannot be an ideal for men.

The contradiction appears in all actual affairs. That things temporal without exception are indifferent, means in plain language, that all limited objects are indifferent. The sage must be able to be at one with himself in all situations, must be active under any terms of existence. The will of reason must be active, its powerful nature is activity. The sage may, for instance, be a commander-in-chief. He fights a battle. Why? To gain a victory! Yes, only a fool thinks so, an individual who is yet under the will of impulse. No, the wise man fights a battle for the sake of reason, entirely for the sake of reason. Whether he gains a victory or is defeated, or whether he gains glory or shame, does not concern him; in this respect he is quite indifferent. But if all external ends are indifferent, then the corresponding actions too must be indifferent. Why then will the wise man condescend to act?

The sage acts and works not for the sake of other people, not for the sake of the nation, not for the sake of the state, but entirely for his own sake, that he in his existence and activity might know of himself that he is in harmony with reason. From this follows again that his standard of virtue and vice must be altogether different from that adjusted for the community of citizens. As every external act is in itself indifferent, its quality, its merits or demerits must exclusively depend on the character acting, according as he is in harmony with himself or not. The sage

may in consequence of his claims to self-harmony be entitled to commit acts, that in the eyes of men would look like crimes; he may plunder, murder, steal, lie, all in consequence of pure reason. In this respect nothing is forbidden, except the impossible.

But one objects to this, saying: If the man of pure reason can become such a monster, how then could characters so noble and elevated as Socrates, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius be counted among men of reason? Our answer is: They are standing on the step of will of reason, as far as the inmost impulse is not an undeveloped and obscure impulse, but a truth which has been made clear by thought. But by an ethical self-delusion they have made the reason something more than it is, a spiritual self-existence, a deity that wills. They have from their own rich recesses of being placed something in reason, which cannot possibly be derived from its nature. They are characters with a religious back-ground: the personal pre-supposition is, that self is eternal. Such a pre-supposition is indeed not against reason, but—again and again it must be enforced—it cannot be proved by reason, cannot be derived from the pure concept of reason. The concept of reason, looked at as it is, is the concept of the selfless universal: arguments of reason are arguments of necessity, and not arguments of liberty.

That concept of liberty that can be derived from the pure reason is as self-contradictory as possible. The sage has a will, because he has a self. Then he begins to purify this self, to pour it into the crucible of reason in order to release it from admixture of impulse. He collects himself, works with a power of will, an energy as though this self were destined for a whole eternity. But exactly here the contradiction reaches its highest point; it culminates, so to speak, in the zenith of reason. Because self, viewed in this light, is not eternal; it is perishable as things in

nature. The existing self is individual, and the individual will be dissolved and perish. Only the reason is eternal, eternal as the laws. When the sage has played his part on the theatre of the world, quite indifferent as to whether it is the part of a beggar, a tailor or an emperor, and sees that his part is over, he resigns. He need not wait for natural relief, he can relieve himself, he can with satisfaction extinguish his light and go away: to put oneself to death is the expression of the highest will of fate, that concept of will in which the self dissolves itself, that last act of the formal liberty of the reason.

But if man himself is perishable as everything else in the world and the perishable is an indifferent thing, then it must be evident from this, that the self too is an indifferent thing, its self-independence and self-harmony at last an indifferent thing: and yet it is exactly for the sake of self and self-independence—and therefore for an indifferent thing!—that one should live, act and work. This is the logical result of the pure will of reason.

Modern consciousness admits, that the real Stoics had involved themselves in contradictions, but of course, they admit too that the ethical ideal of reason is the only true one. The fact is, that those old thinkers were one-sided. Their view of the world was cold and barren: the substance of existence, luxuriant growth of the tree of life, its umbrageous trunk, the dancing beams, luxuriant shoots of individuality, with foliage and flowers in fragrance and colour, all this is lacking; all this was overlooked, for the old thinkers were, as already stated, one-sided. But the new thinkers are all-sided, they take up everything, small problems as well as great, they do not overlook anything. How do they manage then? It seems intricate, and yet it is very simple: they hastily make nature reason, and the substance of life, the concrete, comes of its own accord. Reason is natural in feelings, impulse and passions; nature is reasonable in thoughts, ideas

and law. The claim of reason is the right of nature: Reason in flesh and blood, the re-instatement of nature into its right, is the true ideal of the time to come, the deeper meaning in "the gospel of flesh".

So far the old did not advance, their simplicity was still very great. Surely they too began with a common unity of reason and nature: to live in harmony with reason was with them the same as to live in harmony with nature. But this was maintained merely in general; for as soon as they entered into details, discord appeared. To make temporal things eternal, and eternal things temporal, indifferent things essential, and essential things indifferent, was a problem, the solution of which baffled the thinkers of old time, and has therefore been reserved for the thinkers of our days.


The rule of reason and "the gospel of flesh"! Dare we now give ourselves up to this fair hope, that such a colossal contradiction really will be solved? Instead of going forward, we are going backward; instead of raising ourselves to the higher step of the will of reason, we are unconsciously sinking down under the will of impulse. Reason is no modern thing, neither is nature; after all it is not quite sure, that the consciousness of modern days and the eternal reason are one and the same thing.

The step of will of reason is a necessary step to pass over, and the comprehension of what reason actually is, is an essential condition for a powerful will. The purifying and educating process lies in the human self, learning to yield itself to something universally binding and through continued resignation, receive an impression of something immortal. But reason cannot teach men to comprehend their own individual self as something immortal. If it could do so, there would be within science full valid and irrefutable evidence of an immortal soul. But that such evidence is neither given, nor at any future time will be

given, is a plain fact, if we first fully have learned to comprehend what reason is, and why its eternity must be devoid of self: The possibility of immortality can be proved, but its reality cannot.

If we would prove the immortality of the soul by moral reasons appealing to the fact, that a perfect development of our free moral personality would be impossible, if our soul were not immortal, we pass beyond the boundary of reason, overtask its power and make a personal risk, for the common validity of which the pure reason neither will nor can be surety. So the old persuasion remains: Reason, the universal being together with ideas and laws, is eternal; the individuality of men together with its organic conditional self-consciousness, its impulses and claims of life are temporal. If we put a decided stress upon the last, the will of drifts is the ruling power; if self-determination sticks to the first, the will of reason is the ruling power.

The will of drift is a step in itself, and the will of reason a step in itself. The two steps are not to be screwed together into one. One cannot take pieces out of the will of drift to mend the will of reason and *vice versa*. The personal self-independence cannot be consolidated by gluing together something individual, which is not eternal, with something eternal, that is not individual. The self-government of will is no cobbling work: one can cobble an old shoe, but cannot cobble together ideals. If the will of reason is to be united with the will of drift, then both of them must undergo a transformation and be received into a third higher: this third higher is the will of spirit.





Lecture IV.

We live in the age of discovery; new things are constantly sought after and discovered, new machines, new stars, new solar systems, new matches! who can enumerate them all, nothing whether great or small avoids the glance of the investigator. Things unknown before swarm forth from the bottom of the ocean, from the depths of heaven and from the inmost recesses of the earth. Things scattered are collected, compared, explained, valued, and examined. It is the substance of reality, the cohesion of the world, the powers of things and the realm of laws the reflecting, observing reason is incessantly busied in searching out.

The great voyagers of discovery do search not merely for things external, but for things internal too. Reason does not only dwell on things perceptible to the senses, it asks for the immaterial too, it wants to discover the spiritual in things material; in things to come it will apprehend things already in existence. Then what is this spiritual existence? Is it perhaps the foundational part of matter, the unchangeable atoms whereof all things have been put together to be dissolved again? Or is it perhaps an over-conscious and just therefore an unconscious being of thoughts, nature's blind, inherent wisdom, that works and weaves in all phenomena? Or perhaps the secret is an indefinite nothing, a nothing which levels all, a dark night that conceals everything, a holy silence in which all voices become mute, an overfilled-empty gulf, an eternal abyss from whence all proceeds, and whereto all will at last return? What is nature, what is

spirit, where is the tie that binds them together? Here reason makes discovery upon discovery; one view of the world drives out the other, one philosophy supersedes the other, one thinker outbids the other, materialism, spiritualism, realism, pantheism, atheism, nihilism: that is a variegated, widely extending map of proof here put before us. And what does all this prove? That there are many, and if looked at more closely, cohesive attempts, which are all pursuing the same end. Reason will with its many sides clear its vision; free thought will not be hampered by any dogmas, or draw back for any command or yield to any arbitrary barriers.—This is right, so it ought to be. We ought not to put the light of intellect under the lamp-shade of traditions, or fetter free thoughts, or wish that at last there might be an end to the many and great discoveries. On the contrary the more discoveries of intellect are made, whether they belong to the external or internal world, the more clear must enlightened consciousness become.

One discovery has yet to be made, only one, but a very essential one indeed, a discovery which has been constantly run over in learning, and in spite of very much learning, hastily treated; its problem is implied in the question: What is man?

“Man,” modern science answers, “is a happily organized animal, that is clear from the history of the development of the globe. Man is a descendant of one or another species of animals of olden time, probably of a strange old monkey of doubtful ancestry.” If this descent is merely viewed as a zoological, natural transition, the investigation concerns exclusively the science of physics, and we will allow the hypothesis to pass for what it is—a hypothesis. But if the descent is to be understood in this way that the nature of man is originally brutish, the nature of a monkey, which in the course of innumerable alterations and gradual transitions of thousands upon thousands of years has

worked itself up to become a conscious intellectual being, a being, the obscure nature-bounded monkey will of which has gradually become a human, clear, and free will of reason: the discovery becomes philosophical and must be dealt with under the teaching of spirit.

The philosophical, it is urged, is rather hard to understand; it is only for men of genius. Yes, the philosophical, we have before us here, is, undoubtedly hard to understand. A monkey-nature, that is conscious of its reason, scientific monkeys, monkeys that philosophize! The philosophical in a philosophy like this is above the common sense of men; it can only be understood—in pure logic—by the clear head of the family.

If from this point of view we would enter upon ascertaining the profit men have gained through this gradual development, then doubtless, viewed from one standpoint, there are astonishing results to be exhibited; but on asking, how far all this has been really conducive to the liberty of the race, doubts arise, especially regarding the will. The animal wills what it ought to will, it is content with its will of impulse; man has taken upon himself to will, both what the impulse will and the reason will: that is a great inconvenience. The monkey is happy, it likes best always to do, what it ought to do. Man has to make a difference between what he likes best to do, and what he ought to do; he is not at all happy. By this admirable self-development, his own cultivation and civilisation, man has brought upon himself the great calamity of being encumbered with two irreconcilable wills.

That is what we get out of the many discoveries. Man has discovered himself, and in his self, he has discovered a discord; the discord is in the inner being, and the contradiction penetrates to the very marrow of his bones, because the self is brutish, and yet rational. The monkey that never engaged itself in discovering itself, has happily avoided the discord. The animal has a

self of nature, but it never sees it, and therefore easily gets rid of all trouble about contradiction. But man, who has turned his eyes inward and has there seen his conscious self, has fallen a victim to contradiction. From contradiction arises doubt, and doubt is followed by error: Man has discovered the doubt, and in the doubt the possibility of error. In olden times there were given, both bodily and psychical detailed tables of the many positive superiorities that distinguished man from the beast. The positive in all these superiorities has been partly obliterated by modern criticism. The negative superiorities it has not been able to obliterate. Man can spoil his life, can give the object of his life a wrong turn, take a wrong path and miss his end; the beast has no such superiorities. Man has discovered virtue, because he has discovered vice, and he discovered vice the very day he discovered duty. The animal is virtuous, but does not know anything of it, it acts in harmony with its nature, it does not know vice, because it does not know duty. Man has made acquaintance with duty, alas! this critically diminishes the virtue: if there were no duty, we would all be virtuous. Man has discovered death, an uncomfortable discovery. That the beast must die as well as man, is a fact; but death as death is not known to the animal. Death is in itself nothing; but it has been reserved for the conscious being to think this nothing, to meet with this nothing as a power and to give it existence in thought. The beast lives in the present moment, and enjoys the present moment, every moment has its share, and the next moment does not exist for it. Man sees in the present moment the possibility of the next, and in this possibility he sees death. Then by viewing the next moment, the enjoyment of the present may suddenly be interrupted, the conjuring spirit may appear in the midst of the festival, like the ghost of Banquo at Macbeth's banquet. Man has discovered eternity, and that is the worst of all. This discovery crowns all his

advantages, yet, be it remembered, only negatively; for it is a crown of thorns. By becoming conscious of the eternal, man discovers that self-contradiction is in its nature indissoluble. The eternal tells us what our duty is, and the contradiction is in the obligation.

To what obligation is man engaged? To do good for the sake of the good. This implies, that the good must not be measured by the ell measure of the finite, and be classed with things merely profitable or useful in the present moment; a bare blank doctrine of utility is in a moral sense an impudent denial of the eternal. But if the good be willed, because it is good in itself, then a man might in a worldly sense become unfortunate only because he wills the good. If then our descent from the lower animal is to be understood in the sense, that man dies like a beast, and the meaning is, that the human self is not more eternal than the brutish: then undoubtedly, man who willed the good for the sake of the good must be involved in an insoluble self-contradiction.

Virtue, it is said, has its reward in itself. The man, who feels the obligation, gets a higher idea of his own worth, an involuntary perception that the eternal is a thing present. This is an ambiguous way of speaking. It may be true, as long as the question about the eternity of self yet remains unanswered. It is a bad sign of one's perception of virtue, when a man defends himself against the claim of obligation by demanding evidence of the fact that a temporal sacrifice will really repay in the future eternity. But to speak in this way becomes untrue, when all on a sudden it is discovered, and both parts are in like manner already seen in the discovery, that both, namely the self, laid under obligation, is temporal, and the good dominating the self is eternal.

As the living being is, so its natural claims, its essential wants will be. The beast possesses a temporal existence, it

claims the temporal, and only the temporal has a claim upon it. There is no contradiction of obligation to feel in opposite directions. But man, in whom rests a serious claim both from the temporal and the eternal, has been placed between two fires. By adhering to the temporal, he might be able in an essential sense to satisfy his inmost self, as certainly as this inmost self is temporal and only temporal. But then the thought of eternity comes with its unconditional good and claims, that the temporal self must recognize his true nature in this unconditional good, although he knows within himself, that he is merely temporal, should bind himself to live as if he were eternal. This contradiction is not to be dissolved. The being that puts under obligation, and the being that is put under obligation, must in their primitive origin be of the very same nature, if not the obligation would become a case of compulsion without moral value: only an eternal self can be bound to the eternal. To claim from a temporal self, that it should put itself under obligation to an eternal good is as contradictory as to force an animal, organized only to move in the water, to fly in the air.

If the end is not that the many discoveries at last make existence meaningless and life insufferable, man must once more try to discover himself: He must discover faith, and in faith discover the Spirit.

Discover faith! Here modern consciousness meets us with its philosophy. To discover faith, one would say, is yet more unnecessary than to discover gunpowder. Faith was discovered long ago, and its secret penetrated. Faith is no new star, but an old horn lantern, by the magic light of which every one can see what his imagination prefers to spread before his mind's eye. No, not faith, but science! Science is the new star, science is the sun of the world, the kingly day-light, which beams on the vision of time. So sounds the announcement. But then what are we

going to see by the help of this light, if we carefully look into self? Doubt and doubt, and again doubt. The self in doubt, and the self in contradiction, eternity in the thought, and death in the heart: devouring self-contradiction! Then the light of science cannot, in this case, possibly be the true light. Here are on the other hand not only one, but many lights. The waves of light are spreading so wild, that the many gleams of light partly strengthen, partly again darken each other. They do not come from the heaven of the spirit, but from the secret place of contradictions, from restless changing thoughts. Changing thoughts give merely flickering light: star-shoot, Jack-o-lantern, meteor that flickers in the puffing wind of doubt; such uncertain lights cannot possibly lead us to discover faith.

But then was faith not discovered long ago! Certainly it was. But the fact is, that in regard to discoveries in the inner self, in the obscurity of mind, in the self's hidden depths, we have to seek in quite other ways than is necessary in regard to other discoveries. When any one has made a discovery in science, others may come forth to examine it; and if it stands its examination, they may adopt it. But those, who in this way adopt the discovery, cannot pass themselves as having made the discovery. Nor is it necessary to do so; that which has been discovered stands firm as a fact, and this fact may at second, third and fourth hand come to general knowledge, and by and by spread abroad in an ever widening circle. But concerning the discovery of faith, and the discovery of spirit, which depends upon the former, we must give other reasons; as the discovery of one of these two depends upon that of the other, they are collateral terms for one and the same original discovery, the secret of which lies in the self, and must therefore be brought to light by each man himself. The discovery of faith is a personal discovery for each individual, always discovery at first hand, an original self-

discovery. That this discovery must have its pre-supposition in Revelation is indeed certain, but on that account it does not cease to be original. Of what use is religion together with its holy facts, though it has been given to us, if we cannot comprehend its truth? To comprehend the truth of religion is to discover religion! But to discover religion again is to discover faith.

How superficial and loose the common notion of faith is, is well known by corresponding phrases. If it is external things, historical events, of which we have not as yet full certainty, people will say: I do not know it, but I think it probable. If it is a disputed problem of science, they will say: I am inclined to believe that the idea is correct, but I have some little doubts; and before I am convinced that the theory is just, I must have the whole evidence gone over. This is the case with regard to all those truths whose nature is such, that they may be proved to contain general validity, either by immediate perception or by inferences and conclusive arguments. In all scientific apprehension the belief is merely a previous admission filled with doubt. Truth of reason possessing general validity is not matter of belief, but of comprehension.

If now an empty, superficial mind or an individual, who is engrossed and benumbed by science and scientific investigation, will have the very same standard applied to religion, it will be a striking evidence of his having not yet discovered faith. For, in a religious sense, faith itself is the highest human certainty. In this case, faith takes the place of science, and therefore it cannot be confirmed by science. To know and to believe is in a religious sense one and the same: I know it, because I believe it. I know, because I believe, that this human self, that begins in time, has an eternal origin and carries in itself its germ of eternity. I know that this self with its spiritual, natural individu-

ality has been created, not in the likeness of a monkey, but in the image of God; I know it in faith, as surely as I know by the senses, that fire burns, that snow cools, and that sun-beams give light and heat. I know it, because I feel it, and I feel it, because I think it; I know it not only because I feel and think it, but because, in all feelings and comprehensions and in all thoughts I will it: I will it, not from arbitrary caprice or blind suggestion; I will it, because I, in quiet, clear, discreet self-comprehension, must will it, and I must will it, because I love it. If this self-comprehension has been gained, the faith is discovered, and the old saying comes into force: Tell me what you love, and I will tell you what you are; for what you love, that you are, and what you essentially are, that you will love.

But, says another, if faith can give perfect certainty to all believers, and the religious system cannot reasonably think of having a persuading power for any other than believers, is it not obvious from this, that the contents of faith may as well be subjected to scientific confirmation, as either the contents of nature or that of history; that, in other words, the inquirer after faith must stand in the very same relation to religious facts, as the inquirer of nature does to nature?—This is an old and obstinate, but therefore not a less spirit-enfeebling error, an error far more perilous for religion than materialism or atheism or nihilism or whatever else might be said. Surely there is a sphere of comprehension in which the truths of religion in their inner connection can come to full light, a bright and clear sphere of comprehension in which are seen the eternal laws of thought with a rich apparatus of facts thoroughly investigated and lasting firm and for ever. But if in the very moment one should place the system of faith under the same condition as that, which in an essential sense belongs to science, the whole building will tumble down.

To what will it lead, if the inquirer of faith should stand in the same relation to Revelation as the inquirer of nature stands to nature? Nature is always a present thing accessible to senses and to perceptible certainty. But where exists perceptible certainty for faith? To what will it lead, if the inquirer of faith absolutely bears the same relation to revealed facts, that the inquirer of history does to history.

If the Apostolical creed is first of all to be founded upon historical evidence and be embraced on external authority before it can be believed in, then Catholicism—the papal, not forgetting to include under it the dogma of the Pope's infallibility—is the only right one; because outside the Catholic Church, it is surely as impossible to give full historical grounds for three hundred dogmas of Scripture, as for three Apostolical articles of faith. On the contrary, if the personal assurance of the Apostolical creed of faith is to be sought for in a living faith in the self-present Word of Life, then this faith in the Word of Life will become a source of comprehension for itself, a principle, that within the self gives reason to self independent of knowledge and science. Wherever the masked unassorted system of faith and science still continues in its old ghostly way, faith has not been discovered.

To discover faith is to discover the Spirit, and in the spirit to discover the will, because the spirit is the source of the will, nay, the will itself. Faith is the first condition for the self-government of the human will in the power of the Spirit.

The difference between the will of spirit and the will of reason may already be apparent here. The will of reason is powerless before nature, because it is only man that can will in the name of reason, the reason itself is no being having volition. Those who ascribe to this being a free, independent will, must either set up the reason as an idol or on account of a confusion

of language mistake the reason for the spirit. The Divine Spirit has nature within His power. The Spirit creates, sustains and changes or reforms nature. If on the contrary any one would insist, that it is reason that has nature within its power, we should immediately turn the sentence and say: It is nature that has reason in its power. Both these views are at once true and false. It is with reason as with the laws. Such laws, such judgment or sentence, and *vice versa*, such judgment, such laws. The nature of the judgment appears in the laws, but the reality of the laws depends upon the judgment; if we withdraw the laws, the judgment will disappear, and if we, in thought, withdraw all judgment, what will become of the laws? The relation of mutual dependence, that is between judgment and laws, nature and reason, points to a third higher, that has both within its power, it points to the Spirit.

The Spirit has within His oneness of almighty power all the richness of nature, and all the laws of reason; He does not move us like an obscure impulse, He does not rule like the cold laws; He does not force, He creates; He does not piece together, He animates. It is the Spirit that enlightens the individual, in the universal things, the impulse in reason, and the reason in impulse. The Spirit wills the universal, but He wills originally the individual as well. He does not dissolve self, He does not wipe out the character; He gives eternal life, and to life eternity; He gives to the living a self, and to the self a character destined to glory, He fulfills the laws, and He conquers death.

On the step of the life of Spirit the will becomes strong; let us see what it is, that gives power to it.

As long as the human will has reference to itself merely, as long as it, so to speak, has on its own account to fight against the barrier of nature, and all that resistance by which necessity and its old allies, chances, have it in their power to overcome a

weak individuality, liberty is in a deplorable state: impulse and reason are both subjected to fate. If on the contrary, the militant will can obtain relief from an absolute power, a helper, that itself is will, almighty will, the horizon of liberty will clear up, and the prospect will become bright. The almighty will will not consume the powerless, but it will adopt it and give strength to it: the deeper this conception takes root, the more powerful will the will become. Surely in the temporal existence discord between impulses and duties will remain: The will of impulse is selfish, violent; the will of reason, empty and cold; but in spirit and faith—on the step of the will of spirit—the discord is essentially removed. The heterogeneous claims, the temporal and the eternal, begin to be transformed and become homogeneous. Reason is of spiritual origin and therefore it may be inspired and filled with a personality; the drift is life-warm, it can be cooled and purified by inspiration to become warm again. For the Spirit is not cold; He is the source of all life, in happy desire with deep longings, it has all the warmth of cordiality.

God is spirit, and God is love: The Spirit is love. It lies in the nature of love to unite the contrary and to reconcile the obstinate. Reason, that is to say, our intellectual reasoning consciousness, is able to see the truth of this assertion, as far as it is maintained quite in general, but if we tighten the knot and make an ultimate appeal to the source of love, its end and its will, the reason gets blind. If the reason has to adopt an eternal will, it becomes a will in general, an unconscious will, that is, it becomes one with the eternal necessity, one with the impulse being in nature, both to act and to form. A Divine will, that with a conscious end has breathed life into the clay, has joined an immortal soul with a mortal body, and carried the opposition between corruptible and incorruptible so high, that this body of ours must die in order that the soul may truly live; an almighty

will, that has done all this out of love, and with the fatherly end, that man under the pressure of necessity and the burden of things temporal must raise himself to freedom and bring home to himself an eternal life—such a free, conscious, and personal love does not exist in the scientific reason. We must find it quite natural, that those, who seek for all higher certainty exclusively in knowledge and in science, invariably consider a doctrine of freedom like this, arbitrary and without foundation.


Reason can comprehend that the end at which liberty is aiming has a high standard and would be a sublime end for the endeavours of a powerful will, *if* there be a future world. Yes, *if*? But how to pass this *if*? How are we able to form a clear idea or merely a probable conception about the nature of a supernatural world? What kind of science will undertake to give the evidence for its absolute necessity without smuggling in prejudices which do not belong to science?


That will of eternity, that can be comprehended by reason, is in its unchangeable nature neither lovely nor unlovely; it loves nothing, because it hates nothing. Love and hatred fall like desire and aversion, sympathy and antipathy under the contrast of finiteness, and the nature of the individuals.

By noting the boundary of the human reason, we do not act unjustly toward reason. On the contrary, to claim from a being what surpasses its ability, is unreasonable; it is unreasonable to claim from reason what is beyond its power. The human intellect has made many wonderful discoveries in the world, and it is to be hoped that it will make still many more; but there is one discovery, that it has not made, and never will make in spite of all its research, reasoning, and investigation, that is, the discovery of the eternal life of self. It is exactly this discovery that faith has to make, the only discovery that faith in spirit and truth can make. Faith discovers the eternity of self: it dis-

covers the Spirit, and in the Spirit, love, and in the Spirit of love, a blessed life. This discovery is an inner personal experience, it is like the act of breathing, and must be continually repeated; if the breathing stops, the life will vanish away; if the experience ceases, faith will vanish away, and with faith the Spirit, and with the Spirit, the powerful will.

We are living in the time of discoveries; we live to discover the will of the Spirit.





Lecture V.

If the Spirit is strong, the Will will be powerful; this conclusion may be accepted without any deeper investigation, for the question is whence comes the Spirit and in what way does He gain power over a man.

But not with the Spirit as with the impulse. Whence comes the impulse? We need not seek for it, it is near us, in our nature. It does not come, it is there, it appears involuntarily as it is, because it is.

But not with the Spirit, as with the reason. Whence comes the reason? It does not come from afar. We do not look steadfastly into the blue sky to wait for its coming. It does not come, it is in our own nature. In the very moment, when we call to mind what the reason is, we discover that reason is not something away from us, but a thing essentially present in us.

Might the same be said about the Spirit? To this must be replied both yes, and no! Yes! the Spirit is present; it is Divine indeed, and the Divine is omnipresent. And yet no! for the Spirit is not like the impulse, immediately present, it is not necessarily present in the thought, as reason. When we think reasonably, we think so by necessity; but because one has spiritual thoughts, it is not therefore a matter of course that the person thinking has the Spirit itself in living presence. Therefore the Spirit may at the same time be both present and absent, may be very near to us, although we have to wait for its coming. It is a

problem. The secret is that the Spirit is not only being but moreover will.

If it is emphatically asserted, that the Spirit is will regarding religion and faith—the stress must be put on the will—the coming of the Spirit means a Revelation, and Revelation again implies miracle, so the Spirit of God came upon the first witnesses to truth; it came as a sound from heaven, as a rushing mighty wind that filled the house; it came with tongues of fire, with the gift of languages; it came with the warnings of eternity, with the almighty sign; it came as a great miracle. But this miracle is to scientific reason a sign that gives offence. It is the miracle that has widened the gulf between that age and our age. How has every thing been changed since that first mighty rushing in of the Spirit. The Spirit, they say, is yet the very same, but where is the power, where are its wonders?

The present age of civilization does not believe in miracles; reason cannot even bear to hear them spoken of without a feeling of nausea. The world, it is said, is no longer adapted for miracles. Miracles are against its constitution; its nervous system cannot endure them, neither can that of earth nor of heaven. We cast our eyes downward, we dig in the earth and we find beneath large libraries of stone, that by clear inscriptions relate to the life and conditions of worlds that have passed away; but in no region, at no spot, have we been able to trace a paradise. We equip the eye with optical instruments and look upward, star above star; but where are the angels, where is the throne of the eternal one? The heaven has indeed opened itself even to us, but in a way different from that of those days. The heaven of the present age cannot open itself, as it did in former days to the ascending one. The clouds of our days could not bear Him, if He should come again hereafter in power and in much glory. The believers gaze and yet dare not see it. Faith is a

veiled nun. She modestly casts down her eyes, but looks through the veil by stealth. Therefore—so declare the wise—the race has become weak; it has become a scientific race, and yet it will remain a believing race; its nature has been divided and therefore weakened; it lives half in the old and half in the new, half in the supernatural magic of imagination and yet more than half in the interest of reality together with the present facts of the natural world. So the race dwindles away in half belief and doubt, the will gets exhausted and the character is weakened.

This surely is a sad crisis that must be gone over before modern education can work itself out from that twilight of the gods, in which its irreconcilable apprehensions regarding time and eternity, like giants and gods, are evidently fighting their last struggle. The Spirit of Revelation with its wonders, and nature with its unchangeable laws, have in the consciousness of our time placed themselves so sharply against each other, that half-belief lies heavy upon a wicked conscience and waits for the very last explanation. Thoughts of faith and thoughts of science in a confused mixture, fantasies of religion and impressions from science move in wonderful misleading visions as the mirage of the desert guides the traveller astray. The way through this slough, the only way that will surely carry us to the end, has been indicated by the question mooted in these lectures, the question regarding the will. This question has in itself the peculiarity of carrying the dispute about all the external back to one single decisive internal.

What is the internal moving force of universal existence: the obscure impulse of nature or an eternal free almighty will? This is the cardinal point on which the whole question hinges. On admitting the first, the miracle becomes an impossibility and historical evidences, be they ever so many and ever so harmonious, will not be able to breathe reality into impossibility. On admit-

ting the last, the miracle becomes possible, and yet historical evidences cannot give full conviction about any single real miracle whatever. Historical evidences can only give us a probability, but the real miracle is in its nature always an improbability; science adheres to the probable in history and rejects the improbable. Faith leaves the probable to grasp the possible. The impossible cannot be believed in, but the improbable which is yet possible can be believed in: here is the difference between faith and science.

In the sphere of profane history inquiring science has safe guidance in acknowledged laws, and in these a prescribed rule for probability. If an event is so probable, that no one can deny it without at the same time denying all historical probability, then that event becomes stamped as a fact. But it is otherwise as regards the facts of revelation in sacred history. In this case the probable cannot be regulated according to acknowledged laws, because the wonder itself is the most improbable of all. If now faith leaves behind it the probable to grasp the highest possibility in the name of the almighty will and under the form of reality, then it seems to be exposed to overlook the cohesion of things necessary in nature, to forget the laws and enter into the romantic. Against this error stands the Word of Life (Jesus), the Divine Self, the Revealer of the will of power; He stands firm, unshaken as the rock in the sea. His will is power, the secret of all possibilities; He himself is the wonder, surrounded by wonders and signs, and yet His own will is, when viewed from a human standpoint, as a weakness; He has, to speak literally, no will of His own; His will is to do the will of the Almighty, the will of the Father, who is in heaven. Thus He stands on the ground of liberty and yet under strict laws. He shows Himself, as He is—the truth; yes, but in obedience; not like an arbitrary ruler, but as an obedient servant, is He living in truth, fighting for

truth and suffering for truth. He does not break the laws, but He fulfils them. He does not establish a new religion with the help of new doctrines together with a good example; no, He establishes what He is, and He is what establishes religion itself, the will of Spirit in flesh and blood.

Declarations such as the following do indeed run smoothly: "We are living in the time of laws, and not in that of miracles;" but is the most important question of the race determined thus? Let us translate the declaration into other language, that we may see clearly what it contains. "We are living in the time of laws," this means the will of Omnipotence is extinct, only the finite will remains. The flag of the time to come bears the inscription: Ephemeral Will. With this agrees pretty well the statement that all ephemeral wills must come forth, and that the will of the majority must sit on the throne of power; but how this ephemeral will is to reach the highest end, to fulfil the laws, and raise the mass to a state of freedom, has not yet been explained.

The question about miracles combines in the last instance with the question about the origin of will. This question cannot be disposed of by appealing to the unchangeableness of laws. One might as well refer to the unchangeableness of the laws of thought. If even the unchangeable laws of thought cannot be said to interrupt the human will as regards new ideas, new beginnings and corresponding new actions, much less would the unchangeable laws of nature be able to hinder at any point the unconditional liberty of the Divine will. By unconditional liberty, is not meant that the will is without conditions, but that it has the conditions within its power and is above limited bounds. Reason is the form for the substance of wisdom, but the substance itself is provided by the will! The spirit has not the reason outside itself, as surely as it has not wisdom outside itself. The Almighty will can do what it chooses, act and move as it chooses,

it never comes outside the infinite cohesion of the infinite whole; of course it can never come outside itself. But exactly in the infinitude of the cohesion, freedom has inexhaustible possibilities.

To the Almighty will everything is possible; this does not mean that the omnipotence of will can annihilate the laws, can raise contradictions to the importance of laws, make nature to become contrary to nature, the circle a square etc.; but it means, that it can in and by and with the laws bring forth even that, which is the most improbable in the eyes of men, that it can, without breaking the hidden cohesion of things, break all the standards of probability. The Almighty will, that has all things in its power, has also the laws in its power; but to have the laws within its power, means: to have their fulfilment in its power. He, who has his thoughts within his power, never breaks the laws of thought; he who has nature within his power never breaks the laws of nature.

There is a principle by which the faith of Revelation, together with its assurance about spirit and will, must agree, openly, candidly, fully agree with the consciousness of our days; it is about the statement regarding the unchangeableness of laws. If the reality of this statement rightly understood is fully acknowledged, then the connection between the past and the present is spiritually re-established, and the possibility of a mutual understanding between reason and religion has been secured. On the principle of this understanding rests the separation of what can be known scientifically from what cannot be known, but must therefore fall under faith. What is the primitive foundation of the unchangeableness of the laws of nature? "The nature of things, the intellectually necessary cohesion of the world": this is the explanation of Physics. "The almighty will of God": this is the explanation of Religion. Here appears on the map of comprehension a clear line of demarcation between faith and

science, one that is more certain than that which the Pope marked out when Columbus discovered the New World.

The maxim of experience begins with facts, adheres to laws and stops at necessity. The philosophy of nature goes just one step further. It can in the relation of nature and spirit prove the progress of conditional necessity proceeding from liberty, the origin of laws, from the Law-giver's will. But it must in spite of all this adhere to the side of necessity and be content with that, which belongs exclusively to the understanding of acknowledged facts and scientific confirmation of known laws. As if in a dim religious light of half-transparent necessity, the philosophy of nature can see everywhere gleams of light of Divine liberty; but the will itself in inner infinitude of possibility it cannot see; the sun of liberty will never rise in the region of this science; it remains below the margin of the horizon.

The philosophy of nature's last step is the first of Religion. Nature is supported by the Spirit; the laws are founded on will. Now the sun of liberty is rising, it is dawning over the possibilities. It is a sphere of comprehension for itself, it is the eternal sphere of light, of faith and revelation. What do we see by this light? the will in the Almighty self, liberty in all its possibilities: *miracle!* The miracle is, that omnipotence is will, and the will omnipotence; the miracle is, that the necessity of the universe has its primitive foundation in Divine liberty, the miracle itself is the secret of wisdom.

That miracle of which we are here speaking is not a phenomenon, but an entity, it is a fundamental miracle. It has its infallible sign of certainty, not in any external sign, but in an internal, in our personal self, in self-understanding of faith and will. It has not first to be confirmed by a searching examination of witnesses upon external miracles; on the contrary, it is the external miracles, that, when the criticism of faith brings its standard,

which have all to be brought back to and confirmed by the ever-existing, everlasting, never changing fundamental miracle.

If we now with this presupposition repeat that the Spirit is will, and its revelation is a miracle, then it must be evident, that within this is not hidden the smallest hint of the breaking of laws, loose, arbitrary or Divine caprice. The Spirit is a being, and the Spirit is will; that the Spirit reveals itself means then, it shows itself in the mirror of faith as that, which it is according to the eternal nature of its will. What then is the Spirit according to its revealed nature? love, holy, unchangeable love. In this lies the fact, that it is always ready—for love is always ready—that it will come at any time, when and where it can come in compliance with the conditions of liberty.

We know the Spirit of truth by the Word of Life. If it be asked why it then delayed so long before it came with the Word of Life for a full Revelation, the single answer of faith is: It could not come before, it was impeded, it was in the Word, and the Word was the light of the world, and the light did shine but in dim myths and darkness, and myths did not comprehend it. If it be asked again, why it does not come with the sign of power, with the force of miracle, as it came to the disciples of old, the simple answer of faith is: It does not come with the strength of miracle, because it cannot, it is hindered. It is the human will that has thrown so many stones and heaped up so many obstacles in the way of freedom.

But then it might be said: "after all there is a contradiction, an unpardonable one, inseparable from miracle and will. One of two: either the Spirit is almighty or it is powerless. If almighty, what can prevent its coming? It comes and goes as it likes, when it likes, and where it chooses; it comes with victory, lighting, warmth; hearts are melted by the word of fire, like the ice on the rocks by the heat of the sun. So comes the Almighty. Can-

not the Spirit come in this way? Is there anything that stands in its way, a real something, that is able to paralyse its power, force it to a stand-still or at least turn aside and move gently forward in circuitous paths: where then is the omnipotence of the will, and what is the miracle?" Undeniable! There is indeed a contradiction. The will of God is almighty; the will of man is powerless. "And then this powerless will should be able to rise against the almighty will, the selfish in the self-will of man should really have the power to oppose the will of the Spirit? This must be an imagination, a deception." Our answer is: Yes, surely it is an imagination that the ephemeral will, even if by millions they entered into a conspiracy to make a rebellion, should have the power to set bounds to the eternal will; it is a deception, a shocking, soul-destroying self-delusion. But this self-delusion is a real something, it is in the self-will of man so truly that it can "grieve the Spirit".

If the Spirit depended merely upon power, it could be sure of its gaining the victory, the feeblest puff, and all the hindrance of the world would vanish as air. But then, what would become of the liberty of man? Were the Spirit to use its power and subdue the refractory self-will by violence, it would have to found liberty by destroying liberty; this is a contradiction so clear, that we take it to be impossible. If the question were about making the deaf hear, the blind see, or opening the tombs, and awakening the dead, we could not say: it is impossible to the Almighty will; because our knowledge is not sufficient. We might say that such deeds cannot be explained by the laws known to us, for the number of laws not yet discovered is far greater than the number of discovered laws. All the contradictions that have been formed by a knowledge in its over-hastiness in this respect, are built upon sand, and fall of themselves, if examined. But the contradiction, that the Almighty will should be able not only to force the power-

less—in this there is no contradiction—but force it to yield willingly to forcing power, force it without at the same time destroying its liberty; that is a contradiction so clear and obvious, that he who ascribes to Omnipotence such a possibility, does not know, what he is saying. The knot of liberty cannot be cut to pieces, it must be untied.

The solution of the knot lies in the solution of self-delusion. Self-delusion is in man twofold, nay, threefold. It is in the thoughts and is called blindness; it is in the will and is called defiance; it is in the combined feeling of thoughts and will, and is called obduracy. It is difficult, if not impossible, to catch hold of each delusion separately according to the above heads, the three partners, thought, will, and feeling, keep together in united delusion, they are as conspirators; one of them will not betray another. The reason cannot be enlightened or the blindness removed so long as the will is perverted, and the tide of the feelings is against the truth. The feeling gets false impressions as long as the reason is dim, and as long as the will befooled by misconceptions, bars the entrance and keeps out every ray of light. And is a will, encumbered by false thoughts and misconceptions, false imaginations and selfish suggestions, likely to be able of its own accord to begin with the truth from itself and cut the delusion through as Chlotaldo cut asunder the pearls of Morgana? All this points back to the dormant original constitution of self, points back to the unconscious oneness that bears thought, will, and feeling in explicable self-determination: is such a delusion likely to be removed? There must in his original constitution be something that retains and keeps a possibility for the Spirit.

If we were able to imagine self-delusion continuing its circulation through the three chief forms of thought, will, and feeling, so long, so perseveringly and to such a profundity that the dormant

in the basis of self could be brought up to the light of consciousness and overcome all undeveloped nature; then self-delusion would proceed in a will of unconditional denial of light darkened with a will of spirit, that would not be human but satanic. Under this pre-supposition it is evident, that it would neither be the thought nor the feeling, but the will itself that would at last decide the matter. Feeling is involuntary, the being that feels has not the impressions in his power and therefore an excuse may always be made for the delusion of feeling. The delusion of thought too may be excused as long as the unconscious is yet so predominant, that an appearance is kept up of the thought being continually about to search for the truth. Only when the denied truth stands clear to the thought and the painful state goes through the heart, selfishness is compelled to change the self-delusion into absolute self-blindness and to carry the obduracy to extremity.

If such a self-contradiction were merely logical, it would simply be reckoned under the impossible, and the delusion would pass by our thoughts as a shadow on the wall. But a self-contradiction of this nature is more than logical, it is personal. Already at the stage of the will of impulse the individual comes to the knowledge, that the true is by no means the same as the agreeable, and reason on such occasions often becomes very busy in muffling up the untrue and in giving a colour to the half-true. At the stage of the comprehension of reason, self-will may in the name of fate, preserve itself so firm, that it would rather break than bend. Now if such a potent self-will comes into contact with the Spirit itself, the Spirit of truth and love, it is by no means sure that it will yield itself to the Spirit, although it should have to acknowledge that the Spirit is power. The contrary may happen. The potent self-will feels that in spite of all its feebleness it has yet power to defy the Spirit. Seized by the cramp of self-

contradiction, it chooses in the power of despair rather to suffer all the agony of self-destruction, than to confess its fault, bear the humiliation and yield itself to superior force. When this choice has been made, the blindness is perfect, the truth is falsehood, and falsehood is truth, liberty thralldom, and thralldom liberty, the light of love will be extinguished in the darkness of hatred.

The same Spirit of truth that arouses love, is able to arouse the hatred too, for hatred is love inverted into a selfish defiance. It is not the fault of love that it arouses hatred, it cannot help it. Love can tolerate everything for the sake of others, but it cannot endure self-contradiction. It cannot ignore its nature and say to itself: I must change my nature, I must try to become selfish, that is to say, unloving, or I shall arouse hatred. The nature of love is not to conceal, but to reveal itself. If then the self-revealing Spirit of love arouse hatred, the hatred will not be insignificant, for love is great; no, hatred is nourished by love; it grows by love; it strives to compete with love and to become infinite, because love is infinite. What lies hidden within this we shall not in this treatise try to bring to light, but only assert, that there is in the nature of will, in the name of liberty, a real something that may grieve the Spirit.

We have now considered self-delusion from the strong point; let us finally change our point of view and look at it under the aspect of weakness.

There are men indeed, and their number may be considerable, afflicted souls, who are sighing within themselves saying: "We do not resist the Holy Ghost; we feel that the Spirit is needful for us; we pray to get the Spirit, but the Spirit does not come." And on the other hand again there are those, who enjoy the Spirit in superabundance, the chosen of faith, whose ample foreheads are always shining under the influence of the Spirit. They

talk about the Spirit and talk with the Spirit. They possess that enchanting voice wherein the Spirit lives; they are thus intimately acquainted with the Spirit: they are, in plain words, comrades of the Spirit.—There is in the relation between God and every single man, a secret, that is penetrated only by the All-knowing; but if we look a little deeper into the human nature, is it not evident that here too self-delusion is present in double, nay in triple amount?

There is a delusion of conception, that in forgetting the omnipresence of the Spirit, takes in view the word of Revelation in vain, fixes the Spirit into an image and makes the image external. Under the image of an invisible, but yet finite person that moves in space, the "Holy Ghost" is ascending and descending, and descending and ascending, a winged messenger between earth and heaven. We are not scandalized at the metaphorical; but if this figure crystallizes in the fantasy into a firm reality, if the Spirit at certain times pays a visit into a man's heart and leaves again with a promise to return; if we say, this metaphorical system gains such a power over consciousness as to make the man who prays, sit down and wait for the Spirit to knock at the door as his guest; we cannot help wondering, if perhaps he has to wait in vain. To make the personal spirit a mythic being akin to Iris darting on the rainbow, is to apprehend the Spirit as an idol; but to apprehend the Spirit as an idol is to grieve the Spirit.

The above described delusion of conception leagues itself with a corresponding delusion of feeling. This imagines that the presence of the Spirit may be made the object of an immediate inner perception, that the soul which has been called by the Spirit must be able to tell the very hour of the visit and to make a clear distinction between two existences, his own and that of the Spirit, and converse with the Spirit and say: "I said to

the Spirit and then the Spirit answered me," etc. If this imagination gets the upper hand and its hidden influence is without doubt far greater than many are willing to acknowledge, can we then find it surprising, that there are sincere souls, who acknowledge to themselves that they never stood face to face with the Spirit itself, never at any time have either seen or felt the immediate presence of God himself as the Holy Ghost?

But then the fault is cast upon Holy Scripture. In contrast to the believers of the metaphorical, who, taking the word of Scripture quite literally, make the supernatural unnatural, and squander away the internal upon the external; the "intelligent" make their appearance with scientific explanation, they remove the supernatural, rarefy the word of Revelation and get its characteristic wiped out. Then by the help of a self-delusion the book of the Spirit becomes an ambiguous book. The children in the nursery stick to the metaphorical and play Christmas with the supernatural, the adults discover the natural and flirt with the mythology.

The delusion of conception and of feeling unite in a third, the most dangerous form of all, and that is the delusion of will. The apparent similarity which they take as their platform is the conception, that man's natural will can remain a distinct thing side by side with the will of the Spirit. Some one understands this to the effect, that the natural will, be it in the shape of impulse or of the will of reason, has to be forced to submit to the law of the Spirit and to be scourged into the attempt, if not to earn the Spirit, yet at least to make oneself worthy of the Spirit, to work together with the Spirit, and if possible by good deeds to gain honor from the Spirit. To this belongs a peculiar form of that so-called strict, anxious Christianity, anxious, not in truth but in sourness, a Christianity, the love of which is a sort of Divine vexation, the comfort of which is an assurance of the

eternal damnation of the joyous, a Christianity that hates the world with a morbid faith, that has its seat in the bile. Others again declare man's will to be unable to do the work of the Spirit. Everything rests simply on the Spirit and on faith, the new will will come of itself. If the Spirit wills, I am ready, if the Spirit wills not, well then, there is not yet any will—the will grows slowly. But it does not matter: there is abundant faith, and Spirit and faith suffice. On these terms there is a fine agreement between the spiritual man and the natural man; they go now very well together, for both of them love freedom. Faith has its liberty in the supernatural, and the natural must not be put to inconvenience by that, the will of impulse that has its liberty in the natural may go about grazing wherever it chooses on the common pasture of things temporal, if as to the rest, it is well-behaved and do not attack the faith. The agreement is so cordial that it looks exactly, as if the two wills, the will of faith and the will of drift, had become one will. To this belongs a form of that so-called joyous Christianity, joyous not in truth—for to faith it is an everlasting truth, that the life of Spirit is a life of joy—but in the natural, the boastful exultation that finds the earth so charming, because it is so sure of heaven.

When these self-delusions are, and they may be dissolved—every man has in the revealed word, the living sacramental presence of which is to be found in the church, conditions to dissolve them, provided he wills it in right earnest—then comes the Spirit.

Now-a-days many attempts are made to reconcile the consciousness of our days with the existing religion. The platform taken is simple: a universal pre-supposition, namely, that mankind are yearning after religion—a yearning so deep and essential, that states and nations, civilization and morality, all civic order and all advantages of a higher education would be

dissolved into a chaos of crude passions, and the characteristics of mankind would be changed into the ravenousness of the beast of prey and into the likeness of a monkey, if religion disappeared from human society. And further an opinion is adhered to which is in itself a perfectly valid truth; namely, that religion cannot possibly be to us a living, present reality, if it has not the power, in a spirit-powerful manner, to penetrate the consciousness of our days, so perfect that we in full liberty might live and work and move ourselves in it, as in our right spiritual element of life. It has been perceived rightly that it must be this spiritual element of life, that contains the first determining conditions for the education of the character with a new view and a new will—a will that with faith and courage dares to take up the problems from their very foundation and confidently begin to work out their solution. With every one of these theories, all modern leaders may be supposed to be in harmony; but on looking at the subject a little more closely, do we not meet with a somewhat curious fact, that these attempts overlook at the very outset the first thing needed?

If religion is to get power, one would think it quite necessary, that every person should begin to ask himself as to what after all the religious instinct consists in, what religion originally is, and where the evidence of truth is to be found—that infallible sign by which he can become assured, that he is not taking a wrong path and entering on a mere venture. If the evidence of truth is to be trusted in, it must be found in his own self, in self-perception of faith and Spirit. This self-perception is a perception of the will, an understanding of the miracle, because the miracle is religion itself. That the human will stands in a relation of necessity to things without a will, in this there is no marvel; that human wills stand to one another as points of arbitrariness, all of which are ruled by superior laws,

in this too there is no marvel. But that the almighty will of God has come into relation with the powerless will of man, has revealed itself as a human will (Jesus) and that by this its self-revelation founded a connection of love, a happy reconciliation, that the two wills, those of God and man, may unite into one will throughout eternity, that is in truth and spirit a marvel. Those, who think that the best way of bringing religion into power is to exclude the miracle, are like those who think, that the best way of drawing a circle would be to represent it as a quadrangle. To reject the miraculous is to reject religion; to embrace religion is to comprehend the miraculous.

If the evidence of truth stands firm in the inner man, then the light proceeding from this will clear up the corresponding external man. The inmost in faith is so far from being indifferent to its external, that every real believing man must acknowledge, that this self-perception in Spirit is not brought about by himself, but has been aroused by a word coming from without and is resting upon the wonder of the sacramental word, which by the omnipotence of the will of the Spirit, communicates its inmost in, with, and under a certain external. Then after all there is here, on account of the miraculous continuing, a living mutual relation between the internal and the external. As long as the external is conceived and judged of as a means and a state of transition for the inner, so long the self-perception continues to nourish itself, and the evidence of truth will suffice. But when the consciousness makes attempts to elude faith, to get behind it in order to seize the religious facts in pure historical externality, the evidence of truth will fail and fumbling and doubt begin. It cannot be too strongly enforced that faith and the substance of faith are inseparable: every miracle is a caricature, if it is not seen by the eye of faith. Sacred history unfolds to our consideration a series of pictures from life and leads


us into a sphere of facts and phenomena in which the believers of former days, whether they were eye-witnesses or not, saw and comprehended the sign of omnipotence, through which the saving and redeeming will of love revealed itself to them. The question is, are we able to recognise the nature of faith in their faith, and share faith with them? The understanding and appropriation of sacred history is a recognition of the life of faith, its nature and contents, that is always continuing. Where this recognition fails our evidence of the truth fails too, and the Revelation delivered to us does not affect us religiously.

It is quite a reasonable claim which the present time has set up, that investigation must be free. On the terms mooted here, the faith of Revelation can have no objection whatever to make against the unbounded liberty of scientific investigation; because it knows in itself that no criticism of science, be its results ever so negative, is able any longer to undermine the religious foundation. Even if it could be scientifically proved, that we have not one single gospel, which has been received direct from any eye-witness, nay, even if it could be proved, that our Gospel of Matthew dates from the second, and the Gospel of John from the third century, yet all these proofs could not in the least influence the decision of the contents of religion. We do not ask here for historical transition, through which the evidence of truth has gone; what is asked here is the truth, the revealed truth, and the evidence of truth, the infallible, is in our inner nature.

We are living upon the miraculous, and yet are under laws; we are living under the pressure of necessity, and yet in freedom; in the midst of the palpable facts of a material world and yet in a present eternity, as truly as we have the personal assurance that the will is Spirit, and the Spirit will.

To measure our faith by the warmth of the feeling is unsafe, because the measurement of warmth is indeterminable, and the

indeterminable may be deceptive. To measure our faith by the clearness of thought is also unsafe, because the clearness is cold; and the ideal in the mirror of thought stands outside the reality. But to measure our faith by Spirit and will, by that will of Spirit, that in the clearness of thought has warmth of cordiality and the reality of self-determination is sure, the measure of truth for Spirit and faith is a powerful will.





Lecture VI.

A powerful will will act: choose, decide, work; the will of impulse will do so, the will of reason will do so, the will of Spirit will in the highest sense do so. What then does the will of Spirit choose? It is in nature Divine: it is in its choice Divine-human. It is in the Word as God, that the eternal self chooses each person, and again it is through the Word that man by the Spirit's power can make choice real. First when the human will is at the same time chosen and chooses, it is chosen by God to choose God, to choose its foundation; then for the first time the self-delusion of self-will will burst. The self chooses itself according to its eternal destiny, chooses liberty in unconditional dependence, chooses to will one thing: to be the organ of Spirit, chooses to will the will of God. The choice is not between this and that of many good things; the choice is within the will itself, between a lower and a higher, a corruptible and an incorruptible will. It is the deepest crisis in the life of the will: the old will expires to be born anew; the will of impulse is buried to arise transformed as the will of Spirit. Such a choice between life and death is the choice between faith and infidelity.

Faith, it cannot be repeated too often, is more than a feeling, more than a credulous presumption of some rule, which has to be believed; faith is a deepening of oneself into the Spirit, is the heart's full resignation to the Word of Life; this resignation is more than a thinking, it is an act of will, an internal act, the

first primitive act of the will of the Spirit: "Give me your heart!" means: "Give me your will."

The powerful will has always an end to aim at, so has the will of impulse, so has the will of reason, so has in the highest sense the will of Spirit. What end then has the will of the Spirit to aim at? It wills the temporal, but for the sake of the eternal; the eternal is the end, the temporal is the means. The end is, not merely a temporal conditional development of self, but a powerful deep, all-sided real unfolding of an inexhaustible contents of eternal life. Therefore is this end both temporal and eternal.

The will of impulse has its end within the temporal, in all, that is natural, it wills the present. The will of reason has its end in a present eternal, the laws of which suck the blood of the natural and consume the temporal. The will of impulse wills naturally the human, but makes the personal temporal, and becomes inhuman. The will of reason wills, in the name of universal necessity the human, but dissolves the self and thus becomes inhuman. The inhuman that lies hidden in the basis, as well of the will of reason as the will of impulse, arises from this, that both so exclusively will the human, only the human. The will of Spirit on the contrary has in the unity of its end, a double end; it wills in a personal sense the human, because in the personal it wills the Divine. It wills not a Divine and a human separately; it wills in the holy name of true personality the Divine-human. So its end compasses both heaven and earth, both a present and a future, both a here and a hereafter. The Divine-human oneness of this twofold end is life itself, the eternal life.

That the eternal life is life itself, can be learnt from the laws. The matter does not imply, as many seem to anticipate, that originally there should be two kinds of life, one that has its source in the temporal by the side of one that has its source in the

eternal. Those who asserts the conception of a life, the origin, development, and conclusion of which exclusively belong to limited duration, have not properly enlightened themselves as to what the temporal is, and what is understood by what we call life.

The temporal is by no means all that is going on in time; because every development, even that of an eternal matter has to take place in time, and time belongs to eternity. The temporal therefore is that, which goes on in time, so that its action and existence are conditioned by its being parcelled out and depend upon composition, changeableness, variableness, corruptibility, productibility, and solubility, in other words parcelled-out limited existence, is the characteristic of temporal existence. In this sense all material formations are temporal.

It is otherwise as regards the eternal, the nature of which in every thing is like itself. The life of all is eternal, a self-being, that develops itself, only itself and its contents through matter, the temporal limited existence. The life in all beings proceeds from the interior and keeps itself during the formation, transformation, appropriation of matter within its inner circulation; in this circulation appears the eternal. There are those who declaim the eternity of matter, the eternal stars, the eternal mountains etc.; that is mere declamation. The existence of matter, stars, mountains is devoid of self-existence, an existence which is secondary and therefore is temporal existence.

The billion times trillions of years, that are so easily counted, cannot change all this temporal into real eternity. But the life of all, that whilst secondary overcomes the parcelling out, continues and preserves itself, is eternal. There is in the cell of the plant and in the flowers of the field more eternity than in all the eternal stars put together. The phenomena of life are corruptible, but the essence of life in its quiet circulation is incorruptible; it is neither pieced together with another thing, nor does it dissolve

itself into another: it remains in itself unchangeable in its changes, incorruptible in its inner aspect, although the external perish away.

If one should properly call to mind the difference between the living and the lifeless, he would be convinced, that every thing we take for a living one, be it one living merely in a simple cell, must be considered a self-being, while matter, the material, together with its powers and laws, is merely a secondary existence, is lifeless, because it has no self. In this we perceive a thorough distinct difference between physical laws and the laws of life. The physical laws are temporal laws; only the laws of self-development are true laws of eternity. From pure matter and physical laws cannot be derived the origin of life: to derive life from the lifeless, self-existence from that which has no self, is as impossible as to derive something from nothing. Only when the temporal is ordained to the eternal, and the physical laws taken up into the laws of self-development, will we be able to comprehend the laws of life.

After all then on what rests the distinction between temporal and eternal life? Not upon the Being of all life, for that is from eternity a self-being, but upon the special appearance of life in living individuals. In this respect the difference between the life of plants, the life of lower animals and that of men has a universal significance. In the life of plants the self-existence is so fleeting, that permanent self cannot be formed, in the life of animals the self gets a natural self, for the animal has a soul, but at the stage of the life of men a germ has for the first time been laid down for a self-development, one that is conscious of itself, a spiritual, personal self.

The question as to how living individuals can continue their self-development over the boundary of temporal existence, can be answered by no science. Such an endless development of

individual life is, from the stand-point of natural experience, improbable, yet in consequence of the law of life, a possibility. It is this possibility faith grasps, on discovering the eternity of self, dissolves the self-will that is entangled in the temporal and transforms it into a will of the Spirit. The full certainty of eternal life for individuals depends upon the will of the Spirit.

It is a weak idea, that in this present state of life there should not be found any certainty regarding eternal life, but only after death. Were we for the first time to discover after death, that there is an eternal life, the discovery would be dreadful.

Self-will, whether it appears in the shape of will of impulse or of will of reason, denies eternal life and transgresses its laws. The will of impulse asserts the temporal claims of individuality, but excludes the eternal claims; that is a violation of the law, a transgression of the laws of life. The will of reason asserts the claims of eternity, but in a selfish way, nevertheless devoid of self, that leads to the ruin of individuality, and that is a violation of law, a transgression of the laws of life. Such a self-will may make a fuss about necessity, bow and scrape before the unchangeableness of laws of nature as much as it chooses, yet it violates an unchangeable law, the holy law of freedom and personality, the fundamental law of eternal life. But to pass through death into eternity, as an acknowledged criminal against the fundamental law of eternal life, is, one would think, a critical matter.

On the stage of will of the Spirit the relation between the temporal and the eternal stands as the proportion between discord and harmony. Only in so far as the temporal is in every respect turned into a means for the eternal, is the will of the Spirit able to use the temporal, and in spite of resistance, hindrances and adversities, reconcile itself to it. We can there strive and suffer during the temporal, but if we strive and suffer for the sake of the eternal, we understand, that striving and suffering afford conditions for

the development of the power of will and increase its power; by such an understanding the certainty of eternal life will grow: the eternal will continually draw nearer, and in this we have the reconciliation. But although the life in this reconciliation is *eternal*, it is not yet *blessed*. Bliss is experienced only in happy moments; the discord is not removed. The opposition between blessed and not blessed remains. Such is the law of the life of the will within the boundary of temporal existence.

It will be quite otherwise when temporal existence has changed into eternity, when *here* has been exchanged for *hereafter*. In eternity itself are the two existences, the temporal and the eternal, enemies in mortal combat, irreconcilable enemies. In the kingdom of eternity no temporal existence can be tolerated, for nothing corruptible can be endured there: this follows as a matter of course, it is implied in the law of eternity. All external temporal existence, all marks of corruptibility death can remove; but the corruptible that is in the inmost, where self, with its self-will is in the corruptibleness, where in spite of all its arrogance it is yet in its self-delusion only finite, purely temporal, only corruptible,—this work death is not able to do away with; because death has not power to wipe out the personal in the nature of man.

Then after all this seems to be the inviolable law of eternal life "*either—or*". Either man has his inmost personal life in the will of the Spirit, and then the spring of eternity will come and unfold the life to blossom, that is the blessed state; or man has his life in his self-will, has, in the universality of self-will, willed himself and loses himself. Then this self comes with its self-delusion as the enemy of eternity into eternity. It wishes to be dissolved, and yet it cannot be dissolved, because the eternal in self maintains its right. It has not willed an eternal life, so it has to suffer all the pains of self-contradiction;

it has not willed the will of the All-living, therefore it meets with the power, the omnipotence of the judging will, that is the unblessed state. The contrast of temporal existence of blessed and unblessed can therefore in a future state change itself into a contrast of eternity between blessed and unblessed; that is a judgment according to law.

“But”, the leading men of enlightened intellect would say, “this want of blessedness is opposed to the human. Does the will of the Spirit believe, that it can terrify us by this unblessedness, or in clearer language, by the possibility of eternal damnation, then we have here at last a palpable evidence of what is altogether aimed at. An eternal damnation! That is a fresh ebullition of the old contradiction, a contradiction of thought, which was dissolved long ago by science,—the unblessed, the barbarous, the inhuman! Our answer is a short one. As the life, so are the laws, and the laws are, undoubtedly, unchangeable.” If the fundamental law of liberty, personality, is barbarous, then undoubtedly, the eternal life too is barbarous; but then all talk about inner self-existence, personal ends, struggle for liberty, and all else is meaningless, barbarous talk too.

Let us keep to what we know, the law of eternal life within temporal existence, and in concluding these lectures, take into consideration the relation between the *religious* and the *human*.

We cannot as regards this relation, keep close to the external and call history to witness how often religion has willed one way and humanity another. The question is: what does religion claim, and what does humanity claim? Is it possible, or is it not, to unite the religious and the human claims? Nothing can be more spirit-weakening than that idea which is concerned in misty piety, namely, that the life in God and the life in the world must be irreconcilable, that an energetic, able, and active life in this material world must be sin. When now those, who call

themselves "the children of God" are nevertheless obliged to "work and look out for profit" as well as the "children of the world"; they console themselves with "the hard necessity" and "the mercy of God", and indulge in a pietistic weak balderdash about "the forgiveness of sin," which does not further the human, and has nothing to do with the religious. For what is that, which religion originally calls sin? Surely it is that state, wherein man is outside the Spirit, that state, wherein the individual is fallen under the will of impulse and under that of God-forsaken self-will. Man, says religion, is born in sin: because he is born under the will of impulse. From the state of sin arises those so-called actual sins; these permeate the feeling, phantasy and conception and receive the stamp of individual responsibility on being admitted and accomplished by self-will.

On examining these actual sins more closely, we see clearly, that they demolish the life in the world as fully as the life in God, that they are ruinous in like manner to the human and to the religious. It is a peculiar sort of pious *naïvete* when a soul-stirring minister, who, disposed to fight hard against the wickedness of the world, gives himself up to speak against murder, theft, luxury, avarice, wickedness, fraud, dissoluteness etc., as clear evidences of rebellion against God, transgressions of His strict command. The alarmed consciences receive the impression, that if the Almighty had not so very distinctly forbidden all such things in His holy law and threatened the transgressor with hell, such gross outbursts of human self-will would not in a proper sense require to be looked upon as sins. It is forgotten, that the commandment of omnipotence is a command of love, that vice has been forbidden, because it is vice in itself, and is vice simply because it saps the human. A God, whose will claims something else from man than that, which every man, that comprehends in faith his eternal destination,

claims from himself, is an idol; in other words, a religion, that is at variance with true humanity, is as false as a humanity, that is at variance with true religion.

This conception is closely connected with the right understanding of what forgiveness of sin is. It is a childish idea, that the Father in heaven, who has become angry, because of the transgression of His strict commands, can, because the Mediator (Jesus) has come between, be soothed and reconciled, if the sinner humbles himself and asks submissively for forgiveness. The childlike in such a comprehension we ought to honor and respect, for it is an everlasting truth, that the relation between God and man must on the part of man remain for ever a filial relation. But the filial is essentially different from the childish. And childish the relation will remain as well with the "sweet" Christians as with the "sour", as long as the eternal fundamental law of forgiveness of sin is not acknowledged.

The joyous Christians, who are so cheerful looking, because they are able amidst the "balderdash of the world" to do almost all they like and be always assured of "forgiveness of sin," because of its being written in the third article of the creed, are not childlike but childish. Instead of measuring sin by the human as well as by the religious standard of self-contradiction and apprehending the seriousness of repentance and the reality of forgiveness of sin by the renewed elastic power of the re-awakened will of Spirit, such put the law in the background, and wax and grow in the imagination, that an old hymn is just as good as a new will.

The sour Christians, who stick to the laws of force, are greatly distressed, not merely on account of their own, but especially on account of the sins of others: no wonder, that they are so pale when the great register of sins, including adultery and murder and luxury and voluptuousness and fraud and theft etc. is

unrolled. It escapes their notice that the judge of souls stands with one foot in heaven, and the other in the police office, that the great sins they have done at last are alike inhuman and irreligious, that the police constantly tries to obtain a clue to the worst, although the police is by no means a religious, but plainly a human institution: this grand zeal against sins is, if looked at in relation to spirit, less earnest than childish.

The more the religious conviction is enlightened the more plainly will it be seen, that the life in this world must be an essential condition for the life in God, as surely as the religious life in the highest and most satisfying ends is a life of will. *One thing is needful*; but for the sake of this one the total of feelings, conceptions, interests and actions of a world is needed. Sin can only appear in two shapes. Either the self is in want of this one thing needful, love of the Spirit with faith and hope is left out, and self-will throws itself greedily upon the multifarious: that is sin in the shape of worldliness; or the self consumes all its power of will in getting rid of the sum total of the world and burns away into God, whether it be through the way of finiteness by arbitrary good actions of abandonment, or through the way of infinity by mythically hurling itself down into the light ocean of inexpressible universal love: that is sin in the shape of miscomprehended godliness. Life in God means, that man has absolutely yielded up his self-will and acknowledged His absolute dependence on the will of God. Life in this world means, that the absolute dependence lays a foundation for real freedom, that the will of the Spirit gives a man self-dependence. The Spirit just proves its power of personality therein, that man with a powerful will and a firm hand undertakes the real works of life.

The naïve separation of the middle ages between *godly* and *worldly* actions can stand neither before the judgment of religion

nor that of humanity; all moral deeds are both religious and human, as surely as they proceed from the will of Spirit.

No act in the world, that stands in any relation to the personal life is too insignificant to the Spirit; and no external finite act, even if it should outbid the greatest in a heaven-storming asceticism of a Loyola, is great enough to show the Spirit as Spirit.

In all acts, be they "godly" or "ungodly", there is sin, if the will of the Spirit is wanting; but in all acts, be they "godly" or "ungodly", the sinful element is done away with, in so far as the will of the Spirit is exercised.

There are not three sorts of acts, some of which we have to do for the sake of God, others which we ought to do for the sake of our neighbours, and lastly those we have to do for our own sake. "Love God above all, and your neighbour as yourself." These two great commandments of the law are one commandment. It is impossible to love oneself truly without loving God, and it is likewise impossible to love God without loving one's neighbours. The religious element is that love to God stands first; the human is that love to oneself stands inseparable from love to one's neighbour.

The old fruitless question of how we can be assured of what the will of God is as regards single acts of life in ever-varying circumstances must from this point of view disappear. The temporal world places before men an interminable number of very different problems. The solution of not one of these problems is left to the selfish pleasure of man. Religion claims, that all of them, whether immediate or mediate, shall be referred—in faith—to the will of God. But not one of them all will in its immediate details be decided by a command dictated by God; they should all be comprehended in the liberty of Spirit. Justice is rendered to the human element, as the human will, as the will of

Spirit, is called upon to act in every instance from the inner personality.

From what has been said, the primitive connection between the religious and human elements, can be fixed precisely by the connection between the will of impulse, the will of reason and the will of the Spirit. The will of reason indicates, as we have seen, a step of transition, that cannot be completed; it hangs constantly between religion and irreligion, between human and in-human. The will of impulse having developed into the reasonable, yields strongly to the human. Although it may be influenced by the Spirit, it does not yield itself up, but bargains with the religious, and endeavours in all possible ways to derive benefit from religion in order to preserve and further humanity. To this belongs the often underhand use which political societies are prone to make of it in regard to religious institutions. The will of the Spirit, on the other hand, stands in a double relation to the human, at once hostile and reconciling. It is at variance with the human impulse, because it is at variance with the natural will of impulse. It is decidedly on the side of religion; it directs its attacks against the Spirit-denying humanity, it breaks down its altars and burns its idols. Then it seems as if it were barbarous. But these attacks upon a false humanity are *in principia* in behalf of the truly human; it is only by subjecting itself unconditionally to the religious that the human becomes regenerated to a higher life. The will of the Spirit lays hold of the worldly, plants its banner of liberty and goes forward to fight for the rights of humanity.

The double connection between the will of the Spirit and humanity can be proved to hold in all circles of society, in the family, in the civic, in the aims of the community, as these are worked by means of ideas.

The matrimonial state is the moral foundation of the life of

the family. Whence is its origin? What validity has it? Can it be dissolved, or can it not be dissolved? Those who are living with the adorned humanity of impulse must of course declare the matrimonial state a natural product of the will of impulse. In this case the human means that the matrimonial rests on mutual love; the natural heart's entire devotion of the heart is the happiness of married life. If it now happens that love dies out, and that may very easily be the case, as it is mere love of impulse, then the matrimonial state must be dissolved that it may not end in unhappiness. If now the individuals have not the right to dissolve it themselves without referring to any person, then of course it is a brutal inhumanity proceeding from a slavish state of life, that dare presume to set bounds to free love in "the free flesh". That the will of the Spirit is unable to reconcile itself to such a humanity, is quite evident. Society may be satisfied with possessing an impulse-humanity glossed over by a few spots of moral beauty without agreeing to the unconditional claim of religion, but even this is not satisfactory to the will of the Spirit. From this last standpoint we may draw the inference, that the matrimonial state is undoubtedly according to Divine laws something that cannot be dissolved, but yet by getting special license, be it from Pope or Parliament, it may be dissolved with reference to the human. Against such a half-religious, bungled humanity, have earnest preachers of repentance at different times raised their authoritative voice: the Divine commandment must be heard, acknowledged, and obeyed, even if the humanity of the universe be utterly ruined by it! Then again it seems as if religion were cruel, and despised humanity. But this is a terrible misunderstanding.

Religion must rule absolutely unconditioned, but not by external commandments. The external commandment, whether it rests upon the statements of Scripture or upon the Acts of

Parliament or upon both, must according to its nature always keep within limited conditions, and can on account of its externality never claim to be regarded as absolute. The absolute consists in this, that the Divine commandment is in the name of the Spirit, a command of love, is a command of personality, self-independence and freedom. The religious understanding is that the command will not force itself upon the individual with all its restrictions, but it will convince him of the claims of the Spirit of will and enforce them through his own conscience. If a religious person after an earnest self-examination before God, arrives at the humble certainty, that the matrimonial state on which he has entered, has from some cause or another become a void appearance, a yoke of thralldom, a snare, then such a one, whether man or woman, ought to step forth as independent, break his yoke and go his own way in spite of the stripe of tongues and the well known pharisaism of a righteous neighbourhood: Such courage faith will give. That is the humanity of religion, and a more true humanity is not to be found.

The moral foundation of civil society is right to property; where the right of property is not regarded, there can hardly exist any order of society. The active citizen gains influence in proportion to the increase of his estate. The civic juridical personality appears in the form of property: the more property, the more personality. This is natural humanity. The will of impulse has its most important account in reference to the relation of mine and thine. Thus a human society is formed with human ends in view. If now religion is called to assist in order to consecrate and bless all this humanity, personal possession will of course get a very high opinion of itself. The possession becomes capital, and the power of capital is irresistible. The capital bends under the blessing; it grows and multiplies itself, it subdues the earth and takes dominion over the fish of the sea and over His Majesty

upon the throne, over the labourer in the mines and over every poor animal creeping on the earth. To secure for itself all the fruits of blessing, the humanity of impulse becomes religious; the rich man goes to Church on Sundays, gives money to public charities etc. On the step of will of impulse this is altogether honorable, fair and human. But what says religion? Away with it altogether! Sell all that thou hast and give it to the poor; "it is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God!"—How scandalous! Did you hear that, the intelligent will say, how fanatical one-sided religion is, how little knowledge it has of the truly human!

To take away the scandal and compose the minds of his congregation, an oily-mouthed preacher comes forth and gives an explanation which is at the same time scientific and human, that it is not the meaning of religion, that we should literally give away all our property: the meaning is merely to rouse our conscience and make the blood run cold in the veins of the stingy. The proper meaning is, that we ought to remember the poor, give away something of our property, a good share, especially for religious purposes, but not all; most of it we ought to keep for ourselves, that we may learn to use it for the benefit and happiness of ourselves and our heirs. But what says religion? Away with it altogether! "Sell what you have, and give it to the poor." That is the way to perfection, the forsaking of self for the kingdom of heaven. So was the command understood in former days, when the hermits of the desert and the austere monks of the middle ages had not yet learned to bungle at the religious-human.

Yet, some persons object saying: "The great progress made in our days, consists exactly in this, that endeavour is made to reconcile religion with humanity." Certainly! But the reconci-

liation is not, one should think, to be founded on a cunning fraud. The mistake of those old hermits was not at all their treating the religious claim too unconditionally. On the basis of a literal understanding stands a holy Antonius, a Benedict of Nursia, a Francisco of Assisi, without any comparison higher than all the mediating ethic teachers of modern Christendom.

The misunderstanding of the hermits was not at all that they kept the command to forsake the world too strictly, but on the contrary, that they did not keep it strictly enough. They comprehended this command as an external one, a commandment of force arbitrarily dictated in order to bring men up to perfection. Doubtless, this commandment was to these people a commandment addressed also to the heart, a commandment of love to freedom and happiness; but the commandment of love was not comprehended in the spirit of love, because it was not comprehended in the spirit of personal liberty. Thus the state of bondage got the upper-hand and two sorts of morality appeared within the sphere of religion, a higher for the perfect men, and a lower for the imperfect. It was this error that made the religion of the middle ages inhuman.

First when the command to forsake the world is brought home to the heart in faith as an inner commandment, a commandment of liberty, love and personality in all its strictness, the strictness is again turned into gentleness, and the human is regenerated in the religious. It seems so very strict that man in an external sense should give away all his possessions; the will of impulse does not see any back-door, through which it might elude such an obtrusive claim. If the external on the contrary is changed into an inner commandment, if the commandment turns and says: "Keep what you have in the outward but forsake it in the inner, be with all your property like one who has not got a farthing," then religion is thought to be very wild. The will of impulse sees the back-door,

laughs in its sleeve, and has its own thoughts. And yet, it is so, that the holy commandment of love, comprehended in spirit and truth as a commandment of liberty for personal development, is in all its mildness far more strict than any ascetic commandment of force. It is the power of the will of Spirit that has to be tried in humanity.

If the religious principle of true humanity is not acknowledged, the dispute about mine and thine will develop into a barbarous dispute, and in a barbarous dispute victory will at last be on the side of the elementary powers. If on the contrary the principle of humanity is fully apprehended, not only by those who have property but also by those who have none, the struggle of the world will go on in its usual course, but humanity resting on the power of the will of the Spirit, will conquer.

If we look at the different labours, which are carried on for the benefit of ideas and which depend upon special gifts, we meet with the opposition between *idea* and *spirit*. How great this opposition is, may be learnt from the history of the Greeks and the Jews. The Greeks had an abundant treasure of fruitful ideas, but, what we should properly term spirit, they had none. The Jews stood on the step of the spirit under the legislative will of Jehovah, but they were strikingly deficient in productive ideas. The Jews represent the religious element, the Greeks the human. Therefore one finds it quite natural, that Christendom during its great inaugural struggle in the world began to condemn without mercy all the genial works of the heathen; it was in the eyes of the educated a clear evidence of fanatic inhumanity. And again one will find it quite natural, that the humanity, which a religion-denying people of the present time want to found upon the modern dogma about the absolute oneness of the life of impulse and the life of reason, turns itself away with disgust from the obstinate stupidity of "the Semitic races", and seeks for

its types under the Greek sky. And lastly one will find it natural, that those, who dare not open their eyes to the hostile in the connection between a revealed religion and a heathen humanity, because they dare not acknowledge to themselves that two absolutely heterogeneous principles must fight a mortal combat until one of the two gets the upper-hand, botch up a reconciliation of things contradictory according to their own idea.

On the step of negotiation of half-religiousness, which is both half-human and void of principle, we again meet with the separation of the middle ages between Divine and secular; but it has a modern fashion in it. "All the ideas of humanity are of course entitled; talent and genius are good gifts, and all good gifts are to be made use of." But now we meet with the difficulty that most of the ideas are purely heathen by nature, and it will not do in our days to baptize ideas as they baptized bells in the middle ages. One must therefore make a clear distinction on one side between those, that cannot be referred to religion—as for instance, those of physics and of the drama—and on the other side those which, being partly immediate and partly mediate, might be made use of in the work of religion. The former kind one must leave to themselves in the secular character and only take care that they be kept within certain boundaries. The latter, which are mediators between the religious and the human, must be valued according to the way more or less Divine in which they may be employed. As regards the use of talents and genius, therefore, according to this way of viewing things, it would be more godly to build churches than to build police-stations, more godly to play on the organ than to play on the violin, more godly to paint saints than to paint cows. When any one nevertheless is unwilling openly to acknowledge such a doctrine, the reason seems to be that he does not like to acknowledge the confusion, that has caused the doctrine; because it is exactly the

mixture of what concerns the idea with what rests on the will, that deranges the comprehension of the religious as well as the human.

The substance of the idea, viewed from one side or another is always a substance of the world; the godly idea is no exception to this rule. No idea is in itself either godly or ungodly; this implies, that all ideas may without exception be referred to the will of the Spirit, in so far as the will of the Spirit by no means will subdue the ideas, but, on the contrary, nourish, purify and inspire the will of impulse, that brings them into the world. Every idea has in itself an end to aim at, and every idea is a means to the Spirit. To deny the development of an idea its natural right is inhuman; but to ascribe an absolute end to any idea and deify it, be it an idea of science or one of arts, or an idea of a system of government or an ecclesiastical, is irreligious.

Where the will of the Spirit is wanting, the ideas become selfish; that excitement and discord that is aroused between them, incites the passions and gives them a loose rein. A billowy sea of efforts called forth by selfish ideas may be excited; the storm may increase to such a degree, that a richly gifted people are lost in the struggle. We have in Greek history a tragic example of this.

Natural humanity cannot support itself, it must be sustained by the Spirit. The many conflicts of ideas are problems for the will; they form themselves for the sake of the will, they call to it for exertion, they claim its decision. In a continual struggle against selfish hindrances we have the conditions for a personal development of the power of the will of the Spirit.

From these fundamental laws of existence it may be seen through faith, that there must be a cordial connection between the present and the future, between here and hereafter. This connection cannot be proved by an external viewing of "the resurrection of the dead". The great trouble, which Christian

dogmatics, especially the earlier, has taken in regard to, of course, "scientific" depicting of a coming glory, how the dead are after all to rise, at what age, in what state, with one or two legs, with or without a wig, is quite useless. The whole question points back to cordiality, personality, the will of the Spirit, liberty.

The many exist for the sake of one, the temporal exists for the sake of the eternal: eternal life is an inner life, that feeds itself on memory. All that is experienced in the external, leaves a trace on the inner, that is to say: *it is brought home, it is called to mind*. The more powerful the will is under experience, the deeper will be the trace of the recollection. That these traces could at any time be obliterated, is an imagination, a sensuous self-delusion, which arises from the organs becoming dull. In the life of the soul, in the original personality they will never be obliterated: The laws of life point all to one and the same fundamental law, the law of recollection. Much is said and much is heard, much is remembered and much is forgotten in this temporal state, but the Spirit listens and lays by store; He forgets nothing, in eternity nothing is forgotten. The remembrance may be weakened, the intellect may become dim and the light of consciousness be extinguished; but deeper than all this, and at the foundation of all this lies the nature of self safe and hidden in the recollection of the Spirit. From the night of recollection everything proceeds again and dawns anew: Consciousness, reason, and remembrance awake together with all that has been experienced, and first and last with all that, which has been willed in earnestness. What in this temporal state has been experienced and enjoyed, what has been worked, suffered and fought, what the will has accomplished and what it has heartily aimed at, but not attained, of all this nothing will be lost; in spite of sensuous forgetfulness nothing will be forgotten,

it will all be kept together, buried and laid by in the bosom of recollection for a renewed recognition.

Our subject is not exhausted; it is in itself inexhaustible. Far from the conceit of exhausting the inexhaustible, I have in these lectures confined myself to throw light over some parts of the great picture of the life of will in order simply to make a contribution to it, along with the wish that every person who examines his own experience may in earnestness investigate the nature of the will of the Spirit, and make clear to himself the conditions of a powerful will.

